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Chapter 1.
Electoral Politics and Poverty Relief
1.1 Introduction
Late one evening in the early 1990s, the former Prime Minister Benedetto Craxi was
met by a large crowd outside the exclusive Roman hotel where he lived. Huddled
beneath his overcoat, and pelted with coins, Craxi heard the protesters’ angry cries:
“Bettino, vuoi pure queste?” “Bettino, you want these too?” The immediate source
of the crowd’s anger was Craxi’s claim, when accused with accepting over $30 million
in bribes, that bribes were simply a part of politics (Waters 1994).
That Craxi, the long-time leader of the Italian Socialist Party, came to sym-
bolize the excesses of the tangentopoli (‘bribeville’) scandals is indicative of equally
unprincipled social policy: “Welfare capitalism Italian-style” concentrated benefits
within the powerful (unionized) industrial sectors, and other “protected” categories
(e.g. old age and survivors contributory pensions), and left many vulnerable groups
without support. There were few family benefits or services, nor was there any sup-
port for the young and unemployed, the self-employed, or for those who had been
unemployed for long periods of time (Ferrera 2004). The absence of a national policy
to provide for income support was especially troubling to observers, and in its ab-
sence, civil invalidity pensions became both an important source of poverty relief, and
the “hard currency” of clientelistic relationships (see Sacchi & Bastagli 2005, Baldini,
Bosi & Toso 1999).
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By the end of the decade, however, Italian social policy was headed in an
entirely different direction. Beginning in the mid 1990s, new, more comprehensive
antipoverty policies featured prominently on the legislative agenda, including provi-
sions for universal income support, transfers to large families, maternity allowances,
and income support for otherwise ‘unprotected’ groups (e.g. elderly citizens who
were not eligible to receive standard pensions). A government-appointed commis-
sion on social expenditure recommended further, even more comprehensive changes
in antipoverty policy, and in particular called attention to the “underprotected” and
“weaker social categories;” many of the Onofri Commission’s recommendations were
implemented in a 2001 Social Plan. What accounts for this dramatic shift in Ital-
ian poverty relief– from highly targeted social policy, to a comprehensive antipoverty
program?
This research also takes on more general questions about the political repre-
sentation of low-income citizens: How do electoral rules affect the poor? Under what
conditions are legislators likely to be more or less responsive to the poor? What are
the distributional consequences of partisan and electoral incentives to be more or less
responsive to the poor?
Current explanations of cross-national differences in social policy neglect im-
portant features of poverty relief: Antipoverty measures are highly targeted policies
that are readily perceived by the beneficiaries and attributable to incumbent legis-
lators. Because of these features, following Franzese (2002), antipoverty policies are
especially well-suited for manipulation by election-motivated politicians. Legislators
may craft antipoverty policy meet their electoral goals, providing generous and com-
prehensive benefits only when the electoral support of low-income citizens is necessary
to maintain their office.
This discussion presents evidence that distributions to low-income citizens do
reflect legislators’ electoral incentives to be responsive to the poor, and that these
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electoral incentives are determined by the election rules and by the distribution of
low-income citizens across electoral districts. Specifically, the magnitude of each
electoral district – the number of seats allocated – interacts with the concentration
of low-income voters within the district to enhance or diminish the electoral power of
low-income voters. This election-motivated account of antipoverty policy breaks with
conventional economic explanations, power resources, and cultural accounts of social
policy in important ways that are elaborated in this Chapter. More importantly, this
election-motivated account of antipoverty policy makes an important departure from
other political economic explanations of social policy that rest on sharp distinctions
between proportional representation (PR) and single-member district (SMD) systems,
and link PR electoral rules to more generous progressive redistributive policy: When
poverty is highly concentrated, electoral incentives to be responsive to low-income
citizens may be stronger under SMD than under PR rules. In fact, the change in
Italian social policy, I argue, results from an important reform that replaced most
of Italy’s multi-member districts (MMD), in which legislators were elected according
to a PR seat allocation rule, with SMDs. Following this electoral reform, legislators
in the impoverished Italian South were much more reliant on the electoral support
of low-income voters, and as a consequence, had much stronger incentives to craft
responsive antipoverty policy.
There is much to be learned by examining the quality of contemporary demo-
cratic government from the perspective of those who may be least well-represented.
By focusing on antipoverty policy and the generosity of cash transfers to low-income
citizens as the key dependent variable– that is, costly policy measures – the empirical
foundation of this project offers a hard test of how, given the geographic distribution
of income, electoral rules affect the poor. That, in the end, cross-national differences
in levels of poverty relief reflects variation in legislators’ electoral incentives to be
responsive to low-income citizens is cause for concern: The electoral institutions of
3
contemporary democratic societies may undermine opportunities for these societies
to meet their goal of democratic equality.
1.2 Democracy and Poverty Relief
At its core, this research is an empirical analysis of how electoral rules affect the
political representation of the poor. Nevertheless, Rawls’s (1971) concept of demo-
cratic equality provides important structure and motivation for this research agenda.
If democratic equality is the goal of the contemporary democratic enterprise – that
is, to establish societies that protect basic liberties and are characterized by fair
equality of opportunity and the difference principle, which privileges the least ad-
vantaged members of society in normative evaluations of policy – then comparative
politics ought to evaluate the quality of democratic representation with this goal in
mind. Specifically, this analysis focuses on the quality of political representation from
the perspective of those least well-represented and holds redistributive policy to the
standard implied by Rawls’s (1971) difference principle: Do redistributive measures
concentrate benefits among the least advantaged citizens?
Two questions immediately arise, however, and warrant some attention: First,
is there evidence that the interests of low-income citizens are unlikely to be well-
represented in contemporary democratic societies? Second, what purpose do an-
tipoverty measures serve? Building on current research in political science, this sec-
tion briefly responds to these important research questions.
Social and Political Exclusion
In this research, poverty is seen as a condition of “social exclusion” that limits “the
capacity of the individual to participate fully in the society in which she or he lives”
(Council of the European Union 2007, 10). The relationship between social exclu-
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sion and political exclusion is well-established: Following Macedo, Alex-Assensoh,
Berry, Brintnall, Campbell, Fraga, Fung, Galston, Karpowitz, Levi, Levinson, Lipsitz,
Niemi, Putnam, Rahn, Rodgers, Swanstrom & Walsh (2005, 37), “[o]ne of the endur-
ing findings of political science research over the past fifty years is that poor people
participate less than the wealthy across the entire spectrum of political activities.”
In the contemporary U.S. across-income-group differences in political participation
mean that “[c]itizens with lower or moderate incomes speak with a whisper that is
lost on the ears of inattentive government officials, while the advantaged roar with
a clarity and consistency that policy-makers readily hear and routinely follow”(Task
Force on Inequality and American Democracy 2004). Whether differences in policy
responsiveness result from legislator inattentiveness or from strategic responsiveness,
Bartels (2008) and Gilens (2005) demonstrate that the inequitable representation
of citizen preferences is unambiguous: Across a wide variety of policy dimensions,
American policy rarely reflects the preferences of low-income citizens.
Though Bartels’s (2008) and Gilens’s (2005) results have not yet been repli-
cated in other developed democracies and the strength of the relationship between
social and political exclusion varies cross-nationally, evidence from broadly compara-
tive individual-level analysis generally replicate the American findings (e.g. Nevitte,
Blais, Gidengil & Nadeau Forthcoming, Anderson & Beramendi 2005, Blais 2000).1
As a consequence of these lower rates of participation, and even without the strategic
responsiveness of legislators, the preferences of low-income citizens are unlikely to be
well-represented in the policy-making processes of contemporary democratic societies.
My focus on low- and very low-income citizens marks an important departure
from other comparative analysis of social policy. Huber & Stephens (2001, 18), for
1Often, however, it is not low-income but factors associated with low-levels of income (e.g. being
unemployed, or having few years of formal education) that demonstrate the most robust relationships
with measures of political participation (e.g. Blais 2000). The varying relationship between social and
political exclusion will be studied extensively in future research, with the support of a EuroCORES
HumVIB grant from the European Science Foundation.
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example, explicitly exclude “people without connection to the process of production.”
Since the late 1970s, the group of long-term unemployed, mostly people
with low skills, has grown and has come to constitute what is referred to
as an underclass. This group has become an important target of welfare
state policy, particularly different versions of workfare. However, precisely
because it lacks skills and connection to the process of production, it also
lacks organization and power and thus is acted upon rather than being an
actor in shaping the welfare state.
In fact, the electoral power of a low-income voting bloc may have little to do with
organization or connections to the process of production: Under some conditions, the
political equality secured through electoral participation is sufficient for the poor and
very poor to exert important influence over – that is, to be actors in the formation of
– social policy.
Antipoverty Policies and Political Equality
Redistributive measures are desirable from social welfare and economic perspectives
(see Lambert 2001). However, following Olson (2006), this research relies on a polit-
ical justification for social policy: In societies characterized by economic inequality,
the opportunity for the political equality lies in a guarantee of the means for equal
participation. Specifically, antipoverty measures provide the means to overcome so-
cial and political exclusion and, therefore, alter the incentive structures that favor
the representation of high- and middle-income citizens. In Olson’s (2006) reflexive
framework, therefore, comprehensive antipoverty measures ensure the political equal-
ity that ultimately sustains the welfare state, and thus perpetuates political equality.
As will become clear shortly, however, this discussion makes an important
departure from Olson’s (2006) emphasis on political participation: Here, political
equality is only partly secured through full participation. Given the distribution of
voter groups, a country’s electoral rules may limit legislators’ incentives to be respon-
sive to low-income citizens. It is when electoral rules ensure the fair representation
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of low-income citizens, and low-income citizens are supported in their efforts to be
fully participatory that antipoverty measures will be most generous and will be sus-
tained through full political equality. Alternatively, when electoral rules diminish the
electoral power of low-income citizens and few in the legislature owe seats to their
support, and voting is especially costly, antipoverty policies will be limited in their
effectiveness in overcoming social and political exclusion.
1.3 Three Puzzles in Poverty Responsiveness
This research departs, as well, from current thinking about the causes of cross-national
differences in social policy. To illustrate, this section presents evidence that poverty
responsiveness is not well-accounted for by three prominent explanations of cross-
national differences in social policy. Each of the subsections that follow use a mea-
sure of poverty responsiveness, the poverty relief ratio R, as the dependent variable.
Chapter 3 fully develops and justifies this measure. Here, the poverty relief ratio R
should be interpreted as the ratio of the extent of redistribution that occurs within a
country to the full extent of redistribution needed to bring the income of all (working-
age2) households below the poverty line to the level of the poverty line itself. That
is, R reports how successful antipoverty cash transfers are in alleviating poverty: As
a ratio, R takes values between 0 and 1, and higher values indicate greater levels of
antipoverty policy success.
2For reasons addressed in Chapter 3, the analysis presented in this research includes only working-
age households (i.e. households in which the head of the household is 25-59 years old). All measures
of poverty relief, levels of benefits, Gini coefficients reflect the distribution of income and transfers
among working-age households only and, as a consequence, the values of these measures will be
slightly different from those reported elsewhere.
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Puzzle 1: Income Inequality and Poverty Responsiveness
Current explanations of social policy often draw attention to the structure of the
labor market, and especially to levels of market income inequality. In their now-
classic treatments of the linear tax model, Romer (1975) and Meltzer & Richard
(1981) link redistributive policy to electoral competition by recognizing the right-
skew that characterizes national market-income distributions: The median voter,
who is pivotal in first-past-the-post (FPTP) elections, will have an income less than
national income mean. If proportional taxes are assessed and benefits are distributed
in equal lump-sum amounts, as the Romer–Meltzer & Richard models assume, the
median voter will prefer a positive tax rate and stands to gain in proportion to the
difference between her income and the national mean income level. These analysis
imply, then, that in countries that are characterized by high levels of market-income
inequality, the median voter should prefer and governments should implement highly
progressive redistributive policies: Inequality in national market-income distributions
should be positively associated with more extensive redistributive policies. Under the
assumptions of the linear tax model, redistributive benefits for those with low and
very-low levels of market income should also increase with overall levels of inequality.3
How well does this expectation hold?
Figure 1.1 reports the bi-variate relationship between pre-tax and transfer in-
come inequality and redistributive policy, using different measures of income inequal-
ity and redistribution, and data from 19 developed democracies. In the left panel,
3More recent revisions of the Romer and Meltzer & Richard models incorporate risk of unem-
ployment, and endogenous targeting of benefits towards the employed and unemployed (see Moene
& Wallerstein 2003, Moene & Wallerstein 2003). Nevertheless, as Franzese (2005) shows that the
Romer–Meltzer & Richard models are special cases of the Moene & Wallerstein model, the relation-
ship between income inequality and redistribution generally remains positive: With the level and
extent of targeting of benefits towards the employed and unemployed democratically determined,
the monotonic increasing relationship between income inequality and redistribution is violated un-
ambiguously only when benefits are targeted exclusively towards the poor, and when wage earnings
inequality is sufficiently small. Otherwise, a decline in workers’ wages relative to the mean income
increases demand for redistribution.
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Market Income Gini Coefficient
NOTE. Figure 1.1 reports the bi-variate relationship between market income inequality
(measured here using a Gini coefficient; see Milanovic 1997) and poverty responsiveness.
The poverty relief ratio, R, measures targeted benefits to low-income households, and
is developed in Chapter 3. Country labels are reported in Table 3.2. Solid lines report
ordinary least-squares (OLS) fitted values (standard errors reported in parentheses):
R = −0.269(0.369) + 0.876(0.419){ Median Income / Mean Income } (1.1)
and
R = 0.809(0.191)− 0.801(0.490){ Market Income Gini Coefficient }. (1.2)
SOURCE. LIS.
following the Romer–Meltzer & Richard models, income inequality is measured using
the ratio of median to mean market income for each country. As higher values of
this measure correspond to greater levels of equality, the Romer–Meltzer & Richard
analysis implies that a negative relationship should be observed in this panel, with
less redistribution occurring in the more equitable countries.
The panel on the right uses a more conventional measure of inequality: Gini
coefficients (Milanovic 1997) report deviations in the cumulative distribution of in-
come from the cumulative population distribution. Larger deviations, and thus large
coefficients, indicate a more inequitable distribution. As a consequence, the Romer–
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Meltzer & Richard analysis would lead us to expect a positive relationship in this
panel, with more inequitable market income distributions leading to more progressive
redistributive policy.
The relationships observed in Figure 1.1, of course, do not reflect the empirical
implications of the Romer–Meltzer & Richard models: Surprisingly, levels of market
income inequality are not positively related to antipoverty transfers. In fact, little
empirical evidence connects levels of market income inequality to redistributive pol-
icy. Milanovic (2000), for example, uses Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data to
demonstrate that the median household generally loses – rather than benefits – from
redistribution. Alesina & Glaeser (2004, 59) suggest why analysts may not observe
the expected positive relationship between income inequality and redistributive mea-
sures: First, market-income measures of income inequality like the Gini coefficient do
not reflect redistributive measures that are implemented prior to observing the mar-
ket income distribution, including education, minimum wage, and other active labor
market policies. Second, relatedly, particularly in cross-sectional analysis, transfer-
based measures of redistribution may only partially report cross-national differences
in social policy. Near- and non-cash benefits, for example, are explicitly excluded
from transfer-based measures of redistribution.
Notice that Alesina & Glaeser’s (2004) emphasis, so far, is on measurement:
If market income inequality and redistributive policy could be measured with more
validity and reliability, then perhaps the relationship between market income in-
equality and redistributive policy would conform to the empirical implications of the
Romer–Meltzer & Richard. In fact, Alesina & Glaeser (2004, 59) are skeptical of
a fundamental premise of the linear tax model: “[i]n countries with greater income
inequality, the poor may not have enough political influence and hence may not be
able to extract much redistribution from the rich. That is, such countries may de
facto lack a one-person, one-vote rule, which underlies the models’ results, but in-
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stead have something closer to a de facto one-dollar, one-vote rule.” A one-dollar,
one-vote rule implies that the citizen with the median income is not the median –
pivotal – voter. To the extent that high-income households are over-represented in
the electorate, Alesina & Glaeser suggest, the median citizen is unlikely to be pivotal
in national elections.
There is another way, however, in which the electoral power of the median
citizen may be undermined: Even when one-person, one-vote conditions prevail (i.e.,
there is no turnout bias), it is only when elections are contested in single nation-
wide districts, according to FPTP rules, that we might expect redistributive policy
to reflect the median citizen’s preferences. The core intuition of this research is that
the interaction between electoral rules and the geographic distribution of citizen types
importantly determine who, or which group, is likely to be pivotal in the development
of redistributive policy.
Puzzle 2: Power Resources and Poverty Responsiveness
A second important class of explanations of social policy attributes cross-national
differences to the historical balance of power among the income groups in each country
(see, e.g. Huber & Stephens 2001, Esping-Andersen 1990, Korpi 1978, Korpi 1983,
Stephens 1979). Huber & Stephens, for example, emphasize the role played by the
dominant ideology of governing parties as the source of differences between types of
social assistance programs: Different ideologies, Huber & Stephens argue, emphasize
different views on work and the proper role of governments in providing for their
citizens. As a consequence, differences in the historical balance of power among
parties competing to form the government, and the ideological positions these parties
take, and therefore, result in markedly different welfare policies.
Esping-Andersen (1990) puts similar emphasis on the historical balance of
power between political parties and other organizations with class ties. Specifically,
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Esping-Andersen identifies crucial interactions between patterns of (working-) class
mobilization, class-political action structures, and the historical legacy of regime insti-
tutionalization, that set countries on one of three paths of welfare state development.
What is important, as in Huber & Stephens’s account of cross-national differences,
are the historically predominant ideological beliefs about the nature of work and its
relationship to the market (i.e., the extent of de-commodifcation), and about social
stratification and class-based solidarity. Differences on these dimensions are reflected
in the criteria used to determine eligibility for benefits: The extent to which the poor
rely on targeted social assistance benefits, rather than broadly distributive social
insurance entitlements, provides a key dimension along which the three worlds of wel-
fare capitalism are defined. Specifically, Esping-Andersen classifies social democratic
welfare regimes as those in which social insurance benefits are considered a natural,
and universal extension of democratic citizenship, and are distributed according to
a flat rate principle: Compared to other states, in societies characterized by ‘social
democratic’ welfare regimes, there is little difference between the basic and maximum
levels of benefits distributed. (Benefits are not based on, for example, need or level of
employment). ‘Liberal’ welfare regimes, in contrast to both conservative and socialist
regimes, emphasize need in their distribution of benefits. Further, social insurance
and pensions are often provided through private funds, with residual policies to pro-
vide for those without support. Finally, Esping-Andersen classifies countries in which
social insurance programs vary across occupational groups, and public servants are
endowed with comparatively large pensions as ‘conservative.’ 4
Both of these power resource accounts – Huber & Stephens (2001) and Esping-
Andersen (1990) – have implications for redistributive spending, generally, and an-
4In their revision of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) classification, Hicks & Kenworthy (2003) suggest
that most of the cross-national variation can be captured by two dimensions, one in which the liberal
and social democratic archetypes serve as anchoring poles, and countries are largely distinguished
by their reliance on means-tested benefits, and another which distinguishes countries by the degree
of occupational and status-based differences in social insurance benefits.
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tipoverty policies in particular: If differences in social policy result from the histor-
ical balance of power among class-based organizations, then in those countries in
which parties of the left, particularly the social democratic left, have been especially
strong, tax and transfer policies should be especially effective in diminishing mar-
ket income inequality and alleviating poverty (see Bradley, Huber, Moller, Neilsen &
Stephens 2003, Huber & Stephens 2001). Specifically, we should see levels of poverty
relief increase with number of years in which a country’s cabinet is formed by a leftist
or social democratic party, and generally be higher in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) social
democratic regimes.
Figure 1.2 reports the bi-variate relationship between the historical strength of
leftist parties (measured here as the number of years in which the governing cabinet
was formed by leftist parties, beginning in 1946; see Huber et al. 2004, Huber &
Stephens 2001) and welfare regime type, and poverty responsiveness, measured using
the poverty relief ratio, R. Although a positive relationship between the historical
strength of the left and poverty responsiveness is evident in the left panel of Figure
1.2, this relationship is considerably weakened with the exclusion of the U.S.: With
no political parties of the left, and levels of poverty responsiveness considerably less
than the other countries included in the analysis, the U.S. exerts considerable leverage
in this relationship. With only 15 countries included in Figure 1.2, any conclusions
must be tentative. Nevertheless, particularly when comparisons are made across
welfare regime types (right panel), a power resources approach accounts for few of
the cross-national differences in levels of poverty responsiveness: Contemporary levels
of poverty relief do not reflect cross-national differences in the historical balance of
power among class-based organizations.5
5In fact, the relationship between the historical power of the left and poverty responsiveness will
be used as a jumping-off point for future research: When do parties of the left have an incentive to
stand for election? This question will be given more complete treatment in the conclusion of this
project.
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NOTE. This Figure reports the bi-variate relationships between poverty responsiveness,
and the historical strength of leftist parties (left panel), and welfare regime type (right
panel). Country labels are reported in Table 3.2.
The solid line in the left panel reports OLS fitted values for all cases (standard errors
are reported in parentheses):
R = 0.438(0.0420) + 0.003(0.002){ Historical Strength of Leftist Parties }. (1.3)
The dashed line in the left panel reports OLS fitted values for an analysis that excludes
the U.S.:
R = 0.487(0.039) + 0.001(0.001){ Historical Strength of Leftist Parties }. (1.4)
SOURCE. LIS. Historical strength of leftist parties: Huber, Ragin, Stephens, Brady &
Beckfield (2004). Welfare regime type: Esping-Andersen (1990).
Puzzle 3: Path Dependence and Poverty Responsiveness
Notice that both Esping-Andersen’s (1990) and Huber & Stephens’s (2001) power re-
sources accounts of cross-national differences in social policy emphasize the long-run
historical balance of power among political parties and organizations with class ties.
Esping-Andersen (1990), in particular, attributes important differences in contempo-
rary social policy to differences in working-class political formation and in the nature
of rural coalitions during the period of industrialization. The path dependence of
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NOTE. This Figure reports changing levels of poverty responsiveness in Germany and
Italy between 1984 and 2000.
SOURCE. LIS.
early power distributions is heightened by the legacies of early social policies (see,
e.g. Pierson 1996): Especially broad-based policies are quickly supported, with the
consequence that their revision is enormously unpopular. Path dependence implies,
as well, that populations are similarly skeptical of radical improvements in social pol-
icy. If, as Alesina & Glaeser (2004) suggest, the historical balance of power among
class-based organizations tends to shape attitudes and opinions about poverty, dra-
matic changes in levels of benefits and eligibility criteria are likely to be met with
resistance.
In fact, between 1984 and 2000, in Germany and Italy (both conservative
welfare regimes) levels of poverty relief increased to over three times their original
levels. Especially in Italy, as suggested in the introduction of this Chapter, legislators
implemented social policy that much more comprehensive and generous than the
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policy on which low-income Italian households relied. This dramatic change in policy
is unaccounted for by power resources or policy legacy accounts of cross-national
differences in antipoverty policy.
It turns out, however, that these changes we observe in Germany and Italy
are well-accounted for by changes in Italy’s electoral rules and in Germany’s polit-
ical geography. The next section of this discussion outlines current research on the
relationship between legislators’ electoral incentives and social policy.
1.4 Electoral Incentives and Social Policy
Current accounts of cross-national differences in social policy often treat electoral
institutions as mechanisms that aggregate and articulate the preferences of a popu-
lations. In their account of the evolution of income support in the U.S., for example,
Scholz & Levine (2001, 193) suggest that “[t]he antipoverty effects of the safety net
vary with Americans’ attitudes toward welfare and assistance to the poor, because
attitudes influence the evolution of specific programs.” Later in their discussion,
Scholz & Levine (222) conclude that “the public and consequently politicians are in-
different about the poverty problem.” Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 16) makes a similar
claim about the role of parliaments in the policy-making process: “Parliaments are,
in principle, effective institutions for the translation of mobilized power into desired
policies and reforms.” Even in Huber & Stephens’s (2001) account in which political
parties play an important, policy-determining role, “state structure” – specifically
federalism, presidential government, strong bicameralism, and provisions for referen-
dums – determines only the number of veto points, or the likelihood that a policy
expressing the will of the majority will be blocked (see also Bradley et al. 2003).
There is ample evidence, however, that “almost all important aspects of macroe-
conomic policy and performance” are determined by “the routine structures of poli-
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tics” (Tufte 1978, 137). In a wide variety of political settings, elected officials regularly
manipulate (especially fiscal) policy to create favorable economic conditions in the
months before or just after they stand for re-election, or to benefit their partisan
constituencies more generally (for a recent review of the empirical literature support-
ing partisan and electoral business cycles, see Franzese & Jusko 2006). The rela-
tionship between electoral institutions and public policy outcomes is especially well-
established: Social spending is positively related to the proportionality of the electoral
system (see Iversen & Soskice 2006, Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti & Rostagno 2002, Persson
& Tabellini 2003).
Why might PR electoral rules result in more generous and more comprehensive
social policy? Current explanations of the generally higher levels of social spending
associated with more proportional electoral rules attribute the relationship to the
important ways in which electoral rules shape party competition, or to varying in-
centives to build broad-based coalitions, instead of providing geographically-targeted
benefits.
Electoral Rules, Party Competition, and Social Policy
Iversen & Soskice (2006) and others (e.g. Persson, Roland & Tabellini 2003, Bawn
& Rosenbluth 2006, Austen-Smith 2000) rely on an important regularity in compar-
ative politics to establish the relationship between electoral rules and social policy:
“Duverger’s Law” affirms that SMD electoral rules favor two-party competition. As a
consequence, Iversen & Soskice suggest, voter preferences are imperfectly reflected in
electoral competition under “majoritarian” rules. By their assumption, under SMD
rules, party competition occurs between two parties that represent the interests of
poor and wealthy voters, compete for the support of middle class voters. Thus, pol-
icy proposals tend to be moderate, reflecting the tax and transfer preferences of the
pivotal middle class voters. However, both the low- and high-income parties have an
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incentive to deviate from their campaign proposals once elected, and to implement the
policies most preferred by their core constituencies, the low- and high-income voters.
Because tax proposals are assumed to be progressive, with the low-income voters pre-
ferring a more progressive policy than the middle class voters would implement, the
middle class voters stand to loose more by voting with the low-income voters, than
with the high-income voters. Therefore, under SMD rules, middle-income voters will
support, instead, the party that represents the interests of the high-income voters.
PR rules, however, create incentives for a larger number of parties to compete
in each election. Iversen & Soskice (2006) assume that three parties compete under
PR rules, with each party perfectly reflect the interests of their low-, middle- or high-
income constituencies. With the electoral support of equally-sized constituencies,
each party will win an equal share of seats, and the party representing middle-income
voters will negotiate with the other parties to form a governing coalition. Specifically,
the party representing middle class-income voters can establish a policy compromise
with the party that represents low-income voters that benefits middle-income voters.
That low-income voters would prefer this negotiated outcome to the policy that would
result from a high- and middle-income governing coalition provides the stability of
the coalition.
What is important for this analysis is that the policy that is implemented by
the low- and middle-income governing coalition that results when elections are con-
tested under PR rules is more redistributive than the tax and transfer policy that
is implemented by the high-income party that governs under SMD rules. Therefore,
because of the ways in which electoral rules affect the nature of party competition –
specifically the number of parties that compete for election – electoral rules, follow-
ing Iversen & Soskice (2006), have important implications for the interests that will
be reflected in governing coalitions. As a consequence, redistribution will be more
extensive when elections are contested under PR rules than under SMD rules.
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Notice that the policy divergence results because Iversen & Soskice assume
that, under SMD rules, one party will be responsive to the poor. Chapter 2 builds on
Iversen & Soskice’s (2006) analysis in important ways, but demonstrates that espe-
cially when the implications of electoral rules for party competition are not assumed,
the existence of a low-income voter’s party cannot be taken for granted.
Broadly-Based vs. Geographically-Targeted Benefits
With a somewhat different intuition, Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti & Rostagno (2002), Pers-
son & Tabellini (2003) and others (e.g. Persson, Roland & Tabellini 2005, Lizzeri &
Persisco 2003, Persson & Tabellini 2000) also identify a mechanism through which PR
electoral rules lead to more generous redistributive policy than SMD electoral rules:
[T]he winner-takes-all property of plurality rule reduces the minimal coali-
tion of voters needed to win the election, as votes for a party not obtaining
plurality are lost. With single-member districts and plurality, a party thus
needs only 25% of the national vote to win: 50% in 50% of the districts.
Under full proportional representation it needs 50% of the national vote.
Politicians are thus induced to internalize the policy benefits for a larger
proportion of the population, leading to the prediction of larger broad
spending under proportional representation. (Persson & Tabellini 2003,
731)
Persson & Tabellini (2000), for example, present a formal analysis of legislators who
can devote public resources either to a broadly-beneficial public good, or to a good
or service that benefits only a well-defined geographic constituency (i.e. pork-barrel
politics). As suggested above, incentives to build a more broadly-based coalition dom-
inate under PR electoral rules, and narrowly-targeted benefits are generally provided




This literature, which attempts to account for the empirical relationship between so-
cial spending and the proportionality of electoral rules, provides an important foun-
dation for this research. Nevertheless, this project departs from this literature in
two important ways: First, this research challenges the distinction, made by Persson
& Tabellini (2000) and others, between broadly-based social policy and “narrowly”
or “geographically” targeted benefits. When poverty is geographically concentrated,
antipoverty policies are rightly viewed as narrowly targeted. Especially because an-
tipoverty policies are highly targeted, changes in policy are easily perceived and can
be attributed to incumbent legislators. Following Franzese (2002), these character-
istics make antipoverty policy – classified elsewhere as broadly-based social policy –
especially well-suited for manipulation by re-election motivated legislators.
This research also breaks with current thinking about the relationship be-
tween electoral rules and social policy by recognizing the importance of conventional
assumptions about the geographic distribution of voter types. Typically, the geo-
graphic distribution of voters is assumed to be fully integrated or fully segregated.
Chapter 2 demonstrates, however, that when the geographic distribution of voters is
taken into account, the generally positive relationship between electoral system pro-
portionality and more comprehensive social spending is, in fact, conditional: When
poverty is highly concentrated, SMD electoral rules may yield more generous transfers
for low-income citizens than PR or MMD rules.6
6This research also, of course, builds on important work on the optimal distribution voter types
for legislative responsiveness in the American context. The “majority–minority” districts literature
focuses attention on the geographic concentration of African Americans, and questions how districts
should be drawn to maximize the quality of legislative representation. My research shares with
Shotts (2003) and (Cameron, Epstein & O’Halloran 1996) an interest in understanding how electoral
geography affects incentives for policy responsiveness. However, this research is also concerned with




How do electoral rules affect the poor? Under what conditions are elected officials
likely to be more or less responsive to the poor? What are the distributional con-
sequences of partisan and electoral incentives to be more or less responsive to the
poor?
This research departs from current explanations of cross-national differences
in social policy by recognizing that antipoverty measures are especially well-suited for
manipulation by re-election-motivated legislators: Antipoverty measures are highly
targeted policies that are readily perceived by the beneficiaries and can be directly
attributed to incumbent legislators. In combination with the geographic distribution
of income groups, electoral rules determine the electoral power of low-income citizens,
and thus structure legislators’ incentives to be responsive to this constituency. As a
consequence, the effectiveness and generosity of antipoverty measures will reflect the
share of legislators that rely on low-income citizens’ electoral support.
Through a series of formal-analytic examples, Chapter 2 provides the theoreti-
cal foundation of this research, establishes the important modifying effect of electoral
geography on the more general relationship between electoral rules and social policy,
and yields important guideposts for empirical research.
Evidence in support of this election-motivated account of antipoverty pol-
icy takes two forms: First, I take full advantage of Italy’s electoral reform and the
dramatic change in Germany’s electoral geography following re-unification to demon-
strate that important improvements in the electoral power of the poor are quickly
followed by increases in the effectiveness and generosity of antipoverty measures;
Chapter 4 reports the results of this analysis. Second, in a broadly comparative anal-
ysis, Chapter 5 establishes the general – positive – relationship between the electoral
power of a low-income voting bloc (i.e., the number of seats elected by low-income
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citizens, if they all turn out to vote, and all vote for the same party), and levels
of targeted poverty relief. Both of these analysis use a new measure of poverty re-
sponsiveness, developed in Chapter 3, as their dependent variable. The poverty relief
ratio, R, assesses the effectiveness of antipoverty transfers from the perspective of
low-income citizens – an attribute that is important for the evaluation of an election-
motivated account of antipoverty policy.
That cross-national and over-time differences in the effectiveness and generos-
ity of antipoverty measures support the motivating intuition of this research – that
antipoverty policy reflects the electoral incentives of legislators to be responsive to
low-income citizens – is both surprising and a cause for concern. The Conclusion of
this discussion considers the implications of this research for the quality of democracy
in contemporary democratic societies, and establishes an agenda for future research.
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Chapter 2.
How Electoral Rules Create Incentives to
Represent Low-Income Citizens
How do electoral rules affect the political representation of low-income citizens? This
section of the discussion presents the theoretical basis of an election-motivated ac-
count of partisan poverty responsiveness. Presenting a series of formal-analytic exam-
ples, I demonstrate how the electoral rules create incentives for parties and legislators
to seek low-income citizens’ support, and that differences in electoral rules therefore
contribute to cross-national variance in antipoverty policy. These examples will serve
as the guideposts for later empirical research.
2.1 Conventional Wisdom
As suggested in Chapter 1, earlier accounts of the relationship redistributive policy
emphasize a stark division between PR or multi-member district (MMD) electoral
rules and single-member district (SMD) rules.1 From one perspective, by limiting
the number of parties competing in elections, SMD rules favor the representation
of middle- and high-income voters (Iversen & Soskice 2006). As a consequence,
redistributive policy will be more generous on MMD rules than under SMD elec-
toral rules. Alternatively, because the geographic basis of representation under SMD
rules, legislators elected in SMD systems have fewer incentives to cultivate broadly-
based coalitions of support, and instead provide geographically-targeted benefits
1The expression “single-member district” distinguishes those electoral districts that elect only
one legislator from others that elect more than one legislator.
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(e.g. Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti & Rostagno 2002, Persson & Tabellini 2003, Persson
& Tabellini 2000). Both of these perspectives, however, miss the important modi-
fying effect of electoral context – specifically, the geographic distribution of citizens
of different types – on the effect of electoral rules in structuring legislators’ policy-
making incentives.2 This section of the discussion demonstrates how and why the
geographic distribution of voter types matters, especially the geographic distribu-
tion of low-income citizens and for the incentives of parties to seek their support.3
Put more concretely, this analysis is motivated by the question, given a specific geo-
graphic distribution of low-income citizens, which electoral rules are most favorable
to low-income citizens?
2.2 A Simple Model of Electoral Politics
Electoral politics can be characterized by a two-stage game: An election campaign
is held in which parties commit to redistributive policies in anticipation of voter
decision-making. Then, in a second stage, elections are held, some citizens vote. In
this analysis, voters cast a single (closed party list) ballot, and seats are allocated
to parties according to a historically determined electoral rule. Governments are
formed, and the proposed policies of the governing party or coalition are perfectly
implemented.4
2Previous analysis explicitly assumes either complete segregation of voter types (e.g. Persson &
Tabellini 2000) or an even geographic distribution where all types of voters are evenly distributed
throughout the country (e.g. Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti & Rostagno 2002).
3While this analysis presents a standard tax and transfer model of electoral politics, the larger
project is more interested in transfers targeted towards low-income citizens explicitly, and therefore
has a slightly different dependent variable than other election-motivated accounts of redistributive
policy: I concentrate exclusively on distributions made to low-income citizens.
4As the model presented here builds especially on Iversen & Soskice (2006), wherever possible, I
have maintained their original assumptions. I do, however, depart from Iversen & Soskice’s (2006)
analysis in important ways, and these differences are noted as they arise.
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Citizens
Following much of the previous literature (e.g., Iversen & Soskice 2006, Milesi-Ferretti,
Perotti & Rostagno 2002, Persson & Tabellini 2000) suppose that there are three types
of citizens, defined by their income: there are low-income citizens (L), middle-income
citizens (M), and high-income citizens (H).5
yL < yM < yH (2.1)
Then, a citizen’s indirect utility function is defined by the following expression,
Vi(pi) = yi − Ti +Bi = yi + pi (2.2)
for types i ∈ {L,M,H}, and where yi reports the earnings income, Ti reports taxes
assessed for each citizen type, and Bi reports any benefits that are distributed to
citizens of type i. Thus, pi reports the net benefits of redistributive policy.
Suppose, as well, that there are some factors, exogenous to electoral compe-
tition that prevent some citizens from voting, and that low-income citizens feel the
effects of these factors more frequently than middle-income and high-income citizens.6
Thus, let πi define the proportion of voters of type i in the electorate, and
assume that
πL < πM < πH (2.3)
in the national electorate, although citizen types exist in equal proportions within
the national population.7
Citizens may vote strategically. That is, they may vote for the party other
than the party that offers their most preferred policy (i.e. by type), in order to
5As will become evident, relative (not absolute) poverty is applicable to this research. Thus, in
the empirical analysis that follows, ‘low-income citizens’ are defined as those with incomes in the
poorest third.
6See Wolfinger & Rosenstone (1980).
7Iversen & Soskice (2006) assume, instead, that “the voting population is equally divided between
the three groups.”
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ensure a more favorable policy outcome. As we shall see, strategic voting has impor-
tant implications for the incentives parties face to be responsive to different types of
citizens.
Parties and Election Campaigns
Parties are groups of citizens who together stand for election: party L, party M, and
party H. Thus, party utility is defined by Eq. (2.12). (Assume that there are no costs
or benefit to office-holding beyond influence in policy making.) Parties that expect to
hold the majority of seats in the assembly propose their most preferred policy. Here,
policy proposals take the form of vectors, P = (pL, pM , pH), that describe tax and
transfer policies. Following Iversen & Soskice (2006), proposals are subject to several
constraints: First, no group can be taxed at a rate beyond their capacity.
Ti ≤ yi for all i (2.4)
Also, tax policy must be (weakly) progressive, and redistribution must be (weakly)
non-regressive.8
0 = TL ≤ TM ≤ TH , (2.5)
pL ≥ pM ≥ pH . (2.6)
Finally, the government’s budget must be balanced.
∑
i
pi = 0. (2.7)
Let P∗i for each i ∈ {L, M, H} denote each party’s most preferred policies,
subject to the constraints described above. These most preferred policies are given
8Iversen & Soskice (2006) assume, instead, that 0 = TL < TM < TH : they do not allow for the
case in which no redistribution occurs.
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by the following vectors:








P∗H = (0, 0, 0)
That is, L would tax M and H at their full capacities, and distribute benefits ex-
clusively among low-income citizens. M would tax the high-income citizens at their
capacity, and share the benefits with the low-income citizens. Finally, H prefers that
no redistribution occurs.
Parties campaign by (simultaneously) proposing a policy that is expressed as
a function of their own preferences. For example, a party may propose a coalition {I,
J} and a compromise policy Pij = kijP∗i + (1 − kij)P∗j , with kij ∈ [0, 1], and where
P∗i and P∗j are the preferred policy vectors described in Eq. (2.8).9 The coalition
that secures the support of the majority of voters will then implement the policy
Pij = (pijL , pijM , pijH). If a party expects to form the government on its own, then it
simply proposes kij = 1, and implements its most preferred policy.
Note that parties may use kij to induce strategic voting, and attain a better
policy outcome. Citizen voting rules, therefore, can be summarized in terms of values
of kij, and are reported in Table 2.1. Here, the rows identify the proposing party,
and the columns report the response of voters. Intuitively, ki reports the extent
to which party i is willing to compromise its policy in order to form a coalition
9This set-up is similar to the process by which Irish Labour and Fine Gael entered into their
current pre-electoral coalition: In May 2005, Labour announced its decision to join Fine Gael in
an electoral coalition, and shortly afterward, the parties released a joint policy statement, entitled
“The Buck Stops Here.”
This framework, however, is slightly different from Iversen & Soskice’s (2006) set-up: Iversen &
Soskice apply a Rubinstein bargaining framework, and find that parties in coalition would meet at the
midpoint between their most preferred policies. This framework assumes that the coalition partners
are equally impatient, and that there is no delay between offers. Instead, with my assumption of
complete information, parties anticipate voter reactions to their proposals, and thus will compromise
according to their interests.
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L, M or H H if 0 ≤ pM ⇒ M
if 0 > pM ⇒ H
if yH2 ≤ pL ⇒ L
if yH2 > pL ⇒ M
{H, L} H if kHL = 1 ⇒ M
if 0 ≤ kHL < 1 ⇒ H
if 0 ≤ kHL ≤ 2yM+yH2(yM+yH) ⇒ L
if 2yM+yH2(yM+yH) < kHL ≤ 1 ⇒ M
{H, M} H if 0 ≤ kHM ≤ 1 ⇒ M if kHM = 0 ⇒ L
if 0 < kHM ≤ 1 ⇒ M
{L, M} H if 0 ≤ kLM ≤ yH2yM+yH ⇒ M
if yH2yM+yH < kLM ≤ 1 ⇒ H
if 0 ≤ kLM ≤ 1 ⇒ L
NOTE. This Table reports the criterion under which each type of voter (columns) would support
a policy proposal made by each party or legislative coalition (rows). The policy proposals are
summarized by kij ∈ [0, 1], such that the policy compromise is represented by Pij = kijPi + (1−
kij)Pj , where Pi and Pj are the preferred policy vectors described in Eq. (2.8).
with another party. To illustrate, consider L’s voting rules: In the left-most cell
of the top row of Table 2.1, low-income citizens, L, will vote for the low-income
party, L, unless doing so will result in a policy that leaves L worse off than would
be implemented under a government formed by the middle-income party, M. In this
case (i.e. when yH
2
> pL), L will vote strategically for M. (L never has an incentive
to vote strategically for H.) This same decision rule – that L will vote by type if
pL ≥ yH2 , and vote strategically for M otherwise – is used to determine L’s voting
behavior for each possible coalition. This exercise is then repeated for each citizen
type, and viable coalitions are determined by compatible values of kij.
2.3 Equilibrium Concept
This analysis assumes that elections have a specific structure: First, parties antici-
pate voter decision-making during a campaign period and commit to policy proposals
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that they will implement perfectly if elected.10 These policy proposals may include
a coalition proposal and compromise policy, or may simply reflect each party’s most
preferred policy outcome. In a second, election stage, voters cast ballots in favor of
the party that will implement their most preferred policy. Importantly, coalitions
and compromise policies are negotiated during the campaign period; parties may not
renegotiate after the election is held, nor can they implement a policy other than that
they proposed during the election campaign. If citizens and parties know the distri-
bution of types within the electorate, the policies that will be implemented by the
parties and coalitions that form the government, and the electoral rules that govern
the distribution of seats within districts, the appropriate equilibrium concept, there-
fore, is sub-game perfection with weakly-undominated voting strategies. Sub-game
perfection implies that the policies proposed by parties are optimal given anticipated
voter decision-making. Weak dominance requires that voters do not support a party
that will implement a policy that is contrary to their interests. In equilibrium, there-
fore, parties propose a policy that is a best response given anticipated citizen voting
strategies and voters support parties according to their proposed policy outcomes.
2.4 The Geographic Distribution of Voter Types
Here, we are interested in whether and how the geographic distribution of voter
types moderates legislators’ incentives to be responsive to different groups in society,
created by electoral rules.11 Therefore, without changing the national distribution of
voter types (each group is approximately one-third of the population), imagine three
archetypal countries in which the geographic distribution of voter types varies in the
10Assume, for example, that parties will be punished by the voters in future elections if they
deviate from their campaign promises.
11Earlier versions of this paper also considered a case in which voters were evenly distributed
across geographic regions of the country, but in which turnout bias was severe, and high-income
voters substantially out-numbered low- and middle-income voters together. In this case, electoral
rules did not make any difference in policy outcomes: The high-income voters’ preferences prevailed.
For clarity, I’ve limited this discussion to variance in the geographic distribution of low-income
voters, leaving turnout bias to be taken up in future research.
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following ways:
COUNTRY E. (Even Distribution). Voter types are evenly and equitably dis-
tributed through Country E, although a minimal level of turnout bias is main-
tained in each district. Specifically, Eq. (2.3) characterizes both the national
electorate and the electorate of every district.
COUNTRY R. (Rural Poverty). Suppose that income is correlated with popula-
tion density, such that, although Eq. (2.3) characterizes the national population
(i.e., although turnout bias remains, citizens types exist in approximately equal
proportions in the national electorate), citizen types are concentrated in the
















Thus, the high-income voters live predominantly in urban districts (denoted by
the superscript U), the middle-income voters comprise the largest share of the
suburban districts (S), and the low-income voters are the largest group of rural
districts (R).
COUNTRY U. (Urban Poverty). Suppose now that income is negatively corre-
lated with population density, such that, although Eq. (2.3) characterizes the
national population (i.e., although turnout bias remains, citizen types exist in
approximately equal proportions in the national electorate), citizen types are
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Thus, low-income voters live exclusively in urban districts (U), high-income vot-
ers comprise the largest share of the suburban electorates (S), and the middle-
income voters form the largest group in rural districts (R).
These countries represent, then, the three major classes of the geographic
distribution of low-income citizens: In Country E, low-income citizens are evenly dis-
tributed throughout a country. In Country R, low-income citizens are over-represented
in rural areas. Finally, in Country U, low-income citizens are over-represented in ur-
ban regions. The research question, then, is clarified: Given each of these geographic
distribution, which electoral rules generate optimal policy outcomes for low-income
citizens?
2.5 Three Hypothetical Electoral Systems
To investigate the effect of electoral rules on policy outcomes for the poor, I consider
three hypothetical electoral systems that represent well the main differences between
SMD and MMD systems:
Assembly S. (Single-member Districts) Nine legislators are elected in 9 single-
member districts.
Assembly N. (National District) Nine legislators are elected in a national nine-
member district.
Assembly V. (Varying District Size) Four members are elected in a (perhaps
urban, denoted Ui) four-member district, 4 members elected in two two-member
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NOTE. This Figure reports the nested structure of the electoral districts of Assemblies
S (denoted by dotted lines), N (denoted by the dashed line), and V (denoted by solid
lines). Ui, Sii and R denote legislators elected in urban, suburban, and rural areas,
respectively.
(suburban, denoted Sii) districts, and one member is elected in a single-member
(rural, denoted R) district.
All seats are allocated according to the simple Largest Remainder (Droop
Quota) within each district.12
Note that assemblies S, N and V vary in two dimensions: First, the assemblies
vary in the average number of legislators elected in each district. Second, the assem-
blies differ in the variance of legislators elected across districts.13 These dimensions
12This choice of formula is largely inconsequential, but offers the greatest advantage to smaller
parties among the largest remainder methods. In the context of this example, then, the Hare Quota
is most favorable to the party preferred by low-income citizens. To be clear, seats are allocated in
the following way: First, the quota Qd is calculated as Qd = Nd/Sd, where Nd is the number of
voters in district d, and Sd is the number of seats to be allocated in the district. Then, each party




≤ nP + 1, V Pd is the number of votes cast in favor party P
in district d, and nP ∈ N. Finally, any remaining seats are allocated according to the values of the
remainder for each party, or V Pd − nP × Qd. Note that when applied to a single member district,
the Largest Remainder (Droop Quota) allocation yields the simple plurality rule result.
13This research owes much to Monroe & Rose (2002): They argue that there exists a variance
effect, such that greater cross-district variance, particularly when combined with low magnitude
districts, results in the under-representation of urban interests.
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are evident in Figure 2.1, which summarizes district structures associated with as-
semblies S (denoted by the interior dotted lines), N (denoted by the exterior dashed
line), and V (denoted by the solid lines).
Then, using the geographic distribution described in the previous section, and
the simple model of electoral politics described above, the application of each of these
rules to a particular country can be evaluated in the policies implemented.
2.6 Policy Outcomes under the Rules of Assembly
N
Because the national distribution does not change with the geographic distributions
of voter types – all citizen types exist in approximately equal proportions – the rules
governing Assembly N yield the same policy outcome for each country case. When the
different groups of citizens comprise approximately equal shares of the electorate, the
parties can expect to hold equal shares of seats in the assembly: H, M and L will each
hold three seats. Thus, in order to form a government, parties must propose coalitions
and compromise policies. To determine viable coalitions and compromise policies,
then, we need only identify optimal proposals through backwards induction from
citizen voting rules (described in Table 2.1) and electoral responses. This analysis
can be summarized with the following claims:
Proposition. H is never a coalition partner.
To see this, notice that there is no value of kH that H can propose to sustain
a H, L coalition. Any value of kH >
2yM+yH
2(yM +yH)
will not maintain the support of
L, who will vote strategically for M, and any value of kH < 1 will not maintain
the support of M , who will vote strategically for H. Furthermore, any H, L
proposal weakly dominates any {H, M} proposal that H can make: Any kH > 0
will allow M to form the government, and impose pH = −yH , which is the same
policy that kH = 0 implies.
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Corollary. The only sustainable governing coalition is {M, L}.
Note that L will vote by type for any value of kL that ensures that L will do at
least as well under a {M,L} coalition as by voting strategically for M . Thus,
L need only to ensure that its policy proposal maintains the support of M , or
that pM ≥ 0, which is what M can secure by voting strategically for H. Thus,







To summarize, when no party expects to hold the majority of seats in the
legislature, all voters vote by type, and a L-M coalition will form the government,
tax H at full capacity, and distribute the benefits entirely among low-income citizens.
With no incentive to moderate its policy, H proposes PH = P∗H . When different
income groups form approximately equal proportions of the electorate, and elections
are contested within a single national district (i.e. are perfectly proportional), then,
we can expect governments to represent well the preferences of low- and middle-
income citizens, and implement policy that target benefits to low-income citizens.
2.7 Policy Outcomes in Country E.
In most countries, however, elections are not contested in a single national district,
and the interaction of the electoral rules and the geographic distributions of low-
income citizens structure have important effects on legislators’ incentives to seek the
support of low-income citizens. In this subsection, and the two that follow, I consider
the relationship between electoral rules and redistributive policy outcomes in coun-
tries with different geographic distributions of low-income citizens. As a benchmark
example, I consider first Country E, in which all income groups are evenly distributed
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throughout the country.
Assembly S. Consider electoral politics in the case where elections are contested in
SMDs throughout the country: Although voters of each type exist in roughly
equal proportions in each district, there are slightly more high-income voters
than either middle- or low-income voters. Thus, if all citizens vote by type, H
will win in every district, and implement its most preferred policy, P = P∗H ;
see Eq. (2.8). Note, however, that L has an incentive to vote strategically: L
strictly prefers the policy proposed by M to that which H proposes. Therefore,
all parties propose Pi = P∗i , M wins the election with the support of L, without
any compromise in policy, and implements P = P∗M . H cannot improve this
policy outcome by voting strategically.14
Assembly V. Now consider the case in which elections are contested in districts
of varying size: Again, type H voters constitute a slightly larger share of the
electorate in each district, and if citizens vote by type, H can expect to win 2 of
the urban seats, 2 suburban seats, and the rural seat. M will win 1 urban seat,
and 2 suburban seats. L will win 1 urban seat. Thus, H can implement P = PH
without moderation. However, as before, L can improve this outcome by voting
strategically for M. Note that M can be assured of L’s support, without any
moderation of M ’s preferred policy.
14Suppose, instead that H can propose a policy that does not encourage L to vote strategically.
Specifically, suppose that H can propose P = (yH2 , 0,− yH2 ), such that L is indifferent between a
government formed by H, and a government formed by M. Note that there is no policy that M
can propose that leaves M better off. To see this, suppose that M and H were competing for L’s
support. Both M and H would have to propose P = PL = (yH , 0,−yH). As this outcome would
leave M no better off, and as there are no benefits derived from office holding beyond the policy
outcome, M has no incentive to make this proposal. Also, H strictly prefers this outcome to what
would result from L’s strategic voting: A government formed by M would impose pMH = −yH .
Thus, by conceding − yH2 , and preventing P from voting strategically for M, H has secured a better
policy outcome than what could be achieved otherwise. Therefore, in equilibrium, citizens will vote
by type, H will form the government, and will implement the policy P = (yH2 , 0,− yH2 ). From the
perspective of the low-income citizens, this policy is equivalent to the equilibrium outcome described
in the text.
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Although more discussion of this point will be offered in the summary section,
it is worth noting here that when income groups are evenly distributed throughout
the country, low-income citizens do no better when elections are contested in MMDs
of varying size, than when elections are contested in SMDs. (Note as well, however,
that the policy that results when elections are contested in single national district
leaves low-income citizens better off than under the rules of either Assembly S, or
Assembly V.)
2.8 Policy Outcomes in Country R.
Consider, now, the country case in which low-income citizens are over-represented in
rural regions 15: Which electoral rules generate the best policy outcome for low-income
citizens in this case?
Assembly S. Note that if citizens vote by type, H will win 4 urban seats, M will
win the 4 suburban seats, and L will win the rural seat. Thus, no party holds
the majority of seats in the assembly, and parties must negotiate a governing
coalition and a compromise policy. As we saw in the case of Assembly N, the
only viable governing coalition is formed by L and M, which will implement





Assembly V. Under a fairly equitable distribution of types within each district that
meets the criterion listed in (2.9), H can expect to be elected to 2 urban seats,
M will win 2 suburban seats, and L will win 2 urban seats, 2 suburban seats, and
1 rural seat. Thus, L forms the government, and implements P = P∗L without
compromise. Note that M cannot improve this outcome by voting strategically
for H: M does not comprise a sufficiently large share of the electorate in any
district to change the allocation of seats.
15One distribution that meets the criteria in (2.9), and maintains a fairly equitable national
distribution lets πUH = 0.62, π
S




Unlike the previous country case of Country E, when the electoral rules of
Assembly S and Assembly V did not yield different policy outcomes, these different
electoral rules generate an important difference in policy outcomes when low-income
voters are geographically concentrated in rural areas: Transfers to low-income citizens
are considerably larger when elections are contested in MMDs of varying sizes, than
in SMDs or a single national district.
2.9 Policy Outcomes in Country U.
Finally, we consider the case in which low-income citizens are concentrated in urban
regions. 16
Assembly S. When elections are contested in SMDs, if all citizens vote by type, L
can expect to win 4 urban seats, H will win the 4 suburban seats, and M will win
the rural seat. As in the case above, no party will hold the majority of seats in
the assembly, and parties must negotiate a governing coalition and a compromise
policy prior to the election. Again, H is not a viable coalition partner for
either M or L. Therefore, an {M, L} coalition will form the government and
implement the policy P = PML, with pL = yH .
Assembly V. When elections are contested in MMDs of varying size, L will be
elected to 2 urban seats, M wins 2 suburban seats, and H wins 2 urban seats,
2 suburban seats, and 1 rural seat. Then, H forms the government, and imple-
ments P = P∗H without compromise. Note that L cannot improve this outcome
by voting strategically for M: M and L do not comprise a sufficiently large
share of the electorate in any district to change the allocation of seats.
As we saw in the case of Country R, the interaction of electoral rules, and the
geographic distribution of low-income citizens in Country U generate quite different
16A distribution that meets the criteria in (2.10), and maintains a fairly equitable national distri-
bution lets πUL = 0.74, π
S




policy outcomes: Low-income citizens are much better off under the rules govern-
ing Assembly S, than under the rules governing Assembly V. Note that this finding
cuts against the conventional wisdom regarding the relationship between electoral
rules and redistributive policy: When low-income citizens are concentrated in urban
districts (i.e. districts that elect a large number of legislators when elections are
contested in MMDs), SMD rules create incentives for more extensive redistributive
policy than exist under MMD (with varying district size) rules.
2.10 Summary: Evaluating Policy Representation
Suppose that cross-national differences can be summarized by a electoral concentra-
tion index,











where d = 1...D denotes each electoral district, nd reports the number of citizens
residing in district d, N reports the number of citizens in the national electorate, ni
reports the number of type i citizens, and πjd reports the proportion of type j citizens
residing in district d. This electoral concentration index, E , will equal one when type
j citizens exist in proportions equal to their national proportion in every electoral
district (i.e. for Country E), and decreases as type j citizens become geographically
concentrated and under-represented in district electorates.17
Figure 2.2 reports the benefits distributed to the low-income citizens (pL),
under each set of electoral rules, for each of the country cases considered here. The
horizontal axis reports estimates of E for each of the country cases considered here,
and the vertical axis reports pL for each set of electoral rules, for each country. By
summarizing the results of this analysis in Figure 2.2, the important modifying effect
of the geographic concentration of low-income citizens becomes quite clear: Notice,
17For the geographic distributions used in this analysis, ERL = 0.91, and EUL = 0.63.
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NOTE. This Figure describes reports policy outcomes under different electoral rules,
Assembly S (dashed line), Assembly N (dotted line), and Assembly V (solid line),
for the different country cases. The horizontal axis reports the degree to which low-
income citizens are geographically concentrated, with higher values indicating a more
even distribution.
first, that much of the previous literature compares policy outcomes in national MMDs
and SMDs, which correspond to points A and A’ in Figure 2.2. As we have come
to expect, distributions to low-income citizens are greater when elections are con-
tested in a national MMD, than under SMD rules when low-income voters are evenly
distributed throughout the country (Country E). However, when MMDs of varying
sizes, and different geographic distributions of voter types are taken into account, the
conventional wisdom – that MMDs create incentives for more extensive redistributive
policy – is not very informative. Notice, for example, that when low-income citizens
are geographically concentrated (as in Countries R and U), for example, SMD rules
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yield the same policy outcomes as elections contested in a national MMD (see points
B and B’ in Figure 2.2). Further, note how SMDs and MMDs of varying sizes af-
fect policy when low-income citizens are concentrated in urban regions (Country U;
points C and C’): Contrary to the conventional wisdom, in this case SMDs rules yield
more extensive redistributive policy than MMDs of varying sizes.18 Finally, note that
when low-income citizens are concentrated in rural regions (Country R), and elections
are contested in MMDs of varying sizes (though not a in national MMD), policy is
perfectly responsive to low-income citizens.
2.11 Guideposts for Empirical Research
To summarize the analytic examples presented in this discussion in more general
terms, if elections are not contested in a national MMD, there exists a curve (or,
more likely when the number of legislators elected in each district is large, a set
of curves) that defines the relationship between a group’s geographic concentration
and the incentives for legislators to be responsive to that group. The shape of this
geographic-responsiveness curve, and in particular, the level of geographic concentra-
tion that induces maximum responsiveness (where the curve peaks), is determined by
the electoral rules. Thus, to see how electoral incentives affect antipoverty policy in a
particular setting, we ought to be conscious of both the extent to which low-income
citizens are geographically concentrated (our location across the horizontal axis), and
how electoral rules favor or inhibit the representation of geographically concentrated
interests (the shape of the curve).
In Chapter 4, I use focused case studies to investigate these different compo-
nents of electoral incentives: Italian election reform replaced a system in which all
members were elected in MMDs of varying sizes (like the rules governing Assembly V),
with a system in which most members were elected in SMDs (similar to Assembly S).
18Following Monroe & Rose (2002), MMD rules dilute the electoral strength that comes with
geographic concentration, and ultimately result in no redistribution of income.
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Thus, the process of Italian election reform replaced one geographic-responsiveness
curve with another, while maintaining the pre-reform geographic distribution of voter
types. In Germany, by contrast, reunification did not change the electoral rules (i.e.
the shape of the geographic-responsiveness curve), but rather the geographic distri-
bution of low-income citizens (or, the position on the horizontal axis). In both of
these cases, the changes in electoral rules and context strengthened legislators’ and
parties’ incentives to be responsive to low-income citizens, and shifts in antipoverty
policy track these changes quite well.
The insights gained through the formal-analytic examples presented in this dis-
cussion are also useful in thinking about cross-national analysis. In particular, these
examples have important implications for how the geographic concentration of low-
income citizens and antipoverty responsiveness ought to be measured: In evaluating
the effect of electoral rules on redistributive policy, what matters is the distribution
of voter types within and across electoral districts, as well the number and allocation





How can antipoverty programs be compared reliably across countries? To illustrate
the challenges associated with cross-national comparison of antipoverty policy, this
introductory section summarizes key components of poverty relief in three archety-
pal welfare systems. Following Esping-Andersen (1990), the US is presented as an
example of a “liberal” welfare regime. Germany represents a “conservative” welfare
regime, and Sweden represents a “social democratic” welfare regime.
Example 1. Antipoverty Programs in the US (2001)
Low-income families in the US can draw on support provided by a complex structure of
means-tested non-contributory programs, usually administered by state governments.
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the Food Stamps and housing
assistance programs, and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) are the cornerstones
of American antipoverty policy, and provide cash transfers, near-cash benefits, and tax
credits, respectively, to low-income families, according to their earnings, age and the
composition of their households. EITC, for example, reduces a family’s tax liability,
and in those cases in which the tax credit exceeds taxes owed, EITC can provide a tax
refund to low-income working households. Elderly, blind and disabled citizens who
are in need of additional support can receive cash transfers through the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) Programme. Finally, the unemployed (by definition, those who
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are not working, but who are looking for work) receive benefits that are determined
by their recent wages; the duration of benefits is limited to 26 weeks in most states
(though in 2001, benefits could be received for up to 39 weeks in some states). Support
for healthy unemployed adults who are childless is quite limited.
Example 2. Antipoverty Programs in Germany (2001)
Low-income households in Germany receive income support through a combination of
contributory social insurance and non-contributory social assistance programs. The
cost-of-living assistance program (“Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt”), for example, pro-
vides cash transfers to those who are unable, or only partially able, to provide for
themselves and their families. Transfer amounts are determined by household ex-
penses, as well as household earnings and composition. This program is supplemented
with a highly structured housing allowance program, as well as programs that provide
support for single parents. A family allowance (“Kindergeld”) provides a monthly tax
refund to all families with dependent children, and is supplemented by a means-tested
child-raising allowance provided to parents who serve as the primary care-takers of
young children. Unemployment insurance programs provide support to the young and
unemployed. Benefit amounts are determined by recent earnings, and the duration of
benefits (from 6 to 32 months) is determined by the recipient’s employment history
(number of monthly contributions), and age.1 Unemployment assistance provides
means-tested income support for those who have exhausted their insurance claims.
Example 3. Antipoverty Programs in Sweden (2001)
Antipoverty income support in Sweden is provided through comprehensive social in-
surance programs, the Social Welfare Allowance, and a means-tested housing benefit
for low-income workers. Unlike the German cost-of-living assistance program, social
1Those who are over the age of 52 and unemployed can qualify, instead, for early retirement if
they have contributed to the public pension plan for at least 15 years, been employed eight of the
previous ten years, and been unemployed for 12 of the previous 18 months.
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assistance in Sweden generally does not provide partial support, and eligibility is de-
termined by the exhaustion of other sources of support. Levels of housing support
are determined by the cost of housing, household assets and composition; additional
housing supplements are available for the elderly, and those receiving other social
assistance transfers. Universal family benefits are available to households with de-
pendent children. Advance alimony payments are made as supplementary family
transfer to single-parent families (the absent parent may be fully or only partially li-
able to the state for this amount). Unemployment insurance benefits are comprised of
benefits received through voluntary contributions to (usually trade union-associated)
Insurance Societies, as well as unemployment assistance benefits for those who do
not belong to Insurance Societies, or who have just completed their studies. Bene-
fits received through Insurance Societies are tied to recent earnings and can last for
up to 600 days (with participation in labor market programs), while basic insurance
benefits provide a daily flat rate, for up to 300 days.
Research Question
As the examples of antipoverty programs in the US, Germany and Sweden illustrate,
low-income citizens in different countries draw upon different combinations of con-
tributory, non-contributory, universal, and means-tested programs, in which eligibility
and transfer amounts are determined varyingly by work history, household earnings
and assets, and household composition. The task of this discussion is to determine
how antipoverty program outcomes can be measured in a way that reflects both their
scope and success in a wide variety of political contexts, and in a way that reflects a
low-income voter’s perspective on poverty responsiveness.
Here, I begin with the question, “What is the potential subset of citizens
who would benefit from antipoverty programs?” Recognizing that the way in which
poverty is defined is political, this question leads us to consider how poverty is con-
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ventionally measured, and how it may be measured in this research to best analytic
advantage. Then, I take full advantage of Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data to
estimate parameters that describe the relationship between market income and social
transfers in each country, and construct a measure that is similar to the Gini coef-
ficient,2 which reports the extent to which redistributive transfers are concentrated
among low incomes (specifically, those with equivalised3 market incomes in the first
third of the national market income distribution). Unlike conventional measures of
social policy (e.g., government expenditure, income replacement rates), the measure
of poverty responsiveness presented in this Chapter reports antipoverty policy as it
appears from the perspective of low-income citizens, taking into account all transfers
a household receives through the complex antipoverty policy structures of their coun-
try, recognizing the rate at which transfer levels decline with increased earnings, and
the generosity of universal transfers.
In the end, this analysis relies on fairly specific understandings of those at
risk of poverty, and poverty relief. The poor are identified entirely by their income,4
for example, and poverty responsiveness is measured in terms of cash and near-cash
transfers instead of labor market policy. Indeed, the form that poverty responsiveness
2Gini coefficients provide measures of income inequality by reporting the relationship between the
cumulative income distribution and the cumulative population distribution. A perfectly equitable
society, for example, in which the cumulative percentage of income corresponds to the cumulative
percentage of population (i.e., 20 percent of the population accounts for 20 percent of the cumulative
income distribution), corresponds to a Gini coefficient of zero. Conversely, for societies in which all
income is concentrated among the wealthiest few percent, estimated Gini coefficients would approach
one.
The poverty responsiveness measure developed in this discussion is similar to Gini coefficients in
that it uses a hypothetical distribution as a benchmark for reliable cross-national comparisons, and
estimates the distribution of social transfers, relative to market income. The poverty responsive-
ness measure, however, differs from Gini coefficients in that it incorporates individual-level transfer
amounts, rather than cumulative transfers.
3“Equivalised” income measures adjust for the size of the household: Although other adjustments
sometimes take into account the ages of children and number of earners, total household is most
often divided by the square root of the number of household members (Atkinson, Rainwater &
Smeeding 1995). The implied elasticity factor of 0.5 represents economies of scale in consumption:
A household with four members, for example, requires twice the income of a single-member household
to achieve similar levels of consumption.
4For this reason, they are usually referred to as “low-income citizens,” leaving “the poor” for
more conceptual parts of the discussion.
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takes likely reflects the electoral incentives of legislators to represent the interests of
the poor (this question is taken up in Chapter 6). As we shall see, these restrictions in
the conceptualization of poverty and poverty responsiveness facilitate cross-national
comparison. Nevertheless, these definitions of poverty and poverty relief are also situ-
ated in their broader, more conventional context. This Chapter begins by describing
the main data source used in this research, the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS),
and then uses LIS data to derive measures of poverty and poverty relief. In each
case, the measures developed here are then compared to those used more often in the
literature.
3.2 The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)
LIS data represent a 25-year collaboration among household income and labor force
surveys in 30 countries. For large nationally-representative samples in each country,
LIS data report income by source – market income, for example, is distinguished
from social transfers, and transfers are reported by type – in addition to the socio
demographic characteristics of each household (including place of residence). Thus,
LIS data reveal the geographic distribution of low-income citizens for each country,
and the extent to which low-income citizens benefit through redistributive antipoverty
policy.
Two other features of the LIS data make them especially well-suited for this
project: First, through the provision of standardized measures for 30 of countries (see
Table 3.1), LIS promotes broadly comparative cross-sectional analysis. The second
feature of the LIS data that is especially important for the research design of this
project lies in the length of the LIS time series for, in particular, Germany and Italy.
In both cases, the LIS data-files include several observations from the years before
and after the key change in electoral incentives (i.e., German reunification, and Italian
electoral reform). As a consequence, Germany and Italy can be treated as cases of
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Taiwan (2000) 13,801 10,904 0.21
Norway (2000) 12,919 9,727 0.25
Finland (2000) 10,423 7,829 0.25
Switzerland (2002) 3,642 2,711 0.26
Mexico (2002) 17,167 12,722 0.26
Slovenia (1999) 3,859 2,753 0.29
Poland (1999) 31,428 22,215 0.29
Luxembourg (2000) 2,418 1,675 0.31
Israel (2001) 5,787 4,009 0.31
United States (2000) 49,633 33,253 0.33
Canada (2000) 28,970 19,556 0.33
Belgium (2000) 2,724 1,416 0.34
Australia (2001) 6,786 4,462 0.34
Russia (2000) 3,126 2,024 0.35
France (2000) 10,305 6,703 0.35
Estonia (2000) 6,068 3,913 0.36
Czech Republic (1996) 28,148 17,981 0.36
Germany (2000) 10,985 6,983 0.37
Denmark (2000) 82,062 51,036 0.38
Hungary (1999) 2,013 1,248 0.38
United Kingdom (1999) 24,988 15,400 0.38
Slovak Republic (1996) 16,336 9,980 0.39
Sweden (2000) 14,491 8,625 0.40
Italy (2000) 8,001 4,688 0.41
Romania (1997) 32,187 19,041 0.41
Netherlands (1999) 5,007 2,937 0.42
Spain (2000) 4,822 2,708 0.44
Ireland (2000) 2,865 1,532 0.46
Greece (2000) 3,898 2,140 0.45
Austria (2000) 2,513 1,337 0.47
Average 9,820 0.35
NOTES. a This column reports the total number of households surveyed.
b This column reports the number households in which the “head” of household is of working age
(between 25-59 years of age), and which report some disposable income.
c This column reports the proportion of the total sample excluded from all further analysis (i.e., in




natural experiments, allowing changes in antipoverty policy to be linked to changes
in legislators’ electoral incentives. In the broadly comparative cross-sectional analysis
(Chapter 6), only the most recent LIS observations of each country are included.
The second column of Table 3.1 reports the size of the working-aged sample
for each country. Following the convention of recent comparative analysis of welfare
programs (e.g. Kenworthy & Pontusson 2005), this research excludes households in
which the “head” of the household is less than 25 years of age, or older than 60 years
of age. This exclusion prevents cross-national differences in the administration of
pensions, and transfers in support of education, from confounding measures of poverty
relief. More specifically, because the measure of poverty relief that is presented below
relies on the relationship between market income and social transfers, it is important
to exclude those who might rely disproportionately on transfers for reasons other than
poverty relief.
3.3 Measuring Poverty
Who, from the perspective of legislators, comprises the set of potential beneficiaries
of antipoverty policy? Recognizing that the way in which poverty is officially defined
within each country results from a political process, this research is challenged to
identify those with low income, who live at risk of poverty, in a way that has cross-
national functional equivalence.
One way to identify those at risk of poverty is to specify an income level
that represents the minimum amount of income needed to cover basic housing, food,
clothing and medical costs, and then to classify all those with incomes less than this
threshold as the poor. This is the basis of the official poverty line in the U.S., which
was originally defined according to the cost of food necessary for a minimally ad-
equate diet, and then adjusted for family size, and other necessary expenses (i.e.,
the original amount was multiplied by three). Current estimates augment the initial
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income threshold for inflation, and continue to classify all those with incomes below
the threshold as living in poverty (Department of Health and Human Services, Of-
fice of the Secretary 2000). This measure of poverty, however, has been increasingly
criticized because it neglects how household expenses have changed over time and
the changing demography of the American population. Compared to the share of
household budgets spent on food in the 1960s (when the measure was developed), for
example, groceries comprise a much smaller proportion of current household expen-
ditures (Citro & Michael 1995). As a consequence, the U.S. poverty line increasingly
under-estimates the amount of money needed to keep a household economically sta-
ble. Other “absolute” measures of poverty are subject to similar criticisms: They
neglect variance in the cost of living across time and space.
In an alternative approach to the study of poverty, analysts have emphasized
the “relative” nature of poverty. The European Union, for example, defines poverty as
a condition that limits “the capacity of the individual to participate fully in the society
in which she or he lives,” and uses “income measures of poverty that are related to
some extent to the overall income distribution nationally” (Council of the European
Union 2007, 10). Usually, the relative poverty threshold is defined as a proportion of
the median (equivalised) income in each Member state, and the poverty rate reports
the percentage of the population with income levels below this threshold (e.g., usually
0.6 or 0.7 of the median income; see Whelan, Layte & Maitre 2004). Advantages of
relative measures of poverty lie in their explicit reference to the context of poverty,
and thus take into account cross-national and temporal differences in consumption
patterns.
This research builds on the relative poverty concept, although it is operational-
ized in a slightly different way: Here, the at-risk-of-poverty threshold is set equal to
the thirty-third income percentile of the national market (equivalised household) in-
come distribution. Thus, following the theoretical framework put forward in Chapter
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2, the poor are defined as those who comprise the bottom third of the market in-
come distribution. This strategy offers the important advantage of a common share
of the electorate for cross-national analysis. Differences in responsiveness to the poor,
therefore, cannot be attributed to differences in the size of the poor population, but
must be attributes (e.g. its geographic distribution) of this common share of the
population instead.
Three concerns for cross-national research immediately arise, however, when
poverty is measured relative to the national income distribution: First, particularly
when countries vary significantly in the extent of economic development, a relative
poverty threshold may correspond to quite different levels of economic vulnerability.
These differences can be illustrated using the current U.S. poverty line, which in 2000
(for single-person households, under the age of 65, residing in the continental U.S.)
was estimated to be $8,959 (Department of Health and Human Services, Office of
the Secretary 2000). As seen in Table 3.2, which reports the poverty thresholds used
in this research in 2000 U.S. dollars,5 there is some cross-national variation in the
purchasing power of the poor – especially when the more heterogeneous countries in
the lower section of the table are taken into account. By emphasizing cross-national
differences in the consumption abilities of low-income people, these comparisons high-
light a potentially confounding factor in this analysis: Policy may be more (or less)
responsive to poverty in some national settings than in others because the experi-
ence of poverty itself varies cross-nationally. To ensure the validity of cross-national
comparisons, the analysis that follows excludes all countries in which the estimated
poverty threshold is less than the official U.S. poverty line. Although there are a few
cases rather close to this threshold for inclusion (e.g., Greece and the Czech Repub-
lic), most of the excluded countries have poverty thresholds well-below the official
U.S. poverty line.
5Currency conversions are based on the exchange rates published by World Bank Group (2006).
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A second related concern about the specific poverty threshold measure used in
this research is centered on its relationship to overall levels of inequality. Consider, for
example, how the poverty threshold used here relates to the median market income
in each country (the last column of Table 3.2 reports these ratios). In countries in
which active labor market policy measures ensure a relatively equitable market income
distribution (e.g., Norway), this ratio is somewhat higher than in those countries with
considerably higher levels of market income inequality (e.g., United Kingdom). On
average, the poverty thresholds to median market income level ratios approximate 70
percent of the median income, the conventional measure of the poverty threshold in
European poverty research (see, Whelan, Nolan & Maitre 2007). Taiwan remains the
single country case with a poverty threshold that exceeds the U.S. poverty line, but
with a threshold-to-median ratio that indicates considerably more inequality in the
lower end of the income distribution than any other country. For this reason, Taiwan
is excluded from the analysis that follows.
Finally, low income reflects only one dimension of the risk associated with
poverty (see, e.g., Nolan & Whelan 2007). A multidimensional approach to the study
of poverty would also take into account deprivation related to education, health and
general welfare, and is consistent with current understanding of the relationship be-
tween poverty and social exclusion. Nevertheless, income remains closely related to
other components of poverty (Whelan, Layte & Maitre 2004), and more importantly,
income remains the primary basis of eligibility for antipoverty programs in devel-
oped democracies: Following up on the examples presented at the beginning of this
Chapter, Table 3.3 summarizes antipoverty programs in the countries included in this
analysis. Those policies described in Columns (1), (2), and (3) provide the central
components of each country’s poverty responsiveness, though there are often supple-
ment programs intended to meet basic food, housing, child care, and medical needs
(Column (4)). As Table 3.3 demonstrates, although in some countries antipoverty
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program benefits are also determined by assets and household composition, current
income levels serve as the primary basis of eligibility. As a consequence, very little is
lost in using income to define the group of citizens who are potential beneficiaries of
antipoverty programs.
Summary: Measuring Poverty
In the case studies and broadly comparative analysis presented in the following Chap-
ters, I estimate the extent to which benefits are concentrated among those households
that comprise the bottom third of the (equalized household) market income distri-
bution. This conceptualization keeps with current conventional emphasis on relative
poverty, and offers important analytical advantages for cross-national research. As
suggested in this section, however, defining poverty in this way introduces differences
in economic vulnerability and in levels of inequality that will be taken into account
later in the analysis.
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Italy (2000)∗ IT00 9,951 0.72
Spain (2000)∗ ES00 11,156 0.74
France (2000)∗ FR00 11,449 0.73
Israel (2001) IL01 12,426 0.63
Austria (2000)∗ AT00 12,644 0.76
Ireland (2000)∗ IE00 13,524 0.73
Australia (2001) AU01 13,953 0.67
Belgium (2000) BE00 15,037 0.81
United Kingdom (1999) UK99 16,143 0.65
Sweden (2000)∗ SE00 16,694 0.75
Canada (2000) CA00 17,821 0.71
Finland (2000) FI00 17,936 0.75
Germany (2000) DE00 18,592 0.77
Netherlands (1999) NL99 19,019 0.78
United States (2000) US00 20,613 0.69
Luxembourg (2000)∗ LX00 20,957 0.74
Denmark (2000) DK00 21,796 0.75
Switzerland (2002) CH02 24,702 0.78
Norway (2000) NO00 25,107 0.80
Average 16,817 0.73
Excluded
Russia (2000)∗ 949 0.55
Hungary (1999)∗ 2,887 0.65
Estonia (2000)∗ 2,799 0.66
Mexico (2002)∗ 2,340 0.67
Romania (1997) 3,080 0.76
Poland (1999) 3,224 0.64
Slovak Republic (1996) 3,706 0.75
Slovenia (1999)∗ 6,916 0.77
Czech Republic (1996) 7,894 0.77
Greece (2000)∗ 8,701 0.75
Taiwan (2000) 14,350 0.39
NOTES. “∗” denotes countries in which gross market income measures are not available,
and the poverty threshold, ψ, is estimated using net (equivalised household) market income
levels (earnings net of taxes and employer and employee social insurance contributions).
a This column reports the 33rd percentile of the national (equivalised household) market
income distribution, in 2000 US dollars.
b This column reports the ratio of the 33rd percentile income amount to the median income

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.4 Measuring Poverty Relief
With the poor identified as the bottom third of the (equivalised household) market in-
come distribution, this section of the discussion addresses the question of how to mea-
sure poverty responsiveness in a cross-national setting: To what extent are benefits
targeted towards low-income citizens? How does this targeting vary cross-nationally?
By addressing these questions, this section derives the measures of poverty respon-
siveness that will be used as the right-hand side variable in the analysis presented in
later Chapters.
An additional set of questions considered along with those more central to
this analysis address the extent to which conventional welfare regime cluster analysis
are helpful in understanding cross-national variation in poverty responsiveness. In
Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 37) important study of welfare policy, the centrality of “de-
commodification” emphasizes levels of support provided to those outside of the labor
force, or “the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable
standard of living independently of market participation.” Esping-Andersen’s (1990)
criteria, however, for the classification of welfare regimes are based largely on the in-
come replacement rates for a “normal” worker, on the determinants of eligibility for
pensions, sickness and unemployment benefits, and on the composition of social ex-
penditure.6 These criteria reveal little about the benefits low-income citizens actually
receive, and say almost nothing about the ability of those who may be outside of the
traditional labor force (i.e., those “persistently” at risk of poverty, see Council of the
European Union) to “uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently
of market participation.” This research, therefore, will address the extent to which
6Esping-Andersen’s (1990) de-commodification index is based upon minimum and standard pen-
sion, sickness and unemployment benefits for a normal worker with average earnings, contribution
periods, and benefit duration. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) stratification index, which measures how
benefits vary across social groups, is derived from estimates of the extent to which pension benefits
are distinguished by occupation, the existence of special privileges for the civil service, the propor-
tion of social transfers devoted to means-tested programs, social program coverage rates, and the
ratio of average to maximum benefits.
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the welfare regimes approach to the study of social policy is helpful in identifying
meaningful differences in poverty responsiveness.7
This section begins by identifying specific challenges to the study of poverty
responsiveness within the framework of an election-motivated account of antipoverty
policy, and then, using LIS data, this section presents a measure of poverty relief that
reflect different dimensions of antipoverty policy as they likely appear to low-income
citizens.
Challenges
The challenges of measuring poverty relief in the contexts of an election-motivated
account of antipoverty policy, and in a cross-national comparative analysis, are two-
fold: First, because of the explicit theoretical connection between antipoverty policy
and voter decision-making, it is important for this research that measures of policy
reflect outcomes that would be visible at the individual level. Changes in budgetary
expenditures, which are often used as evidence of social responsiveness, for example
(see Huber & Stephens 2001), may be obscured by the political process itself, or may
ultimately imply few changes in the amounts of benefits low-income citizens receive.
As a consequence, spending data provide noisy measures of the policies low-income
citizens experience.8
7Although Esping-Andersen (1990) provides a useful reference point for this analysis, Esping-
Andersen’s original classification has been adjusted by many analysts (e.g. Pontusson 2005). The
most important revision is offered by the firm-centered “Varieties of Capitalism” literature (see Hall
& Soskice 2001), for example, which collapses Esping-Andersen’s three regime types into a two-fold
distinction between liberal market economies, in which competitive markets structure firm behavior
as in Esping-Andersen’s liberal regimes, and coordinated market economies, in which outcomes are
determined by non-market relationships, especially negotiated agreements between firms and trade
unions, as in many of Esping-Andersen’s conservative and social democratic regimes.
8Others (Bradley et al. 2003, Milanovic 2000) use changes in aggregate measures of inequality,
or changes in the shares of market and disposable income distributions accounted for by different
income groups. However, changes in aggregate measures of inequality may not reflect changes in the
economic well-being of those with low income. Finally, other recent studies incorporate or adapt
OECD measures of income replacement rates, which report ratios of income derived from benefits to
market income (e.g. Bäckman 2005). Because, however, benefits often vary according to the length
of time a recipient is out of work, past earnings, and the number of dependents, income replacement
rates must be calculated for the ‘typical’ (often 40 year old) worker, in very specific circumstances
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The second challenge results from the cross-national variance in the antipoverty
policy instruments. As seen in Table 3.3, the policies from which low-income citizens
benefit vary substantially across the set of countries included in this analysis. These
differences were evident in the examples presented at the beginning of this Chapter:
Social insurance programs, for example, are much more central to antipoverty policy
in Germany and Sweden, than are the American social insurance programs. Using
the descriptions presented in Table 3.3, similar comparisons underscore the different
forms antipoverty programs take in the countries included in this analysis. What is
less clear from a comparison of policies, however, is how much support low-income
citizens receive through various antipoverty programs.
(Martin 1996, Whiteford 1995). More importantly, income replacement rates are not very useful for
describing the benefits received by those who have no market income.
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Table 3.4: Support Received by Low-Income Citizens from Different Types of Social
Policies
















Ireland (2000)e 0.03 0.30 0.34 0.33
United States (2000) 0.05 0.68 0.00 0.28
Australia (2001) 0.12 0.85 0.00 0.03
United Kingdom (1999) 0.15 0.37 0.32 0.17
Canada (2000) 0.17 0.45 0.32 0.07
Liberal Average 0.10 0.53 0.20 0.18
Finland (2000) 0.03 0.24 0.12 0.61
Norway (2000) 0.05 0.10 0.36 0.49
Sweden (2000) 0.07 0.07 0.28 0.59
Netherlands (1999) 0.10 0.09 0.50 0.31
Denmark (2000) 0.11 0.11 0.24 0.54
Social Democratic Average 0.07 0.12 0.30 0.51
Austria (2000) 0.01 0.06 0.57 0.36
Belgium (2000) 0.02 0.41 0.01 0.56
Switzerland (2002) 0.03 0.19 0.00 0.78
Germany (2000) 0.03 0.14 0.47 0.36
France (2000) 0.05 0.33 0.25 0.37
Italy (2000) 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.89
Conservative Average 0.03 0.19 0.22 0.55
NOTES. Table 3.4 reports the average proportion of each type of cash or near-cash transfer
recieved by low-income citizens, of total transfers, in each country. Of the transfers re-
ceived by low-income citizens in Ireland, for example, 3 percent come from minimum income
provisions. Country groupings reflect Esping-Andersen’s (1990)’s welfare regimes.
a This column reports the average proportion of transfers low-income households receive from
minimum income provisions. Although transfer amounts may be determined by the compo-
sition of each low-income household, eligibility for these benefits is primarily determined by
current market income and assets.
b Eligibility for these non-contributory benefits is determined by a coincidence of low earnings
income and other specific circumstances (e.g., the existence of dependent children, exhaustion
of unemployment benefits, need for housing support).
c This column reports the average proportion of total transfers received from non-
contributory non-means-tested (i.e., universal or near-universal) programs. Eligibility is
determined by the existence of specific circumstances (e.g., care of dependent children or
disabled adults, pursuit of advanced education or training).
d Eligibility for transfers included in this column is determined by explicit or implicit (e.g.,
long-term residency) employment-based contributions. This column includes transfers paid
through unemployment insurance programs, wage replacement for maternity or paternity
leave, sickness and disability insurance.
SOURCE. LIS.
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Table 3.5: Support Received by Very Low-Income Citizens from Different Types of
Social Policies
















Ireland (2000) 0.04 0.30 0.06 0.60
United States (2000) 0.10 0.47 0.00 0.43
Australia (2001) 0.18 0.79 0.00 0.03
United Kingdom (1999) 0.27 0.44 0.15 0.14
Canada (2000) 0.58 0.23 0.15 0.03
Liberal Average 0.24 0.45 0.07 0.25
Finland (2000) 0.08 0.31 0.07 0.55
Norway (2000) 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.67
Sweden (2000) 0.20 0.11 0.13 0.56
Denmark (2000) 0.28 0.18 0.05 0.50
Netherlands (1999) 0.34 0.06 0.19 0.41
Social Democratic Average 0.21 0.15 0.11 0.54
Austria (2000) 0.03 0.13 0.14 0.70
Italy (2000) 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.91
Belgium (2000) 0.07 0.14 0.01 0.77
Germany (2000) 0.11 0.30 0.18 0.41
Switzerland (2000) 0.12 0.23 0.00 0.65
France (2000) 0.16 0.34 0.10 0.40
Conservative Average 0.09 0.20 0.07 0.64
NOTES. Table 3.5 reports the average proportion of each type of cash or near-cash transfer
received by those in the first five percentiles of the equivalised household market income
distribution (i.e., the very poor). Table 3.4 provides more information about the coding of
policy types and country groupings.
SOURCE. LIS.
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In fact, as seen more precisely in Table 3.4, countries vary considerably in the
extent to which low-income citizens benefit from minimum income provisions, other
non-contributory programs, and social insurance transfers. Table 3.4 reports the av-
erage proportion of transfers received by low-income citizens from each type of policy
instrument.9 Here, minimum income provisions correspond to the guarantees of suf-
ficient resources described in Table 3.3, and refer to policies that provide income sup-
port. Eligibility for these benefits is determined exclusively by current market income
and assets (though transfer amounts may vary by household composition), in contrast
to the means-tested non-contributory programs (Column (2) of Table 3.4) in which
eligibility is also determined by the existence of specific coincident circumstances
(e.g., the presence of dependent children, the absence of a spouse, the exhaustion of
unemployment insurance benefits). Other non-contributory programs (Column (3))
provide universal or near-universal (non-means-tested) benefits according to existence
of specific conditions (e.g., the presence of dependent children). Finally, eligibility for
social insurance benefits is determined by contributions to sector-specific or public
insurance plans. Table 3.4, therefore, provides insight into the types of policies from
which the poor benefit, and importantly, how reliance on different types of policies
varies cross-nationally. Table 3.4 lists the countries according to Esping-Andersen’s
(1990) typology of welfare regimes. Liberal welfare regimes, of which the U.S. is con-
sidered archetypal, have historically been characterized by their tenant that “public
obligation enters only where the market fails” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 43). Thus,
social policy in liberal regimes provides for those in “demonstrable and abject” need
through means-tested social assistance programs.10 Although, as seen in Table 3.3,
9Although the LIS data categorize social transfers into 46 different policy categories (including,
for example, general social assistance benefits, as well as social assistance benefits associated with
the exhaustion of unemployment benefits, etc.), there are some cases in which more than one type
of transfer are reported in the same LIS variable and cannot be distinguished.
10Esping-Andersen suggests that the incomplete provision of social insurance would undermine
the competitiveness of the market, and as a consequence, it is not surprising that universal social
protection measures are often implemented in otherwise liberal regimes.
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most countries implement some form of means-tested poverty relief, in other regime
types, policy may emphasize other types of programs. For example, antipoverty mea-
sures in social democratic regimes, like the archetypal Sweden, are motivated by the
so-called “flat rate” principle, in which benefit levels are largely invariant to economic
need or history of contributions. The basic unemployment assistance benefits, for ex-
ample, are provided at a standard rate and for a standard length of time, regardless of
past earnings. In contrast, benefits in conservative regimes (e.g., Germany) are closely
tied to past occupational status (especially one’s history of contributions), and vary
by personal circumstances, including age, household composition and expenses.
While the LIS data will not allow us to fully distinguish between the different
regimes by looking at sources of support for low-income households,11 we might ex-
pect to see a greater reliance on means-tested social assistance in liberal regimes, and
a greater emphasis on contributory social insurance programs in social democratic
regimes. Although the important sources of support for low-income citizens in con-
servative regimes are less easily anticipated, particularly because the defining feature
of conservative social policy is in its relationship to occupational status, we might
expect somewhat less reliance on unconditional minimum income provisions. Indeed,
there is some evidence in Table 3.4 that is consistent with Esping-Andersen’s regimes
classification. For example, reliance on minimum income provisions and other mean-
tested programs is generally greater in liberal regimes, than in countries of other
regime types. Alternatively, reliance of low-income citizens on contributory social in-
surance programs is typically greater in social democratic and conservative systems.
Careful inspection of the data presented in Table 3.4, however, reveals that the differ-
ences between subgroups are remarkably fragile: The ranges of values often overlap
considerably, and the differences in means observed above are often contingent on
the classification of one or two countries in each subgroup. In short, while a welfare
11Important differences, for example, arise in criteria used to determine eligibility, and in the
duration of benefits.
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regimes approach may usefully characterize entire systems of social policy, it may
offer little help in understanding determinants of support for low-income citizens.
What Table 3.4 makes clear, in sum, is that the types of policies from which
low-income households benefit vary considerably cross-nationally. More importantly,
as seen in the first column of Table 3.4, minimum income provisions – the policies
most obviously directed towards antipoverty goals – never comprise the most im-
portant source of income support for low-income citizens. Table 3.5 replicates the
earlier analysis for very low-income households (the first five percent of the equiv-
alised household market income distribution), and even within this subset of very
low-income households, reliance on minimum income provisions remains quite lim-
ited. Minimum income provisions comprise the most important source of income
support even among the very poor in only one country: Canada. Further, as with the
larger subset of low-income citizens, the welfare regimes approach is not obviously
helpful in anticipating cross-national patterns of poverty relief.
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present two implications for this research project: First,
legislators have a variety of policy instruments through which they can provide an-
tipoverty responsiveness. Following Franzese & Jusko (2006, 550), an electioneering
Ramsey Rule for antipoverty policy likely holds: Elected representatives “will use all
policy tools, in proportion to their effectiveness in satisfying their electoral goals.”
Along with questions of how much poverty relief is supplied, the last Chapter will
take up the question of which policy instruments legislators emphasize in antipoverty
programs. The second implication of the analysis presented in this section, is that as
a consequence of the cross-national variety of policy instruments used in antipoverty
programs, any analysis that focuses on one specific type of policy (e.g., minimum
income provisions) would miss important sources of support for low-income citizens.
And so, as suggested above, the second challenge of measuring poverty relief lies in
deriving a measure that reflects the varying composition of policies implemented in
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each country.
Dimensions of Poverty Relief
The LIS data present an obvious way to overcome the challenges in evaluating a cross-
national, electoral account of poverty relief: As suggested above, for large samples in
each country, the LIS data report both the total amount of transfers received by each
household, as well as detailed information about the household’s earnings and invest-
ment (i.e., market) income. In fact, the relationship between total social transfers and
market income provides a useful basis of a measure of poverty responsiveness. Con-
sider Figure 3.1, which reports the bi-variate relationships between (equivalised house-
hold) market income and social transfers for Esping-Andersen’s archetypal countries,
Sweden (square points), Germany (diamond points), and the U.S. (round points).
Each data point represents the mean values estimated for one per cent of each work-
ing aged national sample (see Table 3.1), and all currency amounts are standardized
to (thousands of) 2000 U.S. dollars.
Later in this project, I will present more rigorous cross-national comparisons
of the relationship between market income and social transfers. Here, patterns in the
relationships between market income and social transfers in Sweden, the U.S., and
Germany can be usefully compared to identify dimensions of poverty relief. There
are three important differences in the American, German and Swedish distributions:
First, note that the amount of support provided to those with no market income (at
the extreme left-hand side of the distribution) varies across these three countries, and
is more generous in Sweden than in either Germany or the U.S. Second, these countries
vary in the rates at which transfer amounts vary with small increases in market in-
come.12 Finally, a closely-related third feature concerns the distribution of universal-
or near-universal benefits. As seen in Table 3.4, non-means-tested non-contributory
12This feature is similar to Barr’s (2004) “horizontal efficiency,” which corresponds to the distri-
bution of benefits among low-income citizens: Do all citizens with incomes below a specified poverty
threshold receive support?
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NOTE. Figure 3.1 reports the bi-variate relationship between total social transfers and market income
for Sweden (2000; square points), the U.S. (2000; circle points), and Germany (2000; diamond points).
Each data point represents the mean social transfers and market income values for one per cent of each
working age sample (see Table 3.1 ). All currency amounts are reported in thousands of 2000 U.S.
dollars, for equivalised households. Error bars denote 95 per cent confidence intervals. This Figure
exclude the top one, six, and 22 per cent of the German, Swedish and American income distributions,
respectively.
transfers provide an important source of support for low-income residents in some
countries (including Germany and Sweden). Differences in these amounts, as well as
benefits distributed through social insurance programs, are reflected in the relative
levels of the tails of the distribution, not surprisingly with Sweden and Germany dis-
tributing somewhat more contributory and non-contributory universal benefits than
the U.S..13 Nevertheless, because low-income citizens may benefit disproportionately
from these types of policies, a measure of poverty responsiveness, therefore, ought to
include universal benefits as well as levels of support for those with little or no market
income, and the rate at which these levels of support vary within increases in income.
To generate a summary measure that reflects these three components of poverty
13This feature is similar to Barr’s (2004) “vertical efficiency,” which describes the extent to which
benefits are concentrated among those with low-income, or or are they more generally distributed.
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relief, I suggest that the relationship between market income and social transfers in
each country is well-approximated by the non-linear expression:
STij = αj + β1j exp(β2jMIij) + eij , (3.1)
where STij denotes social transfer amounts, and MIij denotes market income, for
individuals i = 1...n in countries j = 1...J , the parameters αj > 0, β1j > 0, and
β2j < 0 describe the bi-variate relationship within each country, and eij is a stochastic
residual term. The solid lines in Figure 3.1 demonstrate that, in fact, this non-linear
specification fits the LIS data in Germany, Sweden and the U.S. quite well.
The specification in Eq. (3.1) provides an accessible substantive interpretation.
Notice that, when β2j < 0,
14 individuals who have no market income receive social
transfers in the amount of αj + β1j . Similarly, for very high levels of MIij , STij
is expected to take on the value αj . Thus, (with the identification restriction) αj
describes the basic level of transfers for which all or most members of a society
are eligible (including social insurance programs), αj + β1j reports transfers made to
residents with no market income, and β2j reports the curvature of the line, or the rate
at which benefit levels decline increased market earnings.15 The parameters αj, β1j ,
and β2j , therefore, jointly describe the antipoverty policy that characterizes a specific
country, and can be used as the basis for a comparison of poverty relief within a
society over time, or across societies more generally.16
Looking at the cross-national distribution parameter estimates (see Figure
3.2), which plots average transfers to those with no market income (α + β1) against
the average rates at which benefit levels decline (β2 < 0), we find a clear pattern of
increasing poverty responsiveness: Countries in the upper right corner, for example,
are those that provide large transfers to those with no market income which drop
14This restriction ensures that the parameters are identified.
15While this is a useful way to interpret β2, it is not precisely correct: The rate at which benefits
decline is also a function of β1.
16This function is identified with the restriction that β1 and β2 do not equal zero.
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Rate of Benefit Decline (B2)
NOTE. Figure 3.2 reports of estimates of the parameters α+ β1 and β2 for the countries included in
this analysis. Error bars denote 95 percent confidence intervals.
SOURCE. LIS.
off relatively slowly with small changes in market income. Those countries situated
towards the lower left-hand corner of Figure 3.2 provide little support for those with
no market income, and what benefits are provided, drop off quickly with increases in
income. What is less apparent in Figure 3.2, however, is distinct clusters of countries
reflecting the conventional types of welfare systems. Although there is some cluster-
ing, particularly of the Scandinavian countries in the upper right-hand corner of the
Figure, there is quite a bit of variance, in both dimensions, within these clusters. Fur-
ther, when considered in this way, these data do not reflect cross-national differences
in the underlying market income distributions: How well, for example, do transfers to
those with no market income (α+ β1) support the beneficiaries, given their national
context?
Of course, a cross-national comparison based on only one (or even two) of the
parameters αj, β1j or β2j would be an incomplete, and potentially misleading, measure
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of poverty relief. Measures based on the benefits received by any particular low-
income household (perhaps, the median) would be similarly misleading. To illustrate,
consider Figure 3.3 which reports the relationship between market income and social
transfers in two hypothetical countries. As in Figure 3.1, here the horizontal axis
reports market income, and the vertical axis reports corresponding social transfers.
In each panel, the solid line denotes the relationship between market income and
social transfers, i.e., Eq. (3.1), and the dotted line reports the linear function,
STi = ψ −MIi. (3.2)
(The reason for Eq. 3.2’s inclusion will become apparent shortly.) By construction,
the parameters are fixed such that αA = αB = α, β1A = β1B = β1, but with β2
varying across cases: β2A > β2B. If comparisons are made on the basis of benefits
provided to those with no market income, or universal and social insurance transfers,
Countries A and B are indistinguishable. However, a comparison of the relief received
by other low-income households (e.g., household x) shows that the apparent similarity
of Countries A and B can be misleading.
In Figure 3.3, the dotted lines which report the linear function Eq. (3.2), reflect
the amount of transfers necessary to bring each household’s income to the level of
the current poverty threshold. Thus, the extent to which the estimated relationship
between social transfers and market income approximates Eq. (3.2) reflects the extent
to which a country is successful in providing poverty relief through the provision of
cash transfers.
Using the threshold ψ, then, the extent to which social transfers provide
poverty relief can be estimated as the ratio of the shaded region in each panel of
Figure 3.3, to the area defined by the triangle, (0, ψ), (0, 0), and (ψ, 0). This ratio
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NOTE. Figure 3.3 reports the relationships between market income (MI) and social transfers (ST ),
in two hypothetical countries, as expressed by the function ST = αj +β1j ·exp(β2j ·MI). Here, αA =
αB = α, β1A = β1B = β1, and β2A > βB2. The dotted line represents the function, STi = ψ −MI,
where ψ denotes a poverty threshold.














ψ −MI)∂MI , (3.3)
where τ reports the point of intersection for Eqs. (3.1) and (3.2).17





+ 2ατ + 2ψτ − τ 2) − 1 (3.4)
Notice that the value of R increases as universal transfers, and transfers to those











Thus, R reflects well the dimensions of poverty responsiveness considered in the
17The parameter τ was identified by searching for the value that equated Eqs. (3.1) and (3.2).
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discussion above.
Table 3.6 reports estimates of the parameters α, β1, β2 and τ for each country
included in the analysis, as well as estimates of the poverty responsiveness ratio, R
(estimates of ψ are reported in Table 3.2).18 Although in some ways, these data
conform to Esping-Andersen’s expectations – the countries listed at the very top of
Table 3.6 are countries with liberal welfare regimes, and the countries in the last
two rows have social democratic regimes – there is little evidence of welfare regime
clustering in the data presented in Table 3.6.
To see how the measure R compares to more conventional measures of social
spending, Figure 3.4 plots R against social spending (as a percentage of GDP, left
panel), and against the reduction in income inequality through redistributive policy
(estimated as the percent reduction in Gini coefficients, right panel). In both cases, R
and the conventional measures are positively correlated. Nevertheless, for countries
with similar levels of social spending, and similar reductions in income inequality,
we see quite different levels of poverty relief: The U.S. and Ireland (both liberal
regimes), for example, look quite similar by conventional measures, but demonstrate
quite different levels of poverty relief.19 Similarly, Switzerland and Belgium (both
conservative regimes), demonstrate similar levels of social spending but quite different
levels of poverty relief. This variance suggests that the poverty responsiveness ratio
reflects a dimension of social policy that is not well-captured by welfare regimes
analysis.
18The parameters α, β1 and β2 are estimated in Stata SE, using a non-linear least squares (NLS)
specification (specifically, Stata’s nlprocedure). Starting values of 1,2, and −.1 were established for
α, β1 and β2, respectively.
19Although Ireland and the U.S. spend similar proportions of their GDP on social policy, their
allocations across social spending priorities are quite difference: For example, while Ireland spend
1.6 percent of their GDP on family benefits, including family allowances and support for maternity
leave, the U.S. spends 0.4 percent of its GDP on family support policies. U.S. policy, instead,
favors the support of the elderly, spending 5.2 percent of its GDP on social security; Ireland devotes
roughly half of this amount to the support of the elderly (Organisation For Economic Co-Operation
and Development (OECD) 2004).
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NOTE. Figure 3.4 compares the poverty responsiveness ratio to more conventional measures of social
policy outcomes, social spending (as a percentage of GDP, left panel) and income inequality reduction
through redistributive policy (measured as the proportionate deduction in Gini coefficient, right panel).
Solid lines report ordinary least-squares (OLS) fitted values (standard errors reported in parentheses):
R = 0.242(0.103) + 0.011(0.004){ Social Expenditure } (3.6)
and
R = 0.440(0.082) + 0.246(0.322){ Reduction in Income Inequality }. (3.7)
SOURCES. Social spending: Organisation For Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)
(2004). Reduction in income inequality: LIS.
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Table 3.6: Poverty Relief in Developed Democracies
Country (Year of Study) Parameter Estimatesa RMSE τb Rb
α β1 β2
United States (2000) 0.6650 5.5925 -0.1275 3.3079 19.4818 0.2472
(0.0256) (0.0790) (0.0035) (0.1809) (0.0030)
Canada (2000) 0.4502 5.6803 -0.0649 2.4706 15.2595 0.3690
(0.0474) (0.0649) (0.0018) (0.0381) (0.0028)
Germany (2000) 0.8813 7.4763 -0.0884 2.7253 15.8736 0.4286
(0.0700) (0.1274) (0.0033) (0.1264) (0.0052)
Norway (2000) 0.8227 10.8806 -0.0694 3.0254 21.9067 0.4295
(0.0703) (0.1412) (0.0018) (0.1508) (0.0039)
Spain (2000) 0.5400 5.3563 -0.1951 3.0408 9.8286 0.4474
(0.0971) (0.2545) (0.0181) (0.2898) (0.0174)
Australia (2001) 0.0390 6.6205 -0.1022 1.9526 11.9662 0.4539
(0.0601) (0.0890) (0.0036) (0.0652) (0.0061)
Israel (2001) 0.6785 5.3129 -0.1143 2.5003 10.0661 0.4639
(0.0701) (0.6450) (0.0065) (0.3139) (0.0490)
Ireland (2000) 0.5551 6.2163 -0.0961 2.4965 10.7600 0.4792
(0.1628) (0.2326) (0.0087) (0.1343) (0.0128)
Switzerland (2002) 0.6398 15.0969 -0.0956 4.6239 22.2636 0.4929
(0.1527) (0.4657) (0.0053) (0.4496) (0.0131)
Netherlands (1999) 0.5648 11.3683 -0.1205 3.3620 16.9863 0.4958
(0.1098) (0.2445) (0.0060) (0.2776) (0.0113)
Finland (2000) 0.9705 8.7840 -0.0877 3.6431 14.5037 0.4990
(0.0912) (0.1708) (0.0036) (0.1317) (0.0067)
United Kingdom (1999) 0.5558 9.1189 -0.1201 2.4935 13.8605 0.5116
(0.0326) (0.0564) (0.0022) (0.0629) (0.0042)
Sweden (2000) 0.4034 11.0709 -0.0636 4.1215 10.6747 0.5165
(0.1511) (0.1768) (0.0025) (0.0821) (0.0062)
Belgium (2000) 0.7174 9.1362 -0.1126 2.8039 11.9283 0.5639
(0.1853) (0.2813) (0.0084) (0.2048) (0.0146)
Denmark (2000) 0.2026 14.8717 -0.0659 3.3232 16.6227 0.5901
(0.0387) (0.0509) (0.0006) (0.0277) (0.0018)
Austria (2000) 0.9466 9.0808 -0.1222 3.4423 8.4739 0.5911
(0.2187) (0.3687) (0.0111) (0.1981) (0.0191)
France (2000) 0.6687 8.7780 -0.1400 3.7848 7.8596 0.6202
(0.0947) (0.1745) (0.0061) (0.0945) (0.0102)
Italy (2000) 0.8509 7.0772 -0.1974 4.0317 7.4842 0.6260
(0.1023) (0.2239) (0.0136) (0.1437) (0.0169)
Luxembourg (2000) 1.8380 17.5569 -0.0962 5.7119 14.9558 0.6770
(0.2472) (0.6450) (0.0065) (0.3631) (0.0195)
NOTES. Table 3.6 reports parameters that describe the relationship between market income and
social transfers, and the poverty relief ratio, R.
a The parameters reported in this column are estimated by NLS (see Eq. 3.1), with conventional
Gauss-Newton standard errors in parentheses.
b τ reported the estimated point of intersection of Eqs. (3.1) and (3.2). Standard errors for
both τ and R, reported in parentheses, are estimated using repeated draws from the posterior
distributions of the NLS parameters.
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Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs)
In using the relationship between market income and social transfer, this analysis
assumes that poverty responsiveness, at least as a component of electoral strategy,
is generally achieved through redistributive policy. As a consequence, this analy-
sis neglects pre-market income policy measures (i.e., “active” labor market policies,
ALMP) that are intended to provide poverty relief, and potentially under-estimates a
country’s more general level of poverty responsiveness. Consider, for example, public
sector job creation measures: What would the market income of public sector job
creation program participants earn in the absence of these programs? In an extreme
case, in which poverty responsiveness occurs entirely through similar ALMPs, the
measure of poverty responsiveness described above (Eq. 3.4), in this case R = 0,
would be extremely misleading. For this analysis, therefore, it may be important to
consider how pervasive ALMPs are in the developed democracies considered in this
analysis.
Table 3.7 reports the percentage of the labor force in each country that benefits
from ALMPs generally, and direct job creation programs specifically, relative to the
number of beneficiaries of out-of-work income maintenance and support programs, in
the countries generally studied in comparative analysis of welfare policy. Although the
OECD data reported here do not correspond directly to the analysis here (i.e., these
data are not restricted by age), these aggregate-level statistics allow us to evaluate the
relative importance of market income manipulation in the complete set of antipoverty
policy measures.
Column (1) reports the percentage of the labor force that benefits from direct
job creation programs, or programs that are intended to provide at least temporary
employment to the unemployed, usually through public works programs. Although
these programs are somewhat notorious, as most observers note, however, and as
clearly evident in Table 3.7, job creation programs usually benefit only a very small
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Sweden 0.00 7.27 6.60 0.91 0.64
United Kingdom 0.01 1.52 3.18 2.09 0.65
Norway 0.00 2.19 4.79 2.19 0.94
Ireland 1.26 3.58 8.63 2.41 1.04
Netherlands 0.62 7.81 9.08 1.16 1.24
Switzerland 0.00 1.80 3.18 1.77 1.28
Italy 0.21 .. 2.92 .. 1.29
Finland 0.46 3.51 13.37 3.81 1.32
Germany 0.82 5.15 10.02 1.95 1.67
Denmark 0.01 5.67 8.65 1.53 1.75
France 1.16 5.53 9.76 1.76 1.95
Canada 0.08 2.23 .. .. 1.97
Australia 0.66 1.81 7.39 4.08 2.14
Belgium 2.53 7.69 14.88 1.93 2.14
Austria 0.04 .. 6.55 .. 2.60
United States .. .. .. .. 3.00
Average 0.53 4.29 7.07 2.13 1.60
NOTE. Table 3.7 reports the number of participants in active labor market programs, and more
specifically, direct job creation programs, as a percentage of the total labor force.“..” denotes
data-points that are not reported by OECD.
a Data corresponding to 2002 are reported unless measures for both variables are not available.
b Active labor market programs include: Training, recruitment and employment maintenance
incentives, integration of the disabled, start-up incentives, and direct job creation.
c Direct job creation programs include those intended to provide either temporary or regular
employment to otherwise unemployed persons.
d This column reports the percentage of the labor force that receives unemployment insurance
payments or other unemployment benefits, including those in early retirement programs. Bene-
ficiaries of non-contributory antipoverty measures are generally not included in the percentages
of recipients reported here (the exceptional cases are Denmark and the Netherlands). Data re-
ported in this column do include, however, unemployment programs that allow older unemployed
workers to receive similar benefits without fulfilling work availability requirements.
e Spending on ALMP includes public employment services and the administration of benefits, as
well as all ALMP programs listed above.
SOURCE. Organisation For Economic Co-Operation And Development (OECD) (2006).
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(usually very specific) proportion of a country’s labor force. In fact, job creation pro-
grams are rarely the central component of a country’s ALMPs.20 Training programs,
for example, typically serve as the core of ALMP in the EU (Kluve, Card, Fertig,
Góra, Jacobi, Jensen, Leetmaa, Schaffner, Schmidt, van der Klaauw & Weber 2007),
and provide an important source of income support for their participants. Although
less directly, employment incentive and start-up incentive programs also provide mar-
ket income support for those not regularly employed. Thus, Column (2) reports the
total percentage of each country’s labor force that benefit from ALMPs, including
direct job creation measures (and the integration of the disabled).
To allow for comparison with “passive,” or redistributive measures, Column
(3) reports the percentage of labor force members that benefit from unemployment
income support policies. Note that beneficiaries of non-contributory, antipoverty pro-
grams are not included in this measure, with the exception of those in Denmark and
the Netherlands, and that ALMPs often supplement the incomes of those receiving
unemployment benefits. As a consequence, a comparison of Columns (2) and (3)
likely understates a country’s emphasis on redistributive poverty responsiveness, rel-
ative to market income manipulation. Nevertheless, as seen in Column (4), which
reports the ratio of the percentage of the labor force benefiting from redistributive
policies to the percentage of those participating in ALMP programs, emphasis on re-
distributive measures exceeds ALMP efforts, on average, by a factor of two. Similar
patterns emerge when spending efforts on the different types of policies, for which the
data are more complete, are taken into account (see Column 5).
In sum, note first that despite their notoriety direct job creation programs
comprise a very small part of any country’s antipoverty policy, and by themselves,
are unlikely to bias estimates of poverty responsiveness, R. Although redistributive
20With the exceptions of Belgium (40 per cent), France (47 per cent), Ireland (50 per cent), and
the Netherlands (35 per cent), EU ALMP expenditures on direct job creation programs are typically
less than 25 per cent.
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measures are more prominent than ALMP programs in most countries, the measure
of poverty responsiveness R, probably underestimates the scope of antipoverty policy
in some cases.
3.5 Conclusion
This Chapter presents the measure of poverty responsiveness that is used as the
basis of the analysis presented in the following Chapters. In a way similar to a Gini
coefficient, the poverty responsiveness ratio compares the joint distribution of social
transfers and market income, to a hypothetical distribution in which all low-income
households are lifted out of poverty. This measure overcomes the challenge presented
by the cross-national variance in the composition of antipoverty programs, and unlike
conventional measures of social policy outcomes, R reflects well the perspective of
low-income voters.
This Chapter also presents some early evidence which suggests that a welfare
regimes perspective may be less helpful in understanding cross-national variation
in poverty responsiveness. This secondary theme is addressed more rigorously in the
last Chapter of this project. Before proceeding to the broadly comparative analysis of
Chapter 5, however, the next Chapter takes advantage of natural experiments in Italy
and Germany, in which legislators’ incentives to be responsive to low-income citizens
changed in dramatic ways. As we shall see, in both cases, legislators’ strengthened
electoral incentives to be responsive to low-income citizens were quickly followed by
more responsive antipoverty policy.
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Chapter 4.
How Changing Electoral Incentives Can Help the
Poor
4.1 Introduction
This chapter offers an empirical test of whether distributions to low-income citizens
are structured by electoral incentives. Evaluating this relationship empirically poses
a particular challenge: For good reasons, as Acemoglu & Robinson (2006) and others
(e.g. Huber & Stephens 2001) suggest, welfare state generosity tends to be highly
correlated with the proportionality of electoral rules.1 As a result, the independent
effects of electoral incentives are difficult to distinguish from other factors related to
welfare policy in a broadly comparative, cross-sectional analysis. Instead, I evaluate
changes in distributions to low-income citizens following major changes in electoral
rules, and in the context in which elections are held: I present evidence from Italy,
before and after the electoral reforms of the early 1990s, and from Germany, before
and after reunification.
As is evident in Figure 4.1, the Italian poor live mostly in the South. (Here,
following the convention established in the previous Chapter, the poor are those of
working age with market incomes in the lowest third in the national market income
1Acemoglu & Robinson (2006) argue, for example, that regime transitions ought to be viewed
from within a framework of redistributive conflict, and that the type of democratic institutions
reflects a commitment made by elites to include low-income citizens in the policy-making process.
From a somewhat different perspective, Huber & Stephens (2001) attribute differences in welfare
policy to the dominant partisanship of governments, and suggest that MMD rules facilitated the
representation of social democratic parties.
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NOTE. This Figure reports the geographic concentration of low-income citizens (i.e.,
those with incomes in the lowest third of the market income distribution) within the
regions of Italy.
distribution.) As a result, when the process of electoral reform replaced large MMDs,
in which seats were allocated according to a proportional representation (PR) rule,
with a system in which most of the seats are elected in single-member districts (SMDs)
under plurality rules, new incentives to be responsive to low-income citizens arose.
While Germany has not recently changed its electoral rules, reunification
changed the distribution of low-income voters across electoral districts. Prior to re-
unification in Germany, low-income citizens were fairly evenly distributed across the
German Länder (see Figure 4.2). However, with reunification, low-income citizens are
now under-represented in the former West German area, and over-represented in the
East. And, while German electoral rules are intended to generate strictly proportional
outcomes – that is, the distribution of votes should match the distribution of seats in
the legislature – they nevertheless favor geographically concentrated interests. First,
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to qualify in the national allocation of seats, a party must be supported by either 5
per cent of the national vote distribution, or win three SMD seats. Second, a party is
entitled to keep any SMD seats it wins in excess of its national allocation (excessive
mandates), which allows geographically concentrated interests to be over-represented
by comparison to the national distribution of support. In these ways, German elec-
toral rules favored the representation of low-income citizens in the post-reunification
period.
Figure 4.2: The Geographic Distribution of Low-Income Citizens in Germany, 1984-
1990 and 1994-2001
Less than 33%
33% -  37%
More than 37%
% Low-Income
NOTE. This Figure reports the geographic concentration of low-income citizens (i.e.,
those with incomes in the lowest third of the market income distribution) within the
regions of Germany.
In this discussion, I demonstrate how electoral rules created new incentives to
be responsive to low-income people by tracking the changing seat share that would
be allocated to a low-income voting blocbefore and after electoral reform in Italy,
and before and after reunification in Germany. Then, I consider whether these new
incentives had real effects on policy outcomes. Because I am examining each country
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over a short time period, this research design offers the advantage of controlling for
the effects of historical legacy and political culture. Any changes in the distribution
of benefits to low-income citizens that are consistent with the implications of changes
in electoral rules or context can reasonably be attributed to changes in electoral
incentives.
4.2 Electoral Reform in Italy
Italy’s electoral reform replaced a system in which elections were contested in MMDs
and seats were allocated according to a open-list PR rule,2 with a system in which
most seats were contested in SMDs under plurality rules. The details of these sys-
tems will be considered shortly. For the purposes of this discussion, however, there
are three important features of the Italian electoral reform process: First, from the
earliest stages of the electoral reform process, SMDs were closely tied to the reform-
ers’ objectives. Second, the pace of reform, from the initial collection of half a million
signatures to the implementation of new electoral laws was quite quick. And third,
the electoral reform process was not the result of any broader initiative to be more
responsive to low-income people.
A brief history of the electoral reform process illustrates these points. Follow-
ing the Italian regulations for referendum initiatives, the “Committee for Referendums
on Electoral Laws” (COREL), led by Mario Segni, a former Christian Democratic
backbencher, presented the following proposal to Italy’s Constitutional Court: (1)
the reduction of the number of preference votes used in lower house elections, from
three to one; (2) the introduction of a SMDs for the election of the Senate;3 and (3)
the introduction of SMDs for local elections. The Court eventually approved all three
proposals, and referendums were held in June 1991, on the first proposal, and in April
2That is, voters could cast preference votes for up to four candidates on a party list.
3It was generally understood that a reform of the Senate would imply a parallel reform of the
Chamber of Deputies (Katz 2003).
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Table 4.1: Electoral Reform Time-Line
Date Event
Feb 1990 COREL is established and begins its campaign for electoral reform refer-
endums
Apr-Jul 1990 COREL collects over 1.25 million signatures supporting its referendum
proposals
Jan 1991 The Constitutional Court approves referendum question on reduction of
preference votes
June 1991 Referendum on reduction of preference votes approved by 96 per cent of
voters
Jan 1992 COREL presents a revised version of the question on SMDs to the Con-
stitutional Court for approval
Jan 1993 The Constitutional Court approves a set of eight referendum questions,
that includes COREL’s second proposal on SMDs
Mar 1993 Legislative reform to incorporate SMDs in local elections
Apr 1993 Referendum on electoral reform, including COREL’s proposal for SMDs
May-June 1993 Committee on Constitutional Affairs drafts and debates proposed electoral
reform, in which 70 per cent of seats are elected in SMDs by plurality rules
Jul 1993 Senate approves the proposed electoral reforms
Aug 1993 Chamber of Deputies approves the proposed electoral reforms
NOTE. This Table reports key events in Italy’s electoral reform process.
SOURCES. Donovan (1995), Katz (2003, 1996).
1993, on the second proposal. (The third proposal, the adoption of SMDs in local
elections, was implemented by the legislature in March 1993, without a referendum.)
This period, “the three years from early 1990 to the spring of 1993 saw a virtually
continuous mobilization in favor of electoral reform” (Donovan 1995, 54).
Historical accounts of the reform process usually emphasize two sets of objec-
tives pursued by the reformers (Table 4.1 provides an time-line of the key events).
For Segni and COREL, in particular, the electoral reform process centered on the
creation of a two-party system of electoral competition that would allow alternation
in government, and on the establishment of a direct relationship between legislators
and their constituents (Donovan 1995, Katz 2003, 48). As a result, it is not surpris-
ing that SMDs were a core tenet in the reformers’ platform: Following Duverger’s
law, which is generally understood to imply that simple plurality voting in SMDs
yields two-party competition (see Riker 1982), SMDs have long been associated with
84
two party competition. Indeed, the introduction of SMDs was a core component
of COREL’s initial referendum proposal. Under Italy’s pre-reform electoral rules,
parties only rarely won a sufficient number of seats to form the government, and
the more frequent negotiated coalitions were notoriously fragile. Some reformers, in-
cluding Radical Party member Marco Pannella, expressed a desire to limit, weaken
or “close down” the number of existing parties through the electoral reform. More
generally, with elections contested in SMDs, reformers hoped that Italian electoral
politics would gain new competitiveness, and by consequence, they argued, greater
democratic legitimacy (Katz 2003). Thus, from the very beginning of the electoral
reform process, SMDs were closely associated with the objectives of the campaign.
Further, the overwhelming support for electoral reform in the 1991 referendum likely
made the eventual adoption of SMDs a virtual certainty.4
The second important feature of the Italian electoral reform process is the
pace at which the reform occurred. Notice in Table 4.1 that once COREL had met
the administrative requirements of referendum initiatives (i.e. collecting signatures
and gaining the approval of the Constitutional Court), the referendums, with their
mandate for reform, quickly followed. The uncertainty regarding the timing of elec-
tions and the implementation of the electoral reform was undoubtedly heightened by
the tangentopoli (‘kick-back city’ or ‘bribeville’) corruption scandals, and subsequent
mani pulite (clean hands) investigation: Many prominent government officials were
implicated, including the former Prime Minister and head of the Partito Socialista
Italiano (PSI), Bettino Craxi, who came to symbolize the tangentopoli scandals.
Finally, the third important feature of the Italian electoral reform process is
that it was not part of a larger initiative to incorporate low-income citizens. In-
stead, Donovan suggests that the electoral reform was symptomatic of strong anti-
4Two more referendums on electoral reform, that would have abolished the MMD component of
Italy’s mixed system, were held in 1999 and 2000. However, after Casa delle Libertà’s poor showing in
the regional elections of 2005, then-Prime Minister Berlusconi pushed through parliament legislation
that re-established a system in which all members are elected in MMDs.
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Table 4.2: Support for Italy’s 1993 Referendum on Electoral Reform, by Region
Region % Regional Average %


















Sardinia 72.5 Insular regions 64.8
Sicily 62.3
TOTAL 77.0
NOTE. This Table reports the proportion of votes cast in favor of the 1993 referendum
on election reform, for each Italian region, and for Northern, Central and Southern
Italy.
SOURCE. Ministero dell’Interno (2006).
partitocrazia sentiment, resulting from the tangentopoli scandals. Moreover, the geo-
graphic distribution of support for the electoral reform referendum reaffirms its largely
Northern foundation (see Table 4.2): Though support for the electoral reform process
was quite high throughout the country, support was especially strong in the North-
ern regions, where low-income citizens are most under-represented. It seems unlikely,
therefore, that the process of electoral reform can be seen either as an initiative of
those representing the interests of low-income citizens, or as the result of low-income
voter support.
In sum, these features – the prominence of SMDs, the pace of electoral reform,
and its Northern origins – suggest that (1) legislators could rationally anticipate the
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implications of the electoral reform movement for their electoral incentives, (2) there
was a great deal of uncertainty about when the reforms would be implemented in an
election, and (3) the electoral reform movement did not arise from a broader initiative
to be more responsive to low-income citizens (i.e. the electoral reform was exogenous
with regards to poverty relief).
Changing Electoral Incentives in Italy
In the pre-reform period, seats in the Chamber of Deputies were allocated in a two-tier
system: First, seats were allocated within each district (according to the Hagenbach-
Bischoff, or Droop, formula in districts electing fewer than 21 seats and the Imperali
formula in larger districts).5 Then, remaining votes were aggregated at the national
level, and unallocated seats were distributed according a simple quota system with
largest remainders.6 Voting was compulsory, and voters were able to cast up to three
or four preference votes on open-list ballots, depending on the number of legislators
to be elected.
As suggested above, the electoral reform process resulted in a radically different
electoral system. Though the technical changes implied by the referendums were
abrogative – Italian law dictates that referendums can only delete law, and as a result,
the formal changes brought about by the referendums were slight – the legislators
found in the overwhelming support a mandate for a system in which SMDs played
a prominent role. In the post-reform period, 75 per cent (475) of the seats in the
Chamber of Deputies were elected in SMDs by plurality rules, and, to ensure the
representation of smaller parties, 25 per cent (155) were elected in 26 MMDs. Voters
cast two ballots, and seats in the second tier are allocated by the d’Hondt quota. The
5The Hagenbach-Bischoff formula uses a quotas of the (V/D+1)+1, where V reports the number
of valid ballots, andD reports the district magnitude. The Imperiali formula, instead, uses the quota
(V/D + 2) (see, e.g. Farrell 2001).
6A simple quota is calculated by V/D, where V reports the number of valid ballots, and D reports
the district magnitude.
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Table 4.3: Allocation of Seats, Before and After Italy’s Electoral Reform
Region A. Pre-Reform B. Post-Reform
MMD SMD MMD
North
Piemonte 12 3 2
Lombardia 15 0 2
Val d’Aosta 0 0
Trento Alto Adige 2 1 0
Veneto 10 2 2
Friuli Venezia Giulia 2 0 0
Liguria 4 1 1
Emilia Romagna 6 0 1
Central
Marche 5 5 1
Lazio 18 13 4
Toscana 7 1 1
Umbria 3 1 0
South
Abruzzo 6 8 1
Molise 2 2 0
Campania 40 43 8
Puglia 24 33 5
Basilicata 2 4 0
Calabria 14 15 3
Islands
Sicilia 35 37 8
Sardinia 8 9 1
TOTAL 215/627 178 40
(34.2%) 217/630 (34.6%)
NOTE. This Table reports the number of seats that would be allocated to a low-income
voting bloc, before and after the electoral reforms of the early 1990s.
Senate is elected under similar rules.
To illustrate how this change in electoral rules created new incentives to be
responsive to low-income citizens, suppose that there exists a low-income voting bloc
such that all low-income citizens vote together, and all turn out to vote. How many
seats would this low-income voting bloc receive under the pre- and post- reform
electoral rules?
To estimate the number of seats a low-income voting bloc could win, before and
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after Italy’s electoral reform, I take the following steps (technical details are reported
in Appendix 5.A). First, using Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data, which report
individual-level income by source, I classify low-income citizens according to their
relative market income position. Then, using the regional identification variables
LIS provides, I estimate the proportions of each region that qualify as low-income.
Focusing on the Chamber of Deputies, and using these proportions to represent the
vote share of a low-income voting bloc in each region, I then allocate seats according
to the rules governing elections, before and after the electoral reform. That is, in the
pre-reform period I allocate seats according to the Hagenbach-Bischoff or Imperiali
quota systems, depending on the size of the electoral district (ignoring remainders,
the allocation of which depends upon the shares of votes won by other parties, and
the second tier allocation). In the post-reform case, I allocate SMD seats according to
the procedure described in Appendix 5.A, and calculate the PR distribution of seats
at the regional level (ignoring remainders and using a Droop quota, instead of the
d’Hondt formula), taking into account the scorporo, or deduction for SMD seats won.
This strategy allows a pre- and post- reform comparison of the number of seats a
low-income voting bloc could win if a party were successful in cultivating its support
(see Table 4.3).
There are several features of Table 4.3 that are important for this discussion:
First, notice that a low-income voting bloc could secure more SMD seats in the post-
reform era than its total number of seats won in the pre-reform MMD rules. Although
the difference in the total number of seats is rather modest – a result ensured by
Italy’s mixed electoral system, the decisiveness of the support a low-income bloc for
each legislator elected in an SMD is considerably greater than under MMD rules.
Second, not surprisingly, almost all of the SMD seats allocated to the low-income
voting bloc are won in Italy’s Southern regions; the low-income citizens in these
regions represent about 12 per cent of the national population. Particularly with the
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new clarity of attribution, these features of Table 4.3 suggest that Italy’s electoral
reform implemented a system that favored the representation of low-income citizens:
Securing their support in the post-reform period was an efficient way to win a large
number of seats that did not exist under the pre-reform electoral rules. As a result
of this reform, efforts at poverty relief should reflect increased incentives to represent
the interests of those with low incomes.
4.3 Germany’s Changing Electoral Context
Elections to Germany’s lower house, the Bundestag, are also governed by a mixed
electoral system. In a way similar to the reformed Italian system, voters cast two
votes (though not ballots): The first vote elects an SMD constituency candidate; the
second vote contributes to the votes cast in favor of Land-wide MMDs. Seats are first
allocated among parties according to the share of national party list votes received,
and then, following the Niemeyer largest remainder method, are distributed among
the Länder according to the geographic distribution of electoral support for each list.7
The number of seats won by constituency candidates is subtracted from what each
party is entitled to, according to the regional Niemeyer allocation, and remaining
seats are filled in the order specified in the Land party lists.
The result of these electoral rules, as suggested above, is a nearly proportional
outcome. That is, the shares of seats held by parties correspond almost perfectly
to their shares of the national vote distribution. Nevertheless, the German electoral
system favors the representation of geographically concentrated interests in two im-
portant ways: First, in order to participate in the national Niemeyer allocation, a
7The Niemeyer allocation first calculates the total number of seats to be allocated to each party,
on the basis of a simple quota with largest remainders, and the party list votes. Then, for each party,
the seats are allocated among the Land lists according to the geographic distribution of support: A
simple quota is calculated for each party, and then seats are allocated among the regions according
to the ratio of the number of votes each party received in each region, to this quota (with remaining
seats allocated according to the largest remainders). This allocation represents the total number of
seats a party is entitled to within each region. See Federal Returning Officer (2002) for more details.
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party must win at least three of the SMD seats, or five per cent of the national vote
distribution. Second, excessive mandates (or overhang seats) are those in which a
party secures more SMD seats in a region than they are entitled to by the Niemeyer
allocation. The party is allowed to keep these seats, and by consequence, have a
seat share that exceeds its vote share. Thus, for the purposes of this discussion, the
advantage of geographically concentrated interests under German electoral rules lies
in the whether or not participation in Niemeyer allocation is assured.8
With German reunification, five Länder were re-established, and 160 seats
were added to the Bundestag. No other changes were made to German electoral rules,
except for a one-time difference in the threshold used in the Niemeyer allocation: In
the December 1990 election, party lists needed only to secure five per cent of the
votes cast in either East or West Germany in order to qualify for the first allocation
of seats. Unlike the Italian case, there can be no question strategic anticipation of the
change in electoral incentives, nor that changes in the German electoral incentives to
be responsive to low-income citizens were exogenous to the process of change itself
(i.e. German reunification cannot be attributed to the actions of low-income citizens,
nor to a broader initiative to be more responsive to the poor). As a result, changes in
poverty relief can be attributed with some confidence to the changes in the electoral
context that followed German reunification.
Changes in the Electoral Context
Following a similar strategy as in the case of Italian electoral reform, here I consider
how the allocation of seats to a low-income voting bloc varies with the change in
Germany’s electoral context. As before, I use LIS data to calculate the proportion of
low-income citizens residing in each of Germany’s Länder. Then, using the Niemeyer
8It is worth noting, nevertheless, that the number of excessive mandates has increased substan-
tially in the post-reunification period: In elections prior to reunification, the number of excessive
mandates range from one to five. The post-reunification period has seen no fewer than five excessive
mandates (in 1990), and as many as 16 excessive mandates (in 1994).
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Table 4.4: Allocation of Seats, Before and After German Reunification
Region A. Pre-Reunification B. Post-Reunification
MMD SMD MMD SMD
Bavaria 25 0 20 2
Baden-Württemberg 21 0 19 0
Rhineland-Palatinate & Saarland 4 10 4 10
Hamburg 3 1 2 2
Schleswig-Holstein 3 4 5 0
Lower Saxony 3 19 11 8
North Rhine-Westphalia 1 50 34 9
Berlin 0 0 0 13
Hesse 0 16 11 1






TOTAL 60 101 106 111
161/496 (32.4%) 217/656 (33.1%)
NOTE. This Table reports the number of seats that would be allocated to a low-income
voting bloc, before and after reunification.
allocation rule described above, I estimate the number of seats (again, ignoring re-
mainders) that would be allocated to a low-income voting bloc if all low-income
citizens vote together, and all turn out to vote. Using the strategy described in
Appendix 5.A, I estimate the number of direct mandates, or SMD seats, that a low-
income voting bloc would win within each region, and then subtract this number from
the regional Niemeyer allocation. As in the Italian case, this strategy allows a pre-
and post-reunification comparison of the number of seats allocated to a low-income
voting bloc (see Table 4.4).
There are several important features of the data reported in Table 4.4: As we
saw in the Italian case, the mixed-member electoral rules ensure that the difference in
the total share of seats secured by a low-income voting bloc before and after reunifi-
cation is decidedly modest, although it is larger after reunification. More important,
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I think, is the proportion of seats elected through a direct mandate in regions that
elect no indirect or regional MMD legislators. With the opportunity to be directly re-
warded for geographically-targeted benefits, this larger group of legislators – for whom
the electoral support of low-income citizens is especially important – have strong in-
centives to be responsive to the poor. As a result, even in the absence of excessive
mandates and large changes in the seat shares elected by a low-income voting bloc,
German reunification created an electoral context that favored the representation of
low-income citizens.
4.4 Measuring Poverty Relief in Italy and Ger-
many
The analysis in this section uses the strategy for measuring poverty relief that was
outlined in Chapter 3. Specifically, the poverty relief ratio R (Eq. 3.3) uses the
relationship between social transfers and market income to estimate the extent of
redistribution, relative to the amount of redistribution needed to increase the income
of all low-income household to the level of the poverty threshold. This measure
incorporates all possible sources of income support, and therefore reflects changes in
transfers to those with no income, universal or near-universal transfers, and in the
rate at which benefits to those with low-incomes decline. Following the convention
established in Chapter 3, all income and transfer amounts are reported in thousands
of 2000 US dollars.
Poverty Relief in Italy
As suggested in the introduction to this discussion, until recently Italian social policy
was characterized by very limited benefits that were highly targeted. Indeed, Ferrera
(2004, 122) presents evidence that the “(distorted) welfare capitalism Italian-style,”
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by which Ferrera means an inefficient system of social policy that favored specific
demographic (e.g. the elderly) and occupational groups (e.g. industrial workers),
continued and consolidated throughout the 1980s. However, beginning in the early
1990s, a series of social reforms were implemented that, although most of the early
changes centered on pension and health care reform, may also have implied significant
changes for low-income people (see e.g. Ferrera 2004). This period of social reform
coincides with the period of electoral reform that established electoral rules favorable
to low-income people. Does the relationship between market and social transfers
reflect incentives for more extensive poverty relief?
















R 0.3454 0.4882 0.5196 0.4763 0.5302 0.5943 0.626
(0.0117) (0.0124) (0.0136) (0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0180) (0.0169)
α 0.5448 0.4904 0.506 0.9469 0.9632 1.0054 0.8509
(0.0426) (0.0472) (0.0562) (0.0623) (0.0703) (0.0987) (0.1023)
β1 4.8718 7.6002 7.4426 5.1966 5.4698 6.4473 7.0772
(0.1636) (0.1643) (0.1796) (0.2003) (0.2086) (0.2293) (0.2239)
β2 -0.3069 -0.2842 -0.2632 -0.3252 -0.2917 -0.2202 -0.1974
(0.0208) (0.0130) (0.0132) (0.0278) (0.0235) (0.0176) (0.0136)
τ 10.0932 10.1276 9.7487 8.2966 7.8495 7.8152 7.4842
(0.2557) (0.1627) (0.1724) (0.2534) (0.2204) (0.1862) (0.1437)
ψ 10.8581 11.0462 10.8275 9.5937 9.3669 9.9744 9.9515
RMSE 2.347 2.503 2.730 3.237 3.397 3.965 4.0317
N 5,452 5,574 5,217 4,920 4,905 4,444 4,688
NOTE. This Table reports parameters estimated in NLS regression models, as de-
scribed in Table 3.6. Gauss-Newton standard errors are reported in parentheses.
In fact, patterns of poverty relief generally do reflect changes in electoral in-
centives: Table 4.5 reports parameters from estimated to describe the relationship
between market income and social transfers, for each LIS observation. Looking across
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the top row of Table 4.5, then, estimates of R are consistently higher in the post-
reform period, indicating more extensive poverty relief measures were implemented.
To provide a substantive interpretation, an individual with no market income re-
ported receiving $5,419 in transfers in 1987, and reported receiving average transfers
of $8,105 in the post-reform period; this represents an increase in benefits of almost
50 percent. The empirical evidence of changing patterns in poverty relief presented in
Table 4.5, therefore, should be interpreted as consistent with the change in electoral
incentives, implemented by Italy’s electoral reform.
Poverty Relief in Germany
In contrast to the Italian welfare system, German social policy is quite comprehen-
sive. In addition to a long-established social assistance program, needs-based benefits
include support for children and for housing-related expenses. Basic entitlements and
qualifications are dictated by federal law, with benefits administered by local au-
thorities, who are dependent on local tax bases.9 Because there is no direct transfer
structure established between the federal government and local authorities, change
in federal policy results in adjustments that are often “non-transparent and indirect”
(Adema, Gray & Sigrun 2003, 14). Thus, the establishment of long-term care insur-
ance in 1994 did much to benefit low-income citizens by lessening demands made on
local social assistance resources. Other policies, like a 1993 regulation that prevented
asylum seekers and other non-resident aliens from claiming social assistance benefits,
similarly reduced the number of social assistance claims. As a result, without pursu-
ing a policy agenda explicitly intended to increase poverty relief, after reunification,
the German government was able to be more responsive to low-income citizens.
Using the methods applied to the Italian case (see also 3), I track patterns in
poverty relief, before and after Germany’s reunification. The results of this analysis
9Although there is some variation across the Länder, it is quite limited (Adema, Gray & Sigrun
2003), with slightly lower benefit rates in the Eastern states.
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Table 4.6: Change in Responsiveness, Before and After German Reunification









R 0.2607 0.2496 0.3570 0.4285
(0.0079) (0.0066) (0.0063) (0.0052)
α 0.3059 0.2207 0.2464 0.8813
(0.0490) (0.0571) (0.0617) (0.0700)
β1 5.6178 5.9207 6.4821 7.4763
(0.1462) (0.1749) (0.1324) (0.1274)
β2 -0.1790 -0.1278 -0.1161 -0.0884
(0.0102) (0.0069) (0.0050) (0.0033)
τ 15.4763 18.3240 15.2448 15.8736
(0.3182) (0.3362) (0.1845) (0.1264)
ψ 16.1347 19.1137 16.5963 18.5923
RMSE 1.989 1.865 2.178 2.7253
N 3,785 3,081 4,538 6,983
NOTE. This Table reports parameters estimated in NLS regression models, as de-
scribed in Table 3.6. Gauss-Newton standard errors are reported in parentheses.
are reported in Table 4.6, with estimates of R reported in the top row. As with
the Italian case, the pattern of change in poverty relief, summarized by the statistic
R is consistent with the change in electoral incentives: Looking across the bottom
row, values of R are consistently larger in the post-reunification period (Columns
3 and 4) than in those observations made prior to reunification. For someone with
no market income, reported transfers increased from $5,923 in 1984, to $8,332 in
2000; this represents an increase of 40 percent. Therefore, the evidence presented in




This section considers two other possible accounts of the increase in poverty relief in
post-reform Italy and post-reunification Germany: Is the increase in poverty relief
attributable to a leftward change in the partisan composition of government? Does
the increase in poverty relief reflect the commitment to social protection expressed
by the Maastricht Treaty?
In fact, there is little evidence that the increases in poverty relief can be at-
tributed either to ideological shifts in governing coalitions or to European community
obligations. Consider first how the partisan composition of German and Italian gov-
ernments changed throughout the pre- and post reform and reunification periods:
Figure 4.3 reports estimates of R for both Germany and Italy, and reports the parti-
san affiliation of Germany’s Chancellors and Italy’s Prime Ministers throughout this
period.
In Germany, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the predominant con-
servative party, governs with the support of the Christian Social Union (CSU) and
the Free Democratic Party (FDP) continuously from 1983 to 1998 – a period that
includes almost the entire period considered in this analysis. As a result, the increase
in poverty relief seen in Germany in Figure 4.3 cannot be attributed to ideological
changes in the composition of the government.
The relationship between the ideological composition of government and changes
in antipoverty policy is equally elusive in Italy. Here, as well, the period leading up
to Italy’s electoral reform was dominated by a single party, Democrazia Cristiana
(DC), that governed in coalition with both major and minor opposition parties until
its collapse in 1994. Thus, both the decline in poverty relief seen in prior to 1990, and
the increase in the first post-reform observation resulted from DC policy. Further, the
continued increase in poverty relief throughout the post-reform period occurs under
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DC PSI DC PSI FI l’Ulivo FI
Italy
NOTE. This Figure reports estimates of R, and its 95 per cent confidence intervals,
for both Germany and Italy, as well as the party of the Prime Minister for both coun-
tries. Parties labels are as follows: CDU= Christlich Demokratische Union, SPD=
Sozialdemokratische Partei, DC= Democrazia Cristiana, PSI=Partito Socialista Ital-
iano, and FI= Forza Italia.
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NOTE. This Figure reports estimates of R for Italy and Germany, as well as France,
and the United Kingdom. Error bars report 95 per cent confidence intervals.
technical non-party governments and the first government formed by the conserva-
tive Forza Italia leader, Silvio Berlusconi. Therefore, with no predominant shift in
the ideological composition of the Italian executive occurring during this period, the
increase in poverty relief seen in Figure 4.3 cannot be attributed to a leftward shift
in government.
As suggested above, another possible explanation for the increase in poverty
relief could lie in obligations to the European Community. Indeed, the Maastricht
Treaty was ratified in 1992, included a commitment to broader social protection, and
implied public sector reform for both Germany and Italy, any change in welfare policy
could reasonably be attributed to the European integration process: Much has been
made of the effect of Maastricht obligations on Italian social policy in particular (see,
e.g. Ferrera 2004). Importantly, though, for both Italy and Germany, meeting the
Maastricht criteria required austerity measures, or general cuts in social spending in
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the post-reform or post-reunification period (e.g., Leibfried & Obinger 2003). How-
ever, in both countries, though, as reported above and seen now in 4.4, poverty relief
increased throughout this period. This increase is especially noteworthy when the
pattern of poverty relief in Germany and Italy is compared to other key EU partners,
France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom (see Figure 4.4): Poverty relief in Belgium
and the UK reflects continued welfare retrenchment during the early 1990s, and re-
turns to original levels shortly afterward as their economies improved. In contrast,
levels of poverty relief in France changed little over the period in which dramatic
changes are observed in Germany and Italy. Although, of course, Figure 4.4 provides
some evidence that is consistent with a convergence explanation – all countries end
up with levels of poverty relief between 0.35 and 0.5 – the cross-national differences in
initial levels of poverty relief, in combination with the timing of Germany and Italy’s
improved levels of poverty relief makes the politics of European integration an espe-
cially unlikely explanation of the changes we observe in Germany, after reunification,
and in Italy, after electoral reform.
4.6 Conclusion
Do electoral incentives structure distributions to low-income citizens? The evidence
presented in this discussion is consistent with an election-motivated account of poverty
relief. By recognizing that antipoverty policy is well-suited for manipulation by elec-
torally motivated legislators, this discussion breaks with current thinking about wel-
fare policy in several ways. First, poverty relief may have little to do with the rel-
ative strength of class-based organizations, as the power resources accounts suggest,
but may instead reflect legislators’ electoral incentives. Second, the evidence pre-
sented here challenges current thinking about the relationship between MMD electoral
rules and more generous social spending: When low-income voters are geographically
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concentrated, as is the case in both Italy and post-reunification Germany, elections
contested in SMDs may create incentives for greater poverty relief than exist when
elections are contested MMDs.
Important questions, of course, remain: Does the relationship between elec-
toral incentives to seek the support of low-income citizens and poverty relief seen here
hold more generally? This question motivates the analysis presented in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5.
Electoral Politics and Poverty Relief in
Contemporary Democratic Societies
5.1 Introduction
How do electoral rules affect the poor? Chapter 4 addresses this question by taking
advantage of two “natural experiments” in the relationship between electoral rules
and poverty responsiveness: Italy’s electoral reform, in the early 1990s, and German
reunification. In each case, the resulting change in electoral geography (i.e., the
interaction between the geographic distribution of voter types and electoral rules)
strengthened legislators’ incentives to be responsive to low-income voters, and the
generosity of poverty relief measures increased substantially. While the results of these
country case-studies are consistent with an election-motivated account of antipoverty
policy, the shifts in electoral geography coincide with periods of profound change in
both Italy and Germany. As a consequence, some alternative explanations for the
observed increases in poverty relief cannot be evaluated.
This chapter, therefore, takes up the question of the relationship between elec-
toral geography and poverty responsiveness in a broadly comparative cross-national
analysis. This strategy allows the more rigorous investigation of this relationship, and
the evaluation of potentially confounding variables, including those typically empha-
sized in the conventional accounts of cross-national differences in social policy. Here,
the measure of poverty responsiveness developed in Chapter 3, the poverty relief ratio
R, serves as the dependent variable. Then, using a strategy that is similar to what
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was employed in Chapter 4 – assuming the existence of a low-income voting bloc,
and then assessing its electoral strength – this chapter takes as the key independent
variable, the share of seats a low-income voting bloc could win under current electoral
rules.
5.2 Measuring the Electoral Power of Low-Income
Voters
How many seats could a low-income voting bloc elect, if all low-income voters turned
out to vote, and they all voted the same way? There are two steps involved in
measuring the electoral power of a low-income voting bloc for the complete set of LIS
countries:
1. Using LIS and sometimes other data resources, I estimate the proportion of low-
income voters in each electoral district, within each country. (“Low-income”
refers to those who comprise the lowest third of the national market income
distribution.)
2. Using these proportions of low-income voters in each district, seats are allocated
according to current electoral rules of each country.
This section of the discussion describes each of these steps, leaving more technical
information for Appendix 5.A.
Estimating the Geographic Distribution of Income
Three different strategies are used to estimate the proportion of each lower house
electoral district that is composed of low-income households:
(A) Whenever possible, LIS data are used directly (e.g., Finland). That is, when
the LIS data report each respondent household’s region of residence and the
regions reported correspond to the country’s electoral districts (or to regions
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that comprise the electoral districts), the proportion of low-income households
in each district is estimated in a straight-forward way.
(B) In several cases (e.g., Australia), data on the distribution of income within
electoral districts are available from other sources. Sometimes the construction
of income measures or samples differ from the measures or samples used the
analysis presented in Chapter 3; these differences are noted in Appendix 5.A.
(C) When income data corresponding to the electoral district are not available, LIS
data are usefully combined with other resources to estimate the proportion of
low-income citizens in each electoral district.
To illustrate, the geographic distribution of low-income households in France,
was evaluated in several steps: While LIS data do not report each household’s
electoral district (circonscription), they do include each respondent’s region of
residence. One way to proceed, therefore, might be to use the regional pro-
portions of low-income households to estimate the proportion of low-income
households in each electoral district. This strategy, however, would fail to re-
flect within-region cross-district variance in the concentration of poverty.
Alternatively, although Institut National de la Statistique et des Études
Économiques (INSEE) does not report income data that correspond to the mea-
sures of poverty used in this analysis, INSEE does report data on the structure
of the labor force – data that correspond to LIS variables – within each electoral
district. Using LIS data, I estimate the proportion of low-income households in
each labor force status and industrial sector for each French region, and then
use this relationship in combination with the INSEE labor force data to esti-
mate the proportion of low-income citizens in each district. This latter strategy
has the advantage incorporating within-region across-district differences that
are related to the distribution of poverty, but would be misleading if poverty
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rates vary within labor force status and industrial sector categories, within each
region. For this reason, this strategy is pursued only when LIS regions do not
correspond to electoral districts and other measures of the geographic distribu-
tion of income are unavailable or are quite different from the measure developed
here.
(D) Finally, when available data only roughly correspond to electoral districts,
and/or are insufficiently detailed to be combined with LIS data in a mean-
ingful way (i.e., only unemployment rates are available), the electoral strength
of a low-income voting bloc is estimated by calculating the binomial expecta-
tion of the number of seats won within a region. For Italy and Germany, the
two country cases for which this strategy was followed, the binomial parameter
p, the probability of winning each seat in the SMD components of each sys-
tem, is calculated in a way that incorporates regional levels of poverty, and the
within-region cross-district variance in unemployment rates.
Appendix 5.A reports the specific details of the estimation strategy used for each
country and lists the electoral districts in which a low-income voting bloc could elect
(lower house) members of the national legislature.
Allocating Seats to a Low-Income Voting Bloc
The second task in assessing the electoral strength of a low-income voting bloc in-
volves the allocation of seats according to the electoral rules of each system. Following
the classification of electoral systems used in Chapter 2, this section of the discussion
distinguishes between systems in which all legislators are elected in single-member
districts (SMDs), systems in which all legislators are elected in a single nation-wide
district, and systems in which the number of legislators varies across districts (usu-
ally in a way that reflects population density). Countries included here in a fourth
category, “mixed” electoral systems, form a hybrid category and typically have two
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or more levels of nested districts, with separate (but sometimes related) allocations
of seats at each level. Using this classification, then, this section outlines the general
strategy used for seat allocations, for countries in each category of electoral rules.
More complete details are included in Appendix 5.A.
Single-Member District Systems
The “first past the post” systems, included in Table 5.1 typically allocate legislative
seats to the candidate who is supported by the largest share of votes cast, although
some countries impose additional criteria (i.e., the location of the “post”) or vary in
how ballots are counted (how candidates get “past”). For example, winning candi-
dates in France must secure the support of a majority of voters, or a second run-off
election is held between the two most competitive candidates. Australia also requires
that winning candidates are supported by a majority of voters, but instead of holding
a run-off election, voters rank order candidates when they cast their ballots. Then,
ballots that give first preference to less popular candidates are re-allocated in the order
of each voter’s preference until one candidate is surpasses a 50 percent threshold.
Table 5.1: Single-Member District Systems
Seat Allocation Rule Country
(A) Simple Plurality Canada, United Kingdom, United States,
(B) Alternative Vote Australia
(C) Two-Round Majoritarian France
Even without the alternative vote and majoritarian revisions of a simple plu-
rality rule, the challenge of analyzing SMD systems for this analysis lies in identifying
a threshold of representation: When is a low-income voting bloc large enough within
a district such that it is likely to be pivotal in the election of that district’s legislator?
Following Lijphart (1994, 28; also Boix 1999), this analysis sets an effective threshold
of 35 percent for all SMD systems, and allocates a district’s seat to the low-income
106
voting bloc if the proportion of low-income voters exceeds 35 percent. This threshold,
Lijphart suggests, represents the mid-point between an upper threshold that defines
the largest share of votes a candidate in a SMD could receive without winning the
seat (50 percent), and a lower threshold that identifies the smallest share of votes
with which a candidate could win her seat when faced with three or four competitors
(20-25 percent), yielding a “rough but reasonable estimate” that, if fewer than four
or five parties typically stand for election in these SMD systems, likely over-states the
electoral power of low-income citizens. As a consequence, this relatively low thresh-
old – recall that low-income citizens comprise the bottom third, or 33 percent of the
national income distribution – will understate differences between SMD and MMD
systems in the representation of low-income citizens.
National District Systems
In the two countries in which seats are allocated in a single national district, according
to a PR allocation rule – Israel and the Netherlands – a low-income voting bloc could
secure a third of the seats in the legislature.
Varying District-Magnitude Systems
Legislators in the lower houses of countries included in Table 5.2 contest their seats in
multi-member districts that vary in magnitude, or the number of legislators elected,
usually with population density. These electoral systems, however, share few other
features: They differ in the seat allocation rule, the number of electoral districts, and
whether seats are allocated in one round, within each district, or across multiple tiers
(see Table 5.2). Appendix 5.A describes each system in some detail, as well as the
strategy used to estimate the number of seats a low-income voting could elect in each
country. Here, I outline the general strategy used to allocate seats to a low-income
voting bloc within each district.
Analysts of electoral rules typically distinguish between “highest average” and
107
Table 5.2: Varying District Size-Magnitude Systems
Seat Allocation Rule Countries
(A) Single–Transferable Vote Ireland
(B) Single-Tier Systems Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, Norway,
Spain, Switzerland
(C) Multi-Tier Systems Austria, Denmark, Sweden
“largest remainder” formulas (e.g., Farrell 2001), and emphasize implications for the
proportionality of seat distributions. This distinction is also important for this anal-
ysis: Highest average allocation rules require complete information about the dis-
tribution of support for all political parties that contest each election, while the
number of seats allocated to a political party under largest remainder rules can be
well-approximated without knowledge of the distribution of support for other polit-
ical parties. Consider, for example, an election contested in a five-member district,
with the following distribution of support for the five political parties that contested
the election (see Table 5.3). A common highest-average formula for the allocation of





For each party p, the index, t = 1..T , denotes each round of seat allocation until all
seats within a district are allocated, such that for each party, the denominator used to
calculate the average Apt reflects the number of seats won in previous allocations. In
the first round, spt−1 = 0 for each party. Then, after the first seat is allocated to Party
A (AA1 > A
p
1 for p = A), Party A’s “average,” AA2 = 150. Seats are then allocated
to Parties B, C and then A, in order of the highest “averages.” Finally, when the
“averages” are re-calculated to reflect the seats won in the second allocation, Party
D is awarded the fifth seat.
As the example presented in Table 5.3 illustrates, a “highest average” seat
1This discussion owes much to Rae’s (1971) discussion of electoral rules.
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allocation requires complete knowledge about the number of parties competing in
each district, and their levels of support. If, instead, seats are allocated according
to the Droop quota, a common “largest remainder” allocation formula, in which the
numbers of seats allocated to especially larger parties are well-approximated by the
(rounded) ratios (Ŝp) of each party’s vote share to a “quota” (Q) that incorporates
the total number of valid ballots (V ) and number of seats (s) to be allocated in district
d:








· (s+ 1). (5.3)
Importantly, little knowledge and few assumptions about the number of parties com-
peting in each election or about distribution of support for other parties is needed
to estimate the seats won by each party. For this reason, a Droop quota is used to
estimate the number of seats won by a low-income voting bloc in those systems in
which seats are typically allocated according to a “highest average” formula. These
systems are noted with asterisks (‘∗’) in Table 5.2.
Table 5.3: PR “Highest Average” and “Largest Remainder” Seat Allocations
Party Votes “Highest Average” “Largest Remainder”






Party A 300 1st (300) 4th (150) 2 (1.796)
Party B 250 2nd (250) 1 (1.497)
Party C 200 3rd (200) 1 (1.198)
Party D 130 5th (130) 1 (0.778)
Party E 80 0 (0.479)




As suggested at the beginning of this section, the countries included in Table 5.4 are
distinguished by multiple levels of nested electoral districts, and separate (though
sometime related) seat allocation processes. Germany and Italy elect between one-
half and three-quarters of sitting legislators in SMDs. The remaining legislators are
elected in MMDs, and seats are allocated to party lists according to a compensatory
or parallel vote tabulation. In this analysis, seats in SMDs are allocated according to
the strategy proposed above (i.e., using an effective threshold of 35 percent), and PR
seats are allocated according to the rules governing each country (though a Droop
quota is used in place of “highest average” calculations).
Table 5.4: Mixed Electoral Systems
Seat Allocation Rule Countries
(A) Simple Plurality – MMD Germany, Italy
The Electoral Power of Low-Income Voters
How many seats could a low-income voting bloc elect, if all low-income voters turned
out to vote, and they all voted the same way? Table 5.5 reports the results of this
analysis, specifically the number of electoral districts in which low-income citizens
are over-represented, and the shares of seats a low-income voting could win in each
country. The data reported in Column (2) will serve as the key independent variable
in the analysis that follows, the electoral strength of a low-income voting bloc.
Note, first, that the success of a low-income voting bloc varies within electoral
system groups, and particularly within the group of SMD countries. In the US and the
UK, for example, the electoral success of a low-income voting bloc is potentially quite
limited, while the largest seat share observed is France. This variance in the electoral
strength of a low-income voting bloc within SMD systems, and observed across the
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complete set of countries more generally, is especially startling when one recalls that
the low-income voting bloc represents the same proportion of the electorate in each
country.
Second, while there is a direct correspondence between the number of dis-
tricts in which low-income voters are over-represented and their share of seats under
SMD rules, there is no correspondence in the systems with varying district magni-
tudes. What matters for the representation of low-income citizens under varying
district-magnitude rules is whether or not low-income voters are over-represented in
rural districts that elect a small number of legislators (e.g. Finland, Norway and
Sweden): Under these circumstance, the dis-proportionality of low-magnitude dis-
tricts, typically found in the rural regions of these countries, can favor the legislative
representation of the low-income voters.
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Single Member District Systems
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NOTES. This Table reports estimates of the number of seats that a low-income voting bloc could
secure if all low-income citizens cast ballots, and cast ballots for the same party. Please refer to
the Appendix materials for details of how these estimates were calculated.
a This column reports the number of districts in which low-income citizens are over-represented.
b This column reports the total share of seats secured by a low-income voting bloc. The districts
in which these seats are secured are listed in the Appendix materials.
c The 18 parliamentary constituencies in Northern Ireland are excluded from the denominator
reported in this column, but are included in the calculation of the seat share a low-income voting
bloc could win.
d The 15 overseas districts are excluded from the denominator reported in this column, but are
included in the calculation of the seat share a low-income voting bloc could win.
e This ratio refers to the MMD Länder, not the SMDs.
f This ratio refers to the MMD circoscrzioni, not the SMDs, the collegi uninominali.
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5.3 Electoral Power and Poverty Responsiveness
This section explores the relationship between electoral geography and poverty re-
sponsiveness. Taking the measure of the electoral power of a low-income voting bloc,
developed in the previous section, as the key independent variable, this section con-
siders the extent to which cross-national variance in poverty responsiveness can be
attributed to legislators’ incentives to be responsive to low-income voters. Specif-
ically, are legislatures more generous in their antipoverty provisions when a larger
proportion of their members owe their seats to the support of low-income citizens?
Figure 5.1 reports the bi-variate relationship between the electoral strength of
a low-income voting bloc (horizontal axis), and levels of poverty relief. As seen in
Figure 5.1, the observed relationship between the electoral strength of a low-income
voting and poverty responsiveness is consistent with an electorally-motivated account
of antipoverty policy: Poverty relief generally increases with the share of seats low-
income voters can elect, if all low-income citizens turned out to vote and all voted
the same way.
Alternative Explanations
While the small number of country cases included in this analysis limits the number
of alternative explanations that can be considered simultaneously, in this section I
consider the relative explanatory power of two variables, often emphasized by other
political economic explanations of social spending: the historical power of the left
and union strength. As Chapter 1 suggests, the historical dominance of leftist parties
is associated both with greater social spending and a more redistributive program of
taxes and transfers.2 Following Bradley et al. (2003), the historical power of the left
is measured as the cumulative number of years in which the cabinet was formed by a
2It is quite likely that leftist parties dominate when electoral rules favor the representation of
low-income voters. This proposition motivates a second component of this project, on the partisan
representation of the poor.
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Proportion of Seats Won by a Low−Income Voting Bloc
NOTE. This Figure reports the bi-variate relationship between the share of seats po-
tentially secured by a low-income voting bloc and the poverty relief ratio, R, estimated
for each country. See Chapter 3 for a complete discussion of the poverty relief ratio;
Appendix 5.A provides information about how the electoral power of low-income vot-
ers was assessed for each country. Country labels are reported in Table 3.2. The solid
line reports ordinary least-squares (OLS) fitted values (standard errors reported in
parentheses):
R = 0.3305(0.0624) + 0.5379(0.1881){ Seat Share }. (5.4)
The dashed line reports OLS fitted values from a model that excludes the US:
R = 0.4163(0.0758) + 0.2967(0.2226){ Seat Share }. (5.5)
leftist party. Years in which a leftist party contributed members to a cabinet, but did
not form the cabinet itself, are entered as the fraction of seats the left party held. As
Chapter 1 suggests, conventional accounts of the role of union strength in determining
the generosity of social policy treats “generous social policy as a quid pro quo for
wage restraint on the part of the unions” (Bradley et al. 2003, 200). Thus, where
wage-setting is characterized by centralized bargaining by powerful comprehensive
unions, social spending generally, and (some forms of) poverty relief measures ought
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to be more generous. Here, the measure of union strength is based on Kenworthy’s
(2001) analysis, and on data reported in Huber et al.’s (2004) Comparative Welfare
States Data-set. This measure distinguishes those cases in which centralized wage
bargaining occurs between powerful union confederations and coordinated employer
organizations, and those in which coordinated wage bargaining occurs only within
industries, if at all.
Table 5.6 reports the results of a regression of the poverty relief ratio, R on the
measures of union strength and left party dominance. Note, first, that the electoral
power of a low-income voting bloc contributes to the observed cross-national variance
in poverty relief, even when union strength and the historical dominance of left parties
is taken into account: An increase in the share of seats secured by a low-income
voting bloc is associated with an increase in levels of income support provided to
low-income citizens. Second, while left party dominance contributes to cross-national
variance in poverty relief, its explanatory power is considerably compromised when
the electoral strength of low-income citizens is taken into account. Finally, union
strength does not appear to contribute to cross-national variance in poverty relief.
If the observed negative relationship is to be taken at face value – note the relative
magnitude of the standard error on this coefficient – there is some evidence that
societies generally good to workers are less generous to those outside of the labor
force. These two observations, that left party dominance is closely related to the
contemporary electoral strength of a low-income voting bloc and that union strength
does not contribute to cross-national variance in poverty relief, will serve as jumping
off points for future research.
115








Seat Share 0.52597 0.4678 0.4582
(0.1966) (0.2039) (0.2289)
Union Strength 3.7428 -0.0705 0.5067
(4.9795) (4.388) (4.5902)
Left Party Dominance 0.2935 0.1135 0.1177
(0.1827) (0.1783) (0.1893)
Intercept 47.5950 33.1963 43.8535 32.7942 32.7547
(3.5211) (6.1311) (4.2030) (6.0663) (6.3209)
N 16 16 16 16 16
RMSE 9.9592 8.3005 9.3349 8.1739 8.5034
NOTES. This Table reports parameters estimated in a least-squares regression analysis. Israel,
Spain, and Luxembourg are excluded. See Chapter 3 for a complete discussion of the poverty
relief ratio; Appendix 5.A provides information about how the electoral power of low-income
voters was assessed for each country.
SOURCES: Union Strength: Kenworthy (2001), Huber et al. (2004). Left Party Dominance:
Huber et al. (2004).
5.4 Conclusion
This Chapter tests the core intuition of this research, that poverty relief reflects the
electoral incentives of legislatures, in a broadly comparative analysis. Specifically, the
empirical evidence in this Chapter suggests that cross-national variance in poverty
relief should not be attributed to the historical dominance of leftist parties, nor to
union strength, but rather to the electoral power of a low-income voting bloc: Poverty
relief measures tend to be most generous when large proportions of the legislature
owe their seats to the electoral support of low-income voters.
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Appendix 5.A Measuring the Electoral Power of
the Poor
This Appendix reports the specific details of the estimation strategy for each country,
and lists the electoral districts in which a low-income voting bloc could elect (lower
house) members of the national legislature, and is organized according to types of
electoral systems, with the main distinction reflecting the number of legislators elected
in each district.
Single Member District Systems
(A) Simple Plurality Rules
Canada. Estimates of the proportion of low-income citizens in each electoral district
are calculated using 2001 Census data (corresponding to 2000 calendar year Statistics
Canada 2003), reported for each Federal Parliamentary Riding (2003 Representation
Order). The income measure includes all sources of income, including social trans-
fers and is reported by income category, distinguishing one-person households from
households including two or more people. Because the data are reported in this way,
the equivalency adjustment used in calculating the thresholds reported in Table 3.2
can be taken into account: For single person households, those with total income less
than $19,999 (in Canadian dollars; an amount slightly less than the $20,744 thresh-
old observed in the LIS data) are identified as low-income households. For those
household with two or more members, a poverty threshold of $29,999 was used to
identify low-income households (an amount slightly more than $29,336, the unequiv-
alised threshold for two-person households). Following the strategy used in the other
single member, simple plurality systems, a threshold of representation of 35% is used
to identify electoral districts in which low-income citizens are likely to be pivotal.
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Table 5.7 lists these districts, by province.





British Columbia 2/36 Southern Interior, Vancouver East
Ontario 2/106 Hamilton Centre, York West
New Brunswick 3/10 Acadie - Bathurst, Madawaska - Restigouche, Miramichi
Newfoundland and
Labrador
4/7 Avalon, Bonavista - Gander - Grand Falls - Windsor,
Humber - St. Barbe - Baie Verte, Random - Burin - St.
George’s
Manitoba 4/14 Churchill, Dauphin - Swan River - Marquette, Winnipeg
Centre, Winnipeg North
Saskatchewan 5/14 Desnethe - Churchill River, Prince Albert, Regina -
Qu’Appelle, Saskatoon - Rosetown - Biggar, Yorkton -
Melville
Nova Scotia 6/11 Cape Breton- Canso, Central Nova, Cumberland - Colch-
ester - Musquodoboit Valley, South Shore - St. Mar-
garet’s, Sydney - Victoria, West Nova
Quebec 22/75 Beauport - Limoliou, Bourassa, Drummond, Gaspsie -
Iles de la Madeleine, Hochelaga, Jeanne - Le Ber, Joli-
ette, Laurentides - Labelle, Laurier - Sainte-Marie, Haute-
Gaspesie - La Mitis - Matapdia - Matane, Megantic-
L’Erable, Outremont, Papineau, Quebec, Bas-Richelieu
- Nicolet - Becancour, Rimouski-Neigette - Temiscouata
- Les Basques, Montmagny - L’Islet - Kamouraska - Riv-
iere du Loup, Rosemont - La Petite-Patrie, Saint-Leonard
- Saint-Michel, Saint-Maurice - Champlain, Sherbrooke,
Trois-Rivieres
United Kingdom. To identify those electoral constituencies in which low-income citi-
zens are likely to be pivotal, I used data collected under the auspices of the Annual
Survey of Hours and Earnings (Office for National Statistics 2002). This data-set
reports deciles of the gross income distribution within the (202) local authorities in
the UK. These low-level geographic areas were matched to parliamentary constituen-
cies according to the “Standard Names and Codes” (SNAC) protocol, provided by
National Statistics. Then, those districts in which the 30th percentile of the income
distribution was less than the 33rd percentile of the national market income distri-
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bution were identified as those districts in which low-income citizens are pivotal (see
Table 5.8).
The ASHE data offer the important measures of gross earnings distributions
(the main component of market income), at much lower levels of geographic aggre-
gation than is available through LIS, which uses the 11 Government Office regions
(these are also correspond to the Eurostat NUTS 1 regions). The ASHE data, how-
ever, provide a conservative estimate of the proportion of low-income citizens in any
district: Only individuals with earnings are included in the sample. As a consequence,
the estimate of the number of seats a low-income voting bloc could secure is likely
quite conservative.
Table 5.8: Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in the UK
Region Parliamentary Constituencies
Greater London Wimbledon
South East Isle of Wight
North West Blackpool North and Fleetwood, Blackpool South




Cleethorpes, Great Grimsby, Kingston upon Hull East,
Kingston upon Hull North, Kingston upon Hull West and
Hessle
Wales Blaenau Gwent, Brecon & Radnorshire, Caernarfon, Car-
marthen West and South Pembrokeshire, Ceredigion,
Clwyd South, Conwy, Meirionnydd Nant Conwy, Merthyr
Tydfil and Rhymney, Montgomeryshire, Preseli Pem-
brokeshire
North East Berwick-upon-Tweed, Blyth Valley, Darlington,
Gateshead East and Washington West, Hexham,
Houghton and Washington East, Middlesbrough, Mid-
dlesbrough South & East Cleveland, Newcastle upon
Tyne East and Wallsend, North Tyneside, Sedgefield,
Sunderland North, Sunderland South, Tynemouth,
Wansbeck
South West Christchurch, East Devon, Exeter, Falmouth and Cam-
borne, Mid Dorset and North Poole, North Cornwall,
North Dorset, North Devon, South Dorset, South East
Cornwall, South West Devon, St. Ives, Teignbridge,
Tiverton and Honiton, Torbay, Torridge and West Devon,
Totnes, Truro and St. Austell, West Dorset
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United States. Estimates of the percentage of the each congressional district electorate
composed of low-income households are generated using the US Census of Housing
and Population, Summary File 3 (U.S. Census Bureau 2002). These data offer the
important advantage of direct correspondence to congressional districts. It should
be noted, however, that the SF3 data report total income– a measure that includes
social transfers, as well as earnings income, etc. – rather than market income. Further,
because of the way in which these data are reported, a poverty threshold of $19,999
was used, instead of the threshold reported in Table 3.2, $19,618.
To calculate the seat share a low-income voting bloc could secure in the House
of Representatives, I use Lijphart’s (1994) effective threshold of representation for
majoritarian systems, 35%: If low-income households comprise 35% or a greater
share of the congressional district, it is allocated the seat from that district. Table
5.9 summarizes the distribution of seats secured by a low-income voting bloc, by state.
(B) Alternative Vote Rules
Australia. Seats in Australia’s House of Representatives are elected under Alter-
native Vote Rules (ATV), in single member districts (of “Commonwealth Electoral
Division”). ATV rules are similar to the single member, simple plurality rules that
regulate elections in the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada in that
candidates who receive the majority of the vote are elected. However, when all candi-
dates fail to secure a majority of the votes cast – when, under SMSP rules, seats are
allocated to the candidate who wins a plurality of the votes cast – ATV rules invoke
voters’ ranking-ordering of preferences. Ballots in which the voters’ first preferences
are allocated to the candidate winning the smallest vote share are re-allocated to
the candidates ranked second by these voters. This process is repeated, with bal-
lots reallocated at each step and according to voters’ preferences, until a candidate
has secured the majority of the vote share. In practice, however, although at least
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Counties, or parts of counties, included in district
Alabama 7 Choctaw, Clarke, Dallas, Greene, Hale, Jefferson, Marengo, Perry, Pick-
ens, Sumter, Tuscaloosa, and Wilcox Counties
Arkansas 1 Arkansas, Baxter, Clay, Cleburne, Craighead, Crittenden, Cross, Fulton,
Greene, Independence, Izard, Jackson, Lawrence, Lee, Lonoke, Missis-
sippi, Monroe, Phillips, Poinsett, Prairie, Randolph, St. Francis, Searcy,
Sharp, Stone, and Woodruff Counties
California 30 Los Angeles County
33 Los Angeles County
Florida 17 Broward, and Miami-Dade Counties
Kentucky 5 Bath, Bell, Breathitt, Clay, Floyd, Harlan, Jackson, Johnson, Knott,
Knox, Laurel, Lawrence, Lee, Leslie, Letcher, McCreary, Magoffin, Mar-
tin, Menifee, Morgan, Owsley, Perry, Pike, Pulaski, Rockcastle, Rowan,
Wayne, Whitley, and Wolfe Counties
Louisiana 2 Jefferson and Orleans Parishes,
5 Allen, Avoyelles, Caldwell, Catahoula, Concordia, East Carroll, Evange-
line, Franklin, Iberville, Jackson, La Salle, Lincoln, Madison, Morehouse,
Ouachita, Pointe Coupee, Rapides, Richland, Tensas, Union, West Car-
roll, and Winn Parishes
Michigan 15 Monroe, Washtenaw, and Wayne Counties
Mississippi 2 Attala, Bolivar, Carroll, Claiborne, Coahoma, Copiah, Hinds, Holmes,
Humphreys, Issaquena, Jefferson, Leake, Leflore, Madison, Montgomery,
Quitman, Sharkey, Sunflower, Tallahatchie, Tunica, Warren, Washington,
and Yazoo Counties,
4 Clarke, Forrest, George, Greene, Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, Jasper,
Jones, Lamar, Marion, Pearl River, Perry, Stone, and Wayne Counties
Missouri 8 Bollinger, Butler, Cape Girardeau, Carter, Dent, Douglas, Dunklin, How-
ell, Iron, Madison, Mississippi, New Madrid, Oregon, Ozark, Pemiscot,
Perry, Phelps, Reynolds, Ripley, St. Francois, Scott, Shannon, Stoddard,
Taney, Texas, Washington, Wayne, and Wright Counties
New York 10 Kings County
12 Kings, New York, and Queens Counties
15 Bronx, New York, and Queens Counties
16 Bronx County
North Carolina 1 Beaufort, Bertie, Chowan, Craven, Edgecombe, Gates, Granville,
Greene, Halifax, Hertford, Jones, Lenoir, Martin, Nash, Northampton,
Pasquotank, Perquimans, Pitt, Vance, Warren, Washington, Wayne, and
Wilson Counties
Oklahoma 3 Alfalfa, Beaver, Beckham, Blaine, Caddo, Canadian, Cimarron, Creek,
Custer, Dewey, Ellis, Garfield, Grant, Greer, Harmon, Harper, Jackson,
Kay, Kingfisher, Kiowa, Lincoln, Logan, Major, Noble, Osage, Pawnee,
Payne, Roger Mills, Texas, Washita, Woods, and Woodward Counties
Pennsylvania 1 Delaware and Philadelphia Counties
South Carolina 6 Berkeley, Charleston, Dorchester, Georgetown, and Horry Counties
Texas 15 Bee, Brooks, Goliad, Hidalgo, Kleberg, Live Oak, Nueces, and San Patri-
cio Counties
West Virginia 3 Barbour, Brooke, Doddridge, Gilmer, Grant, Hancock, Harrison, Marion,
Marshall, Mineral, Monongalia, Ohio, Pleasants, Preston, Ritchie, Taylor,
Tucker, Tyler, Wetzel, and Wood Counties
121
four major parties compete for election, most of the seats are allocated to two major
parties or coalitions, and election results closely resemble outcomes that characterize
elections held under SMSP rules. For this reason, and to limit the influence of as-
sumptions made about the number of parties competing, this analysis uses the same
seat allocation rule as was used in the SMSP systems: Seats are allocated to the low-
income voting bloc in those districts in which the proportion of low-income citizens
exceeds 35% of the population.
To estimate the proportion of low-income citizens in each district, I use income
data collected as part of the 2001 Census: For each district, the Australian Bureau of
Statistics reports the number of individuals in 14 gross income categories (including
social transfers) and eight age categories (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001). In-
cluding only working-aged individuals (in this case, 25-64 years old), estimates of the
number of low-income citizens are based on the number of individuals whose yearly
earnings are less than $10,884 (AUD$15,599), an amount slightly lower than that
listed in Chapter 3 ($13,613). Table 5.10 lists those districts in which the proportion
of low-income citizens exceeds 35%.
Table 5.10: Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Australia
State Commonwealth Electoral Divisions
New South Wales Blaxland, Charlton, Cowper, Fowler, Gilmore, Gwydir, Hunter, Lyne,
New England, Newcastle, Page, Parkes, Paterson, Reid, Richmond,
Shortland, Throsby
Northern Territory Lingiari
Victoria Ballarat, Bendigo, Corio, Gellibrand, Gippsland, Maribyrnong,
Mcmillan, Wannon
Western Austrlia Brand, O’Connor
(C) Two-Round Majoritarian Rules
France. Legislative seats in France are allocated in single member districts, when
a candidate secures 50% of the votes cast in their district. If, after the first round
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election, no candidate has secured this majoritarian, the two candidates who secured
the largest vote shares stand in a a second round election. The candidate winning
this second round election will then be allocated the seat. Following Lijphart (1994)
and Powell (2000), I use the 35% threshold of representation, and allocated seats in
those districts in which low-income citizens comprise at least 35% of the district to a
low-income voting bloc.
Under current rules, seats are allocated in 555 single-member electoral districts
(“circonscriptions électorales”, plus 15 overseas SMDs). While income data are not
available at this low level of aggregation, census data collected in 1999 on the compo-
sition of the labor force are available for each district (National Institute for Statistics
and Economic Studies (INSEE) 2002). Using the LIS data to generate estimates of
the proportion of low-income households for each labor force category (in which the
head of household is classified as employed in agricultural, industrial, construction,
service work, or is unemployed), for each of eight regions, and then using these re-
gional proportions, the proportion of low-income citizens in each district is estimated
in a way that reflects within-region variance in labor market conditions. Table 5.11
reports, by region, those districts in which a low-income voting bloc exceeds 35% of
population within the electoral district.
Varying District Size-Magnitude Systems
(A) Single Transferable Vote
Ireland. Legislators in Ireland’s lower house of representatives, (“Dail Eireann”) are
elected in MMDs and seats are allocated according to a Single-Transferable vote rule.
In practice, this implies that voters rank candidates on a single ballot, and in a
first allocation, seats are distributed according to a Droop quota “largest remainder”
formula (see Eq. 5.2). The surplus votes cast in favor of any candidate whose share
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Departments (Number of Seats in Department)
Mediterranean 65/65
North 38/38
South-West 40/62 Arige (2), Aveyron (2), Corrze (2), Creuse (2), Dordogne
(3), Gers (2), Gironde (7), Haute-Garonne (3), Haute-
Vienne (2), Hautes-Pyrnes (1), Landes (1), Lot (2), Lot-
et-Garonne (3), Pyrnes-Atlantiques (2), Tarn (4), Tarn-
et-Garonne (2)
Paris Basin 61/103 Aisne (5), Ardennes (3), Aube (3), Calvados(3),Cher (1),
Eure(4), Eure-et-Loir (1), Haute-Marne (1), Indre (1),
Indre-et-Loire (2), Loir-et-Cher (2), Loiret (1), Manche
(2), Marne (2), Nivre (2), Oise (5), Orne (2), Sane-et-
Loire (4), Seine-Maritime (10), Somme (5), Yonne (2)
West 39/73 Charente (4), Charente-Maritime (4), Ctes-d’Armor (3),
Deux-Svres (2), Finistre (1), Ille-et-Vilaine (1), Loire-
Atlantique (5), Maine-et-Loire (4), Mayenne (2), Morbi-
han (4), Sarthe (4), Vende (3), Vienne (2)
Center-East 24/63 Ain (1), Allier (3), Ardche (3), Cantal (1), Drme (3),




of votes exceeds the quota (and thus is automatically elected) are redistributed to
candidates who are listed as each voters’ second preference, in proportion to the
preferences of all ballots cast in favor of the successful candidate. Seats are allocated
to each candidate whose vote share exceeds their district’s quota, and votes are re-
distributed until all of the seats in the district are filled. If, at any stage in the
allocation of seats, no candidate is supported by a share of votes which exceeds
the quota, votes for the least popular candidate are re-distributed according to the
distribution of preferences expressed by her supporters.
To estimate the number of seats won by a low-income voting bloc in Ireland,
I consider only the first allocation of seats, using the approximation of Droop quota
given in Eq. (5.2) as the basis of this calculation. This strategy avoids assumptions
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about the number of candidates competing in each district and voters’ rank order
preferences.
Generating estimates of the proportion of low-income citizens in each con-
stituency involves a number of steps: The LIS data report the Eurostat NUTS 3
region for each household. Each of the eight NUTS 3 regions, however, includes be-
tween two and 12 districts (in the Midland and Dublin regions, respectively), each
electing three to five seats. Fortunately, although the Central Statistics Office Ire-
land does not report distributions of income within the 43 electoral districts, the
published census data include the number of employed and unemployed (male) res-
idents for each district. Using corresponding head-of-household employment status
data, which are included in LIS, I’ve identified the proportion of low-income house-
holds in each employment status group, for each region, and use these proportions
here to estimate the proportion of low-income citizens in each electoral district. This
strategy offers the important advantage of incorporating within-region variation in
the geographic distribution of income by incorporating differences in the structure
of the labor market; an alternative strategy would be to simply impute the region
proportion of low-income citizens for each electoral district. In practice, proportions
of low-income citizens estimated in this way have regional means that are within a
one or two percentage points of the LIS-generated regional proportions. Table 5.12
reports the number of seats in each region that could be elected by a low-income
voting bloc.
(B) Single-Tier Systems
Belgium. Legislative seats in Belgium are allocated in 11 multi-member districts
(largely corresponding to provinces) that range in magnitude from 4 seats in Luxem-
bourg, to 24 seats in Antwerp. Although seats are typically allocated according to
“highest average” d’Hondt formula, this analysis uses the Droop quota approxima-
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Table 5.12: Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Ireland
Region Number of Seats Dail Constituency
Border 10/18 Donegal South – West (2), Louth (2), Sligo - North
Leitrim (2), Donegal North - East (2), Cavan-
Monaghan (2)
Dublin 12/47 Dublin North - West, Dublin South - Central,
Dublin South - East, Dublin - Central, Dublin
South, Dublin North, Dublin North - Central,
Dublin Mid - West, Dun Laoighaire, Dublin South
- West, Dublin West
Mid-East 5/18 Meath West, Kildare North, Wicklow, Kildare
South, Meath East
Midland 4/9 Laoighis - Offaly (2), Longford - Westmeath (2)
Mid-West 4/12 Limerick West, Clare, Limerick East (2)
South-East 7/20 Tipperary North, Tipperary South, Waterford,
Wexford (2)
South-West 10/25 Carlow-Kilkenny (2), Kerry North, Kerry South,
Cork South - West, Cork South - Central (2), Cork-
East (2), Cork North - Central (2), Cork North -
West
West 7/17 Galway West (2), Galway East (2), Roscommon -
South Leitrim, Mayo (2)
tion, Eq. (A-2), as the basis of this analysis.
As with several of the other countries included in this analysis, unfortunately,
income data are not available at the district level of analysis. Data on the age struc-
ture of each district, however, are available for each district through Eurostat, and
can be usefully combined with regional information about the geographic distribu-
tion of poverty from the LIS data-set:3 The LIS data provide the respondents’ region
of residence (Brussels, Flemish Region and Walloon Region), as well as their age.
To estimate the number of seats a low-income voting bloc could secure, first, using
LIS data, I calculate the regional proportion of low-income citizens in several age
categories that correspond to Eurostat age categories. Then, I use these propor-
tions to estimate the number of low-income citizens, given their age distribution, for
each district. This strategy has the important advantage of reflecting within-region
3In this case, Eurostat unemployment data yield within-region proportions of low-income citizens
that are quite different from BI’S estimates of regional proportions. The Eurostat age data, used
here instead of unemployment rates, yield within-region estimates that are much closer to the LIS
regional estimates.
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district-level variation in the composition of the districts. Table 5.13 reports the
number of seats in each region that could be elected by a low-income voting bloc.
Table 5.13: Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Belgium
Region Number of Seats Province
Brussels-Capital Region 5/22 Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde










Finland. Legislative seats in Finland are allocated in way that is similar to the Belgian
allocation of seats: 200 seats are allocated in 15 multi-member districts that range in
the number of seats allocated from one in Aland, to 34 in Uusimaa, according to the
d’Hondt formula (the modified Droop quota, described above, is used here instead).
With a few exceptions, the boundaries of the electoral districts correspond to the
boundaries of Finland’s 20 administrative districts.4 Because the LIS data identify
the administrative district of each household, the geographic distribution of income
can be estimated directly from the LIS data; no supplementary data are needed.
Table 5.14 reports the number of seats in each district, with districts grouped by
province, that could be elected by a low-income voting bloc.
Luxembourg. Elections to Luxembourg’s 60-seats legislature are contested in four
multi-member districts that range in magnitude from 7 to 23 seats. Seats are allocated
according to the Droop quota (see Eq. 5.2).
4The city of Helsinki comprises a district in itself, and several electoral districts combine two or
three administrative districts.
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Table 5.14: Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Finland
Province Number of Seats District














Aland 0/1 Aland Islands
The LIS data, however, provide no geographic information about the location
of the Luxembourg respondents. To estimate the geographic distribution of income,
therefore, I use a strategy similar to that implemented in the analysis of Belgium:
Using the relationship between age (of household heads) and low-income status, and
data on the age structure within each Luxembourg canton (which combine to form
the electoral districts Statec 2003), I estimate the proportion of low-income voters for
each district. Then, using the Hagenbach-Bischoff seat allocation rule, I estimate the
number of seats a low-income voting bloc could secure in Luxembourg’s Chamber of
Deputies. Table 5.15 reports the regional distribution of these seats.
Table 5.15: Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Luxembourg






Norway. Legislative elections in Norway are contested in 19 multi-member districts,
that range in the number of seats elected from 4 (in Aust-Agder) to 17 (in Oslo).
The electoral districts correspond to the Norwegian counties; the numbers of seats
in each district reflect both the distribution of the population and the geographic
size of each county, with the result that voters in rural areas are over-represented in
the Storting. Following elections, seats are allocated first according to the modified
Sainte-Lague method, which uses a slightly different quota from the more common
d’Hondt allocation rule used in several of the other systems included in this analysis
(the d’Hondt denominator in the expression for Apt , Eq. 5.1, is replaced by the
series 1.4, 3, 5, .., (2spt−1 − 1)). Then, an additional “leveling” seat is allocated within
each district to the party whose seat share is less than its vote share (provided that
the party meets the nation 4% threshold). The number of seats elected in each
district varies slightly across elections; the analysis presented here reflects the 2001
distribution of seats.
The LIS data do not report the Norwegian respondents’ region of residence.
Therefore, to estimate the distribution of poverty, I use the national relationship
between low-income status, age (whether the respondent is 25-39 years of age, or
aged 40-54), and labor market activity (whether the head of household is employed,
unemployed or receiving a pension), in combination with similarly-coded data on the
county-level relationship between age and labor market activity (Statistics Norway
2001). Table 5.16 reports the results of this analysis, with the distribution of seats
secured by a low-income voting bloc listed by district.
Spain. Spain’s 52 provinces serve as the multi-member districts for the Congress of
Deputies. Although a PR allocation rule was used, seats are allocated (according
to the d’Hondt “highest average” formula, though the approximate Droop quota,
Eq.A-2, is used in this analysis) such that each province has at least two seats (plus
one seat for each of Spain’s autonomous cities, Ceuta and Melilla); the distribution of
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Table 5.16: Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Norway





Sogn and Fjordane 2/5
Vest-Agder 2/5













the remaining 248 seats reflects the distribution of the population. As a consequence,
most districts elect fewer than eight seats, while the districts that include Barcelona
and Madrid elect 31 and 35 legislators, respectively.
LIS data identify the (NUTS 1, groups of autonomous communities) region
of each respondent household, but not the province in which they reside. Regions
include between one (Madrid) and 16 (Castile and Léon) provinces. Fortunately,
Spain’s Instituto Nacional de Estad́ıstica reports data on the structure of the labor
force (by industrial sector and rates of unemployment) within each province (for the
first quarter of 2000 Instituto Nacional de Estad́ıstica N.d.). Using LIS data on the
economic activity and industrial sector of each working-aged head of household, in
combination with income data for each household, I have calculated the proportion
of low-income households in each labor force group (agricultural, industrial, service,
construction and unemployed works), for each region. Then, using these regional
proportions, I estimate the proportion of low-income households in each labor force
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category for each province. Finally, Table 5.17 reports the number of seats that would
be allocated to a low-income voting bloc in each region.
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Region of Murcia 4/10 Murcia
Ceuta and Melilla 1/2 Ceuta and Melilla




















Valencian Community 3/12 Alicante
1/5 Castellán de la Plana
4/16 Valencia
Balearic Islands 2/8 Balearic Islands







La Rioja 1/4 La Rioja






Madrid (7) 7/35 Madrid
Canary Islands (7) Las Palmas 4/8 Las Palmas
Santa Cruz de Tenerife 3/7 Santa Cruz de Tenerife
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Switzerland. Seats in Switzerland’s National Council are contested in the 26 districts
(corresponding to the cantons and half-cantons), each electing between 1 (in 6 can-
tons) and 34 legislators (in Zurich). Ballots are cast in complex ways, as voters can
cast votes for candidates across party lists, or cast multiple votes for their most pre-
ferred candidates. Seats are allocated according to the Hagenbach-Bischoff highest
avergage rule.5
LIS data report only the region of each respondent’s residence, not the canton,
and so a strategy similar to that used in several other cases included in this analysis
is used here, as well: Swiss Statistics reports the distribution of workers over three
economic sectors (primary, secondary and tertiary), as well as the unemployment
rate, for each canton, in the on-line Regional Portraits(Swiss Statistics 2004). Using
the LIS data, the proportion of low-income households is calculated for each of these
categories (using the head of household’s economic activity). Finally, using these
regional proportions in combination with the Swiss Statistics data on the composition
of the labor force within each canton, I estimate the proportion of low-income citizens
in each canton. Table 5.18 reports the results of this analysis.
5Although there are differences in practice, particularly in small electorates, here the Hagenbach-
Bischoff allocation that is functionally equivalent to the Droop quota.
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Lake Geneva region (13) 3/7 Valais
4/11 Geneva
6/18 Vaud
Zürich (8) 8/34 Zürich
Northwest Switzerland (7) 2/7 Basel-Land
4/15 Aargau
1/5 Basel-Stadt
Tessin (4) 4/8 Ticino
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(C) Multi-Tier Systems
Austria. Legislative seats in Austria’s National Council are allocated in three steps,
or across three tiers: Voters cast ballots for candidates contesting seats allocated
within 43 local electoral districts, or regionalwahlkreise, and for candidates competing
for election within the Austrian states (landeswahlkreise). Allocations within the
states are compensatory: Seats won within districts are subtracted from state-level
allocations. A final allocation of seats occurs at the national level, and taking into
account all valid votes, and allocates any remaining seats to parties that have secured
at least one lower-tier seat or four percent of the national vote share.
To identify the strength of a low-income voting bloc in this complex system,
I replicate these three stages of seat allocations, using LIS and data published in
the “Statishisches Jahrbuch” (Statistik Austria 2008). LIS data report each respon-
dent’s region of residence. Statistik Austria reports the composition of the labor force
(specifically, the number of workers in the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors, and
the number of registered unemployed workers, in 2001 and 2002, respectively) for each
of the 35 NUTS 3 regions, which correspond to groups of Bezirks, Austria’s traditional
“districts” and independent cities. Then, using the regional relationship between la-
bor force group and low-income status, observed in the LIS data, in combination
with the Statistik Austria labor force composition data, I estimate the proportion of
low-income citizens in each electoral district. The results of the seat allocations made
using these data are reported in Table 5.19.
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Öostösterrich (25) Burgenland 1/3 Burdenland Süd
1/4 Burdenland Nord







Wien 1/3 Wien Innen-Ost






Westöstereich (23) Obersterreich 3/6 Müviertel
3/6 Traunviertel
3/7 Linz und Umebung
2/5 Innviertel
3/8 Hausruckviertel








Vorarlberg 1/4 Vorarlberg Nord
1/4 Vorarlberg Süd













Denmark. Legislative seats in Denmark’s Folketing are allocated in two tiers, first
according to the Saint-Laguë highest average allocation rule in 17 multi-member
districts (corresponding to Denmark’s counties), and second, in a compensatory allo-
cation, according to the Danish highest average formula.6 As a consequence of this
two-tiered allocation, Danish seat allocations are highly proportional, with party seat
shares closely matching their national vote shares.
To estimate the electoral power of a low-income voting bloc, LIS data can be
used directly: The county of residence is reported for each respondent.7 Table 5.20
reports the results of this analysis.
6This formula is similar to the d’Hondt formula, but like the Saint-Laguë formula, uses a different
series of divisors.
7Although the cities of Copehgan and Frederiksberg together form three electoral districts, they
jointly form one LIS category.
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Table 5.20: Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Denmark
Region
(Seats in Region)
Seats in County County






5/13 North Jutland County
Øerne (15) 4/14 Copenhagen County
2/9 Frederiksborg County
1/5 Roskilde County




Copenhagen and Frederiksberg (6) 2/4 Southern District
2/6 Eastern District
2/4 Western District
Sweden. Elections to the Riksdag are contested in 29 MMDs (valkrestar ), with 39
seats allocated in a second nation-wide tier to ensure the proportionality of the result,
for those parties securing at least four percent of votes cast, or 12 percent of the votes
cast in any constituency. A modified Sainte-Lägue highest average allocation rule is
used for the allocation of seats in both tiers. Following the convention established
above, a Droop quota is used in the allocation of first-tier seats in this analysis. (Seats
allocated in the second tier are excluded from this analysis to avoid assumptions about
the distribution of support for other parties.)
Although LIS data do not report the electoral districts in which each Swedish
respondent lives, LIS does report each respondent’s county. With two exceptions,
the boundaries of the 22 counties largely coincide with the boundaries of Sweden’s
electoral districts: The Sk̊ane county contains four electoral districts, and Västra
Göalands county is comprised of five electoral districts. Here, the county proportions
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of low-income citizens are used for each of the composite districts. The results of this
analysis are reported in Table 5.21.
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Table 5.21: Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Sweden
Region (Seats in Region) Seats District
Middle Norrland (8/16) 3/5 Jämtlands County
5/11 Västernorrlands County
North Middle Sweden (16/35) 6/13 Dalarna County
5/11 Värmlands County
5/11 Gävleborg County
Upper Norrland (9/20) 5/11 Västerbotten County
4/9 Norrbotten County





South Sweden (20/48) 6/13 Skäne County South
2/5 Blekinge County
4/10 Malmö
4/10 Skäne County West
4/10 Skäne County North-East




West Sweden (28/70) 5/11 West Gotalands County North
5/11 West Gotalands County East
3/7 West Gotalands County South
7/18 Gothenburg City
5/13 West Gotalands County West
3/10 Hallands County




(A) Simple Plurality – MMD
The electoral systems of Germany and Italy are described in the text of Chapter 4.
Here, the discussion focuses on the estimation of the number of seats a low-income
voting bloc could win in each case.
Note, first, that while LIS data report geographic regions for each respondent,
these regions do not correspond to the primary electoral districts in either country.
These regions roughly correspond to the primary districts in pre-reform Italy and
the secondary districts in post-reform Italy, and they correspond perfectly to the sec-
ondary districts in Germany. To use the observed data to estimate the proportion
of low-income citizens in each district (Ld for d = 1, ...D) with a region, let Lr de-
notes the (observed) regional proportion of low-income voters. Then, the relationship
between L and Ld may be expressed in the following way,
Ld = Lr + ud. (A-1)
Here, ud describes within-region cross-district variation. Suppose ud is well-approximated
by a normal distribution ud ∼ N(0, σ2u), for the bounded interval [0, 1]. Then, given
knowledge of σ2u, the proportion of low-income citizens in any district d can be esti-
mated using a the normal probability density function. Specifically, we can estimate
Ld and σ
2
u, the probability, p, that the proportion of low-income citizens in any district
d in the region, is greater than the electoral threshold τ . If σ2u is known, this is eas-
ily accomplished using the cumulative normal distribution function for the truncated
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distribution of τ (i.e., 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1):8










When Lr is not observed directly, but is estimated from LIS data, there is an
additional sampling variance component, ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε ), in the expression for Ld:
L̂d = Lr + ud + ε (A-3)
Note that because ud and ε are uncorrelated, the residual component, ud + ε, is
distributed N(0, σ2u+σ
2
ε ). Thus, the quantity of interest, p, can be estimated according
to the following expression:
















In this analysis, L̂r is estimated directly from the LIS data, and τ is the specified





The first component of Eq.(A-1) σ2ε , the variance of the proportion of low-
income citizens living in the region, is estimated according to the usual expression for





where nr denotes the number of respondents residing in the region (
∑
r nr = N).
The second component of Eq. (A-5), σ2u, the within-region cross-district vari-
ance, however, cannot be estimated directly using the LIS data: Data reporting
8In practice, the denominator of Eq. (A-2) is almost always equal to one.
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each respondent’s electoral district are not available. Instead, using unemployment
data, which are reported at levels of aggregation that generally approximate both
the regional level at which the LIS data are reported and the electoral districts in
both Germany and Italy(Eurostat 2008b).9 Thus, an estimate of the ratio of the
within-region cross-district variance in unemployment, to the cross-region variance in




Here, ρ reports the ratio of the within-region cross-district variance in unemploy-
ment to the cross-region variance in unemployment, and σ2u reports the cross-district
variance in L, or the proportion of low-income citizens. Thus, with estimates of the
proportion of low-income citizens residing in each region, and the within-region cross-
district variance in this proportion, the number of seats allocated to a low-income
voting bloc can be estimated in a straightforward way.
Germany. Let sSr and s
M
r report the total numbers of SMD and MMD seats to be
allocated in region (Land) r = 1..R. Then, using the procedure described above, let
p̂r denote the probability that the proportion of low-income citizens in each district
in region r exceeds the electoral threshold τ . The number of SMD seats won by a
low-income voting bloc in region r, SSr , can be approximated for each region by a
binomial function, in which the probability of a low-income voting bloc electing k
9The unemployment data are reported for the NUTS 1, 2 and 3 administrative units. In Germany,
NUTS 1 units correspond to the Länder, and NUTS 3 units generally correspond to the electoral
districts, although there are some electoral districts that intersect with several NUTS 3 units (there
are 439 NUTS 3 units, and 328 SMDs in the post-reform period). Matching the NUTS 3 units
with the electoral districts was done using spatial information provided by EUROSTAT and the
Federal Returning Officer. This allowed weighted estimate of unemployment to be calculated for
each district, with weights corresponding to the relative geographic areas of the component NUTS
3 units.
In Italy, the NUTS 3 units are slightly larger than the post-reform SMDs (there are 475 SMDs,
and 110 NUTS 3 units). As a result, and because the spatial data are not available for the Italian
SMDs, district-to-region ratios were calculated using NUTS 3-level unemployment data instead of
SMD level data.
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seats within region r is approximated by the following expression:






 pkr(1 − pr)dr−k (A-8)
The electoral strength of a low-income voting bloc can then be estimated as the
expectation of a binomial distribution with parameters pr and dr:
E(SSr ) = pr · dr. (A-9)
Under Germany’s Neiymeyer allocation rule, the total number of MMD seats
SMr to be allocated to a low-income voting bloc in each region can be calculated
according to the following expression:
SMr ≤ Lr ·
nr
N









r reports the total number of seats in the legislature. Finally,
the number of direct mandates (SSr ) is subtracted from the MMD allocation (S
M
r ),
yielding the number of list seats mandates allocated to a low-income voting bloc in
region r. Table 4.4 reports the results of this analysis.
Italy. SMD district seats are allocated using the same strategy as that which was
used in the analysis of Germany. The allocation rule for MMD seats, however, is
considerably less complex than the German allocation: In Italy, MMD seats are
allocated according to a simple quota, with the denominator in Eq. (5.2) equal to the
number of seats to be allocated.10 The results of this analysis are reported in Table
4.3.
10As noted in Chapter 4, there is also a scoporo , or vote-share penalty for winning applied to
parties winning SMD seats: A winning party’s vote share is adjusted by the vote share won by the
second-place party prior to the PR allocation. Here, to avoid assumptions about the number of




How do electoral rules affect the poor? Under what conditions are legislators likely
to be more or less responsive to the poor? What are the distributional consequences
of electoral incentives to be more or less responsive to the poor?
This research makes an important departure from current explanations of
cross-national differences in social policy by recognizing that antipoverty measures
are especially well-suited for manipulation by re-election-motivated legislators: An-
tipoverty measures are highly targeted policies that are readily perceived by the
beneficiaries and can be directly attributed to incumbent legislators. As Chapter
2 demonstrates in a series of formal-analytic examples, the geographic distribution
of income groups exerts an important modifying effect on the relationship between
electoral rules and redistributive policy – a effect ignored by other analysts of this
relationship. By incorporating electoral geography, this research challenges the con-
ventional wisdom and asserts that, when poverty is highly concentrated, the electoral
incentives created by SMD electoral rules favor more redistributive policy, and more
generous targeted provisions for low-income households, than do the electoral incen-
tives created by MMD rules.
To demonstrate the plausibility of this election-motivated account of antipoverty
policy, I take full advantage of two “natural experiments” in the relationship between
electoral rules and social policy: First, Italy’s electoral reform in the early 1990s re-
placed MMD rules with a system in which most seats were elected in SMDs, strength-
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ening legislators’ incentives to be responsive to the poor. Second, the dramatic change
in Germany’s electoral geography following re-unification also strengthened legisla-
tors’ incentives to be responsive to low-income voters. Directly following these ex-
ogenous changes in legislators’ electoral incentives, the effectiveness and generosity
of antipoverty benefits increased substantially in both countries, providing important
empirical support for an election-motivated account of antipoverty policy.
Support for the core intuition of this research – that legislators provide an-
tipoverty support in proportion to their need for the electoral support of low-income
citizens – is also evident in the a broadly comparative analysis, presented in Chapter
5. Here, I establish the general positive relationship between the electoral power of
a low-income voting bloc (i.e., the number of seats elected by low-income citizens,
if they all turn out to vote, and all vote for the same party), and levels of targeted
poverty relief.
As Chapter 1 suggests, that the empirical evidence is consistent with an
election-motivated account of antipoverty policy is both surprising and a cause for
concern. The substantive implications of the analysis presented here are surprising
because of apparent general commitment to political equality in contemporary demo-
cratic societies. The results of this research are, more importantly, a cause of concern
because they imply that the institutions that provide the democratic legitimacy of
our governments also undermine opportunities for democratic equality.
6.1 Opportunities for Future Research
This discussion presents research that will serve as a foundation for a research agenda
motivated by questions about how electoral institutions affect the quality of demo-
cratic representation and policy responsiveness, especially for low-income citizens. In
this last section of this discussion, I outline opportunities for future research that
build on the analysis presented in this discussion.
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Electoral Politics and the Composition of Antipoverty Policy
In developing a measure poverty relief, Chapter 3 draws attention to two impor-
tant features of antipoverty policy: First, in addition to the levels of poverty relief
provided, eligibility criteria for antipoverty benefits differ cross-nationally, and low-
income households receive varying levels of support from minimum-income, social
insurance, and other types of income assistance. It was suggested then that the com-
position of antipoverty policy reflects legislators’ incentives to “use all policy tools,
in proportion to their effectiveness in satisfying their electoral goals” (Franzese &
Jusko 2006, 550). What determines the electoral effectiveness of minimum income
assistance provisions, for example? Why might legislators privilege (contributory, and
thus exclusionary) social insurance policies over other policy instruments?
Chapter 3 also draws attention to the very targeted nature of antipoverty poli-
cies in some countries: Levels of income support for low-income working-age house-
holds are not necessarily related to overall levels of social spending in each country.
Although Ireland and the U.S., for example, spend similar proportions of their GDP
on social policy, Ireland spends considerably more than the U.S. on family benefits,
while Americans devote larger proportions of their social spending to support for the
elderly (Organisation For Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) 2004).1
Because this analysis is restricted to working-age households, the poverty relief ratio,
R, likely under-represents the antipoverty efforts of countries, like the U.S., that focus
support on non-working-age households. This, of course, raises an important ques-
tion: What explains cross-national differences in the focus of antipoverty measures?
1It is not the case, however, that the U.S. generally spends more than other countries included in
this analysis on support for the elderly: In 2000, the 30 OECD countries spent an average proportion
of 7.4 percent of GDP on old age support programs; the U.S. spends an amount equivalent to 5.2
percent of its GDP, and Ireland spends 2.6 percent of its GDP on income support for the elderly. In
the U.S., this represents almost half of social spending, while in Ireland, this proportion is slightly
more than one-fifth of social spending. A similar analysis of spending on family benefits shows an
OECD average of 1.9 percent of GDP, 1.6 percent of Ireland’s GDP and 0.4 percent of GDP in the
U.S. devoted to family benefits.
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Does the focus of antipoverty measures reflect legislators’ incentives, too, or is it here
that beliefs about the nature of poverty become especially important?
Using the analysis presented in Chapter 3 as a platform, future research will
investigate the composition and focus of antipoverty policy, with an emphasis on the
political representation of different low-income constituencies.
The Partisan Representation of the Poor
The analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5 rely on the idea of a low-income voting
bloc – that is, that all low-income voters turnout to vote, and they all vote for the
same party. To what extent does this occur? What explains the varying extent
to which, first, low-income citizens turnout to vote, and second, share a partisan
identity?
These questions, I think, are related to larger questions about the partisan
representation of the poor: What explains the varying electoral success of leftist par-
ties? Do parties mobilize low-income voters as their core constituency only when
electoral rules favor the representation of their interests (i.e. when a low-income vot-
ing bloc is likely to secure a large number of seats)? Notice that in its current form,
for example, the theoretical foundation of this research lacks an account of legislative
politics: Are antipoverty transfer rightly viewed in the same light as conventional
“pork-barrel” policies, that reflect the initiative of individual legislators? In fact,
while this is a useful way to think about the relationship between the geographic dis-
tribution of low-income citizens and the targeted provision of anti-poverty measures,
the implications of a pork-barrel politics model are less clear in MMD systems.
As Chapters 1 and 5 demonstrate, however the historical strength of leftist
parties – that is, the cumulative, historical presence of leftist parties in governing
coalitions – is positively (if weakly) related to current levels of poverty relief in each
country, and to other more conventional measures of social policy. This suggests that
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a model of legislative politics that emphasizes policy leadership and agenda-setting
may be most appropriate. As a consequence, understanding the varying electoral
success of leftist parties seems especially important. A second avenue of future re-
search, therefore, will draw on the historical distribution of income to investigate when
political parties mobilize a constituency of low-income voters. Within a broadly com-
parative framework that recognizes the important of electoral geography, this future
research will build on the analysis presented here to establish the relationship between
the partisan and political representation of the poor.
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